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PATTERNS OF FAMILY FORMATION
ABSTRACT
The aim of the thesis was to examine patterns of
family formation; to consider the ways families in one
developed country had been built up and the future fertility
changes that were anticipated. Interviews were conducted
with one hundred and five women, each of whom had just had
a second child, and the resulting accounts of their family
formation patterns were subjected to a qualitative and
quantitative analysis.
Timing to the first child seemed to stem from the
couple's view of marriage and the place of children within
it. Three constellations of ideas were noted. Firstly,
there were those couples (largely working class) who felt
children were the primary reason for marriage and, hence,
once married, it was best to begin the family as quickly
as possible. Secondly, there were those couples (largely
middle class) who, though they felt children were essential
to a marriage, felt it was more important for newly-married
couples to establish themselves financially. These couples
tended to wait two or three years before beginning their
families. Thirdly, there were those couples who felt
children added to a marriage but that they must "fit in"
with other arrangements the husband and wife had. These
couples were not characteristically middle or working class
and, in most cases, it was the woman's age which prompted
them to have their first child.
Timing to the second child seemed to be influenced
mainly by the desire for a specific interval of time
between children and there appeared to be two competing
considerations in this regard. On the one hand, it was
important to have children close so that they could be
playmates and, on the other hand, it was important to have
some space between them so that each child could get its
share of attention. Most women appeared to be trying to
balance these two considerations.
With regard to future fertility intentions, most
couples in our sample wanted and were planning on having
only the two children. Most had always wanted a small
family and could see few reasons to continue with child-
bearing, Those couples who were planning (or undecided
about) additional children tended to be desirous of a mixed-
sex family and/or positively oriented towards larger families.
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PA.RT 1 INTRODUCTION
CHA PTER ONE THE PROBLEM
1.1 Introduction to the Problem
The question of the number of children they
will have is a vital, complex, deeply
involving one for ... couples.
Rainwater, 1965: 15
If Rainwater's statement on the centrality of family
size decisions for couples was true in 1965, it is even
truer today. With the increase in reliable contraceptive
techniques and the greater emphasis placed upon rewarding
alternatives to parenthood, "having children" has increa¬
singly become a problematic issue for women and men.
In this study we intend to explore the reproductive
decisions of a small sample of Canadian couples. Our
primary task will be to examine the couples' patterns of
»
family formation — that is, to explore why they have
the families they have and why they want the families
they are planning to have.
The topic of differential fertility is not without
a long history. However, three decades of surveys in
Britain and the United States have outlined only the
gross social parameters of differences in family size.
In a "rapid historical summary" of the development of
the socioeconomic theory of differential Gold¬
berg (1975) points out the narrow range of research
results, particularly sociological research results^.
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He argues that before sociologists had access to much
fertility data, they developed a set of hypotheses to
account for fertility trends within and differences
between countries. However, in the late fifties and
early sixties when they gained access to a surfeit of
American data they found that the variable sets, with
their large correlation matrices, accounted for very
little of the variation in fertility. The sociologists
retreated from their theoretical objectives and the
economists, treating babies as consumer durables and
fertility as an income-price function, moved in. Gold¬
berg goes on to suggest that, until today, it has been
these economists who have provided the theoretical excit¬
ement and elegance in fertility theory; the sociologists'
2
contribution has been slight .
Goldberg chastises the sociologist-demographer for
allowing this to happen. As he points out (1975: 90),
economists emphasise the direct effects of independent
variables, with intervening variables treated essentially
as standardising measures. Thus economists have a select
list of variables of primary importance — say, income,
child quality and opportunity costs — and all other
factors are at best standardised and at worst ignored.
For sociologists, this is not good enough. Finding a
gross relationship between independent and dependent
variables simply specifies the questions that need to be
asked. It is the intervening variables that are of
primary importance because it is these intervening vari-
2
ables which will "flesh out" the undefined space between
independent and dependent variables. Goldberg concludes
his article with the following strong plea:
We (referring to sociologist-demographers) have the
responsibility to provide intelligent inputs and
in many respects we have failed to do so. Our
failure on this count derives from some ridiculous
faddism within disciplines and irresponsibilities
in data collection and analysis. We offer a very
narrow range of research results. The base of
that research should be broadened immensely. ...
Certainly, if the sociologist-demographers don't
wake up they will find their "baby" kidnapped by
the economists who may be smarter but who, for¬
tunately or unfortunately, live in a small world.
Goldberg, 1975: 102-103
It was with this criticism of the existing literature
uppermost in our mind that we undertook this study. We
felt there was a need for a "sociological" dimension in
explanations of fertility behavior. Too many surveys
and studies of differential fertility had limited their
analyses to economic influences. This is not to imply
that these economic influences will be ignored in our
thesis — only that they will be but one component in
our theoretical (and explanatory) framework. Our inten¬
tion is to provide an explanation of patterns of family
formation that includes both economic and sociological
influences.
1.2 Theoretical Background to the Problem
In an historical review of fertility literature,
two different emphases in accounts of "why people have
the number of children they do, when they do" can be
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traced. First of all, there are those (who by and large
have been trained in economics) who stress "economic or
utilitarian" factors. They argue that fertility behavior
is primarily a result of "household choices" — couples
choose a family size which "maximizes overall ''utility" ,
subject to the constraints of resources and prices"
(Namboodiri and Pope, 1968: l). Alternatively, there
are those (and these tend to have had their training in
sociology) who stress "sociological" factors. Advocates
of this emphasis may focus upon the institutional mechan¬
isms in society and the "intermediate" variables that
link these variables to fertility (see, for instance,
Davis and Blake, 1956), or, they may stress the normative
constraints on fertility decisions — "the fertility of
any social collectivity tends to correspond with a level
prescribed by the social norms" (Freedman, 1961-62: 4l).
They may, alternatively, use an interactional frame of
reference and see the dynamics of the nucleur family as
influencing fertility behavior (see, for instance, Hill,
O
Stycos and Back, 1959) • In more recent fertility lit¬
erature, "integrations" of these two approaches can be
found. Using an economic model as the framework, modi¬
fications are made taking into account sociological factors.
It is a version of an integrative model that we intend
using in this thesis, however, before outlining this
model, we shall survey the fertility literature.
Because so much of the recent fertility literature
has been concerned with economic factors, we shall begin
our survey with this emphasis. The survey must surely
k
begin with Gary S. Becker's now classic i960 article
"An Economic Analysis of Fertility". Although there had
been previous attempts to apply economic reasoning to the
population area (see, for example, Harvey Leibenstein,
1957* Bernard Okun, 1958; S. H. Cootz, 1957 and before
them Maithus, 1798, 1803, 1817, 1827), it is Becker's
k
article which is most frequently quoted .
Becker applied the economic theory of household
behavior to fertility behavior. He treated the demand
of parents for children as analogous to the demand for
other consumer durables. Parents were seen as consumers
with given tastes trying to maximise their utility subject
to the constraints of income and prices. Becker saw the
demand for children as both a "quantity" demand and a
"quality" demand, the "quality" of children being some
function of how much parents actually spent on them.
Following the economic theory, Becker concluded that
increases in income would be positively related to both
"quantity" and "quality" of children demanded. He noted,
however, that there was a difference in the income elas¬
ticities of each of these demands — that for quantity
being quite low and that for quality being quite high.
Becker proceeded to test one important implication
of his theory, namely that the number of children desired
would be directly related to income. His data were con¬
tradictory. However, he concluded that if the observable
data did not seem to support the theory — that is, if
fertility appeared to be negatively related to income —
it was because relevant variables other than income were
5
intervening. Becker suggested that among the more impor¬
tant of these other variables were the differential
growth of contraceptive knowledge between social classes,
the decline in child mortality and the secular rise in
the cost of children.
The critics were quick to take issue with Becker's
model. Duesenberry (i960: 231 - 23^+) criticised it for
not assigning sufficient weight to sociological factors
such as education and occupation — factors he saw con¬
stituting formidable constraints in determining individual
preferences for children. Spengler^ argued (1966: 120 -
122) that reproductive behavior was likely not as amenable
to rational rules as most economic behavior and, there¬
fore, more likely subject to the influence of hidden
values. Becker's strongest critic, though, was Judith
Blake. In a series of articles (1965, 19^7, 1968, 1969),
Blake adamantly rejected any application of an economic
theory to fertility behavior. We shall outline Blake's
criticisms in some detail^, as they represent most clearly
7
the "sociological" emphasis that was mentioned above.
Blake's major complaint with Becker's model was its
neglect of the social context of reproduction.
Rather than simply trying to take economic factors
into account in explaining family-size preferences,
he (Becker) has chosen to propound a solely economic
analysis of fertility desires. In doing so he has
ignored, or specifically attempted to invalidate,




Blake's objections were organised around four features
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Becker's analysis: the analogy of children with con¬
sumer durables; the concentration on the "consuming"
as against the "producing" role of parents; the mis¬
apprehension of child costs; and the failure to analyse
the utilities involved in having children. We shall
consider each in turn.
Relevance of the Consumer Durables Analogy
The first criticism Blake had of Becker's model was
its treatment of children as consumer durables. Four
reasons were put forth for this criticism, the first of
which was that while the acquisition by the consumer of
such consumer durables as cars, houses, etc. is limited
by actual financial capabilities (cash or credit rating),
the acquisition of children is not:
The "consumption" of a family by individuals who
cannot "afford" one is regarded quite differently
from their decision to purchase a consumer durable
that they cannot afford. In fact, the right to
have a family is widely extended to individuals
who are impaired physically and mentally, as well
as financially.
Blake, 1968: 16
The second point Blake made against an analogy of
children with other consumer durables was that parents,
in their consumption of children, can not engage in
dynamic reshufflings of their consumption behavior in
order to maximise their well-being. Consumers of children,
as opposed to consumers of other goods, do not have the
flexibility to optimise their equilibrium positions by
adjusting their consumption.
Such an assumption of freedom to change the items
one consumes — an assumption that underlies the
7
economic theory of demand for consumer durables —
is sociologically absurd when applied to children.
At best, parents can only anticipate, not re-arrange,
their equilibrium position with respect to off¬
spring. ... If the parents miscalculate and find
that the marginal utility they actually derive from
an additional child is less than they would have
had from an expenditure on something else,, they
cannot, normally, adjust the situation.
Blake, 1968: 16
Blake's third criticism against treating children
as consumer durables was that the acquisition of children
of a particular quality or type can not be controlled by
the parent. In contrast, the consumer of other durables
is able to choose among visible products whose qualities
can be ascertained.
The final objection Blake had against treating
children as consumer durables was that parents are not
free to use (or abuse) their children as they like.
Parents do not "own" children, and, as guardians,
they are legally required to keep them in minimum
repair, not to abuse them physically or mentally,
or, through negligence, allow them to be victimized
by accidental violence and the like.
Blake, 1968: 17
Parents as Producers of Children
The second criticism Blake had with Becker's model
was its failure to deal adequately with the influence
of factors to which parents, as producers of children,
give importance in deciding how many children they want
to have. Because parents are "producers" as well as
"consumers" of children, their desire for offspring will
be influenced both by the production problems involved
in having a family as well as by the utilities they
expect to gain.
8
Blake acknowledges that Becker recognises the pro¬
ductive role of parents, but argues that he treats it
entirely as part of the costs parents pay for the utility
they expect to gain. Blake claims, however, that there
are elements that cannot be subsumed under the heading
"cost of production".
There are, however, elements in the productive
process — particularly relating to the structure
of the productive unit and its articulation with
the society at large — that cannot fruitfully
be subsumed under the category of costs,
Blake, 1968: 17
For example, Blake presents the problem of producing an
adequately socialized child. Adults by themselves cannot
do this job; the interaction of children with one another
is required. Of course, this interaction can be achieved
in a number of ways — siblings are not necessarily re¬
quired. However, Blake argues that the isolation and
geographical mobility of the nuclear, modern family makes
the substitution of non-siblings for siblings difficult.
"Hence, in facing up to the problem of providing adequate
socialization, parents are typically motivated to avoid
the "only child" type of unit" (Blake, 1968: 18).
In sum, Blake's second criticism of Becker's model
is that it ignores the influence the productive role of
parents has on family size desires. Furthermore, the
influence is such that it is unlikely to produce a positive
relation between family size desires and income under
any and all conditions.
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Misapprehension of Child Costs
The third criticism Blake had with Becker's model
was that by concentrating on direct costs of children
(resources actually spent on childbearing and rearing),
it ignored indirect costs (alternative utilities on which
parents could spend their resources). Moreover, with
respect to direct costs, Becker failed to recognise, or
denied the importance of, factors which made these costs
heavier for wealthier parents.
Blake argues that Becker overlooks two important
points in his consideration of direct costs. First,
parents are not reasonably able to separate the standard
of living of their children from their own. Because
they all live in the same house, eat the same food, etc.,
it would be impossible for parents to do other than
provide their children with a standard of living similar
to their own. Second, the way of life at a given social
level influences the standards of child quality that are
acceptable. The way of life of the poor leads them to
accept lower standards of child quality. The wealthier,
however, are under pressure to contribute to standards
in children that will both conserve present advantages
and provide additional ones.
Concern with child quality is intensified among the
more affluent by the social mobility — both upward
and downward — that is a persistent feature of
life in middle and upper income strata. ... It
is thus not uncommon for families in the wealthier
strata of modern societies to feel subjectively




Becker seems to argue that if richer couples decide to
spend more per child, they do so as a matter of voluntary
choice, vhereas Blake holds that expenditure per child
in any social class is not a decision variable but rather
a constraint (imposed in part by the respective reference
groups) on fertility decisions.
With respect to indirect costs, Blake argues that
Becker's model does not consider the alternative utilities
that enter into family size decisions. The argument is
that, in addition to monetary costs, the bearing and
rearing of children involves attention and time on the
part of parents. Furthermore, higher levels of social
status involve parents in interests and activities which
are incompatible with large families.
. . ., the way of life of upper-income groups is
more competitive with children for time, effort
and finances than is the life-style of those in
lower-income brackets. The former tend to be
more active in political, civic and community
affairs, ... more wholly committed to the demands
of work and of "running" things in general, ...
have more attractive and diversified consumption
opportunities than have"those of lesser income.
An upper-income person is normally under some
pressure to take advantage of these opportunities.
Blake, 1968: 21-22
The Utilities of Children
Blake's final criticism of Becker's model had to
do with two assumptions that were necessary to Becker's
thesis of quantity income elasticity, but which Blake
felt were incorrect.
The first assumption is that there is no family
size threshold below which couples (even poor couples)
11
will strongly resist falling. Blake argues that there
is a family size threshold which all wish to attain.
By exercising control over every step in the re¬
productive process, but principally by a ruthless
exclusion of structured alternatives to and substi¬
tutes for family satisfactions, and kinship affilia¬
tions ... societies channel motivation in the
direction of goals that imply the advent and exis¬
tence of children. One can become a "parent",
"have a family", be a "mother" or "father", only
by acquiring children. That one should desire
these statuses is the final result of complex insti¬
tutional control, but, given this desire, children
and only children can satisfy it. It is the socie¬
tal support for the family that provides the strong
desire for children that makes it highly unlikely
that poorer people will be willing either to remain
childless, or to curtail their family size to the
extent required for producing a direct relation
of family size and income.
Blake, 1968: 22-23
(Emphasis in original)
The second assumption is that there are no systematic
social class differences in the relative utilities of
children ("taste" for children) that limit the family
size desires of the well-to-do. Using the same reasoning
used to reject the first assumption, Blake argues that
one can expect variability in the relative impact of
familial goals on motivation, and thus structural dif¬
ferences in "tastes" for children. As was outlined in
the discussion on the indirect costs of children, the
upper classes seem to be under greater pressure from
non-familial demands than the lower classes, and hence
may find greater utility in small-to-moderate size
families.
Blake's criticisms of the economic model were in
time criticised themselves. We shall not consider these
g
criticisms here , as our main aim was to outline the
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broad contours of the two emphases we saw in the litera¬
ture. To repeat, there was the economic emphasis in
which having children was seen as similar to purchasing
consumer durables and, therefore, increases in income
were hypothesized as leading to more and "better" children.
Conversely, there was the sociological emphasis which
argued that economic factors could never solely explain
family size preferences because they ignored well-known
sociological factors which often worked in ways opposite
to the economic considerations.
At this stage Easterlin^ (1970) entered the debate
by suggesting an "integration" of the two approaches.
. . ., it became increasingly clear that economists
and sociologists engaged in demographic research
were largely talking past each other. Too often,
sociologists view "the economic theory of fertility
as simply an argument for the effect of income on
behavior. On the other hand, economists have sub¬
stantially ignored factors emphasized in sociology.
Easterlin, 1970s 127
Easterlin suggested that sociologists and economists
could fruitfully get together, the former making use of
the type of model that economists use to describe and
predict consumption, and the latter paying more attention
to "taste" variables in their models.
In Easterlin's model, fertility behavior was seen
as the result of household choices, in which resources
were weighted against preferences. Parents were seen
as consumers with given tastes trying to maximise utility
subject to the constraints of income and prices. Thus
the three factors income, tastes and prices were the
basic building blocks of the theory.
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With regard to income, Easterlin argued that income
at one point in time was not a valid representation of
the income concept relevant to household decisions.
Thus his model considered potential income flow through
time — a concept that took into account income potentials
represented by the earning capacity of the wife (and
other household members) and prospective changes in the
income stream over time.
In considering prices, Easterlin reformulated the
concept of "child cost" to take into account the "oppor¬
tunity" costs of the parents and other indirect costs
incurred in childbearing and rearing. Mincer (1963) had
empirically examined the role of opportunity costs and
concluded that the appropriate price to consider was the
opportunity cost of the wife — that is, her potential
earnings in the market place. Easterlin agreed with
Mincer's premiss that the time required for childbearing
and rearing was relevant to fertility decisions, but
questioned whether the potential earnings of the wife
were the best indicator. A working wife would not neces¬
sarily assess the cost of childcare in terms of the
earnings she had foregone, but, rather, in terms of the
cost of the relevant childcare services she was using.
Thus Easterlin's model calculated the opportunity costs
of the parents in ways other than a simple consideration
of the potential earnings of the wife.
With regard to tastes, Easterlin advocated that the
social determinants, and the non-static nature, of tastes
14
be explicitly recognised in the fertility model. He
conceived of tastes as a "preference field or map" which
embraced all possible combinations of goods. Attached
to each combination was a subjective evaluation of its
worth in terms of satisfaction to the household. Families
did not necessarily desire a single fixed amount of any
one good, rather they considered a variety of alternatives
ordered in terms of prospective satisfaction. Furthermore,
tastes were to be seen as relative (i.e. "more or less")
not absolute in nature. It thus followed that the strength
of a household's desire for any given good, in this case
children, had to be considered in the context of its
attitudes toward other goods competing with children for
the household's resources.
The most radical change Easterlin made to the more
traditional economic analyses of fertility had to do with
the subject of family limitation practices. He argued
that no population is completely ignorant of birth con¬
trol techniques. Abstinence is universally known and
populations such as those of Western Europe had managed
to reduce their fertility long before modern contraceptives
became known and available. Thus it was not satisfactory
simply to say that variations in birth control knowledge
and techniques led to differences in fertility over and
above those due to consumer choice. What Easterlin
proposed was to apply the theory of consumer choice to
decisions regarding fertility control as well as desired
family size. For this purpose, a new good, coition, was
introduced into the model and subjected to the same
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treatment as other goods. Coition which might have
resulted in an unwanted pregnancy was distinguished from
coition which would not, and different utilities and
costs were attached to each type.
Lastly, Easterlin reemphasised the need to view the
demand for children as a "joint" demand — "joint" in
the-sense that it involved children, coition and other
competing goods. He summed up his model as follows:
At any given time, a household (or a couple con¬
templating union) has, on the one hand, a structure
of preferences relating to goods, children, leisure,
and fertility control practices, shaped largely by
prior experience. The household has also certain
income potentials, taking account of the earning
possibilities of husband, wife, and other family
members as well as any non-labor income. There
are, in addition, various price constraints, such
as the prices of child care and of various fertility
control methods relative to those of goods in gen¬
eral, Out of the balancing of preferences and con¬
straints, decisions are reached on marriage, ferti¬
lity control practices, fertility, wife's labour
force participation, and perhaps even husband's
hours of work. In the course of the reproductive
years preferences are modified by ongoing exper¬
ience, and income potentials, prices, and available
fertility control methods may change with consequent
appropriate changes in these decisions. The ferti¬
lity record of a given household reflects this
balancing of preferences against constraints over
the course of the full reproductive age span,
Easterlin, 1970: 138
By providing a sociological dimension to a basically
economic model, Easterlin had begun to get sociologists
and economists "talking to one another". His model was
used by numerous researchers; Hawthorn, for example,
used the model in his 1970 book The Sociology of Fertility.
However, there were still sociological criticisms that
had not been entirely met and further criticisms that had
developed as the model was used. It was at this point
16
that Nainboodiri published his economic framework for
fertility analysis (1972a). This framework had evolved
from considerations and criticisms of previous economic
frameworks, and in many ways, we think, furthered the
10
"integration" of the economic and sociological -approaches
The guiding principles underlying Namboodiri's model
were (l) fertility decisions are joint decisions of the
husband and wife, and (2) fertility decisions are sequen¬
tial decisions, each decision being to have or not to
have another child at a given time. Thus, in the model
of fertility behavior, the husband and wife are initially
considered separately and then their joint decision
process is considered. Further, the dependent variable
is not family size but, rather, a sequential decision
in which each step deals with the addition of a(nother)
child to the family.
It was this shift to considering fertility decisions
as sequential decisions which made Namboodiri's work,
for us, particularly important. Most previous models
of fertility decision making had considered the impact
of household economics on completed family size. Cer¬
tainly Becker (i960), Blake (1967, 1968) and Easterlin
(1969, 1973, 1975» 1978) all work under the assumption
that a long-run equilibrium family size exists"^* Eas¬
terlin, for example, in his latest theoretical formulation
writes:
The dependent variable is the completed fertility
of a married couple. To simplify the exposition,
the following assumptions are made: ... (2) pros¬
pective parents are not concerned about the spacing
17
of births; . . . (5) there is no uncertainty about
the independent variables over the planning horizon.
The quality of children and the work/leisure allo¬
cation of time are also taken as given, so that the
problem of choice focuses on number of children
versus goods for the parents. ... The approach
adopted is that employed in static economic analysis.
Easterlin, 1978: 79
This static decision making framework is in direct
contrast to the dynamic perspective outlined by Namboo-
12
diri . In this perspective the dependent variables are,
to repeat, "fertility decisions taken at different points
in time, and the success or failure in carrying out those
decisions" (Namboodiri, 1972a: 198). That is, the major
focus is on birth intervals and completed family size
is seen as the sum of a sequence of outcomes culminating
in the decision to have no more children. The advantage
of this perspective, at least in our view, is that it
emphasises the possibility that each birth occurs in and
is influenced by a different set of circumstances (Nam¬
boodiri, 197^5 Rosenzweig and Seiver, 1975). The static
perspective, because the variable of interest is the
completed family size, does not have this flexibility.
As Hout suggests:
From a (dynamic) perspective, the birth of each
child may be viewed an an event that "alters the
parents' perception in a way they cannot entirely
anticipate" (Rosenzweig, 1976; 339). This ...
perspective suggests shifts in the impact of socio¬
economic variables on subsequent births. The per¬
fectly general utility function underlying the static
model allows both nonlinearities and interactions
in the effects of the socioeconomic and demographic
variables related to completed family size. How¬
ever, the one-period decision-making framework in
which the model is cast precludes the possibility
that exogenous variables may interact with parity
in the determination of fertility, because to
18
include parity, a lagged endogenous variable, would
be incompatible with the one-period specification.
Hout, 1978: 139-li+O
Presently, most fertility research still works under
the assumptions of a static decision making framework.
For instance, researchers such as Cartwright (1976),
Askham (1975) and Peel and Carr (1975) in the United
Kingdom, Westoff and Ryder (1977) in the United States
and Beaujot (1975) and Beaujot, Krotki and Krishnan (1978)
in Canada use as a dependent variable total or completed
family size. This emphasis may be changing, however.
A number of recent studies (for instance, Hout, 1978;
Bumpass, Rindfuss and Janosik, 1978) call for a shift of
attention to the timing and spacing of births.
With regard to the "integration" of the sociological
and economic emphases, most present work done by economists
seems to be, at best, "standardising" sociological con¬
cerns (see, for instance, Easterlin, 1978; Becker and
Tomes, 1976; Cain and Dooley, 1976). It would appear
that sociologists working in the area of fertility de¬
cision making have tried to integrate economic and socio¬
logical elements more seriously in their research (see,
for instance, Beaujot, Krotki and Krishnan, 1978; Cart-
wright, 1976; Askham, 1975) but, as we have said, there
still remains much to be done.
We will end our review of the literature here.
Although covering only a few authors, most perspectives
and trends have been alluded to. To repeat, there appear
to have been two strands throughout the literature —
one emphasising economic or utilitarian factors and the
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other emphasising sociological concerns. Integrations
of the two approaches have more recently been suggested.
Crosscutting this is sua emphasis on either a dynamic or
a static conception of marital fertility. The dynamic
model is the more recent and emphasises fertility deci¬
sions as sequential decisions. The static model, con¬
versely, concentrates on completed family size with little
regard for the spacing of births. Our leaning, which
undoubtedly is apparent, is towards an integrative,
dynamic model. This is, in fact, the model ve intend
using in the thesis and the following section of Chapter
One outlines it in greater detail.
1.3 Theoretical Framework of the Thesis
The theoretical framework we intend using in this
thesis is, as we mentioned above, integrative with a
dynamic perspective. That is, the influence of both
economic and normative influences will be considered on
each parity progression. The dependent variable is not
total family size, but, rather, the probability of a couple
adding a(nother) child to their family at a given parity^
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and the intervals between births . Fertility behavior
at each step is conceptualized as working through three
factors^ (each of which is discussed below):
1. the demand for children — that is, the number
of children a couple would have if they had perfect
control over their fertility;
2. the potential output of children — that is,
the number of children couples feel they would have if
they did not deliberately control their fertility; and
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3. the costs of fertility control — that is, the
subjective (or psychic) costs and objective costs involved
in learning about and using specific contraceptive tech¬
niques.
The Demand for Children
The demand for children (d), in our model, is seen
as a function of income (i), prices (p) and tastes (t).
D = f(l,P,t)
It is posited that, at any given point in time, couples
/
have certain tastes which they attempt to maximise subject
to the constraints of income and prices. Thus a couple's
demand for children is the result of their resources
being weighted against their preferences and the costs
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they see attached to having children .
Demand variables (often referred to in the litera¬
ture as "preferences", "ideals" or "desires") are the
most frequently stressed in explanatory models of dif¬
ferential fertility. There is, however, a difference
between how they are traditionally viewed and how we
intend viewing them, Easterlin provides an example of
how demand variables are normally used. He suggests
that a couple may be conceptualized as beginning their
marriage with "a structure of preferences relating to
goods, children, leisure and fertility control practices,
shaped largely by prior experience" (1970: 138). Couples
then weight these tastes against what they "anticipate"
their family income to be and their expectations of the
prices of childcare. Their actual fertility behavior
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"reflects this balancing of preferences against constraints
over the course of the full reproductive age span" (1970:
138).
This traditional conception of demand variables
implies that couples adopt at the beginning of their mar¬
riage "a utility-maximizing lifetime plan for childbearing,
for expenditures of time and money on children, and for
other sources of parental satisfaction not related to
children" (Willis, 1973: S17). In other words, because
most previous research has adopted a static model of
marital fertility with its concomitant emphasis on total
or completed family size, the demand for children has
had to become conceptualized as a "one-off" decision on
the part of the couples at the beginning of their mar¬
riage. With our adherence to a dynamic model of ferti¬
lity behavior, with the emphasis on how families are
built up, on the other hand, we do not have to make this
assumption. Because we are concentrating on parity
progressions, we are able, at each step in the process,
to let income, prices and tastes vary. At any given
point in time, a couple's demand for children is seen
as a function of these three variables, but these are
variables which shift as the couple's life unfolds before
them.
The other facet of the demand-for-children factor
which deserves mention has to do with rationality. While
our conception of a couple's demand for children implies
that the couple is rational — that is, their action is
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intentional and goal-oriented — we do not intend using
the rationality framework associated with the "classical
economic man". This framework, which is widely used in
economic analyses of fertility and is, for example,
implicit in the works of both Becker and Easterlin, implies
that couples are aware of all possible alternatives of
action, they can foresee the consequences of each in
probability terms and they can rank order all alternatives
in terms of utility, hence making possible an optimal
choice or decision. These assumptions we feel are unten¬
able. As Askham suggests (1975: 16-17): "Utility models
tend to overestimate the ability of individuals to make
rational choices. If, as Hawthorn indicates, "utilities
are extremely difficult to measure", then how can indi¬
viduals themselves decide between x amount of one good,
versus y amount of another, especially when many more
than two competing goods may be involved?". All our
model implies is that at any given time couples will
have some preferences which they will attempt to satisfy
as best they can, given what they know about their incomes
and the prices of children. It is not assumed that
couples are omniscient in their knowledge or their ability
to make decisions. Hawthorn makes a similar argument
for his model:
Sociologists ... may feel that there are two
objections to it ... it presupposes rationality .
, , in reply to the ... objection, these choices
need not be rational in any strong sense. All
that the model demands is that the actor it is
applied to will have at least one preference and
that he or she does not have unlimited resources
to realize it. This demand probably defines,
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indeed, the necessary conditions for regarding
someone as a human agent at all.
Hawthorn, 1970: 117
The Potential Output of Children
The second factor in the theoretical framework
which we suggest influences child-building patterns is
the couples' anticipated natural fertility — that is,
the number of children they feel they would have if
fertility was not deliberately limited.
In Easterlin's model (l975» 1978), potential out¬
put of children refers to the couples' natural fertility —
the number of children they would have if they did not
deliberately control their fertility. This is, however,
unknown to most couples. It seems to us that what orients
peoples* behavior is not their natural fertility per se,
but their perceived natural fertility. For example,
amongst our sample, there were a number of couples who
used contraception much longer than was necessary because
they thought they were fecund"^. When they did try for
their first child, however, they found themselves unable
to conceive. The fact they did not begin trying for a
child until they wanted one was because they were orien¬
tating their behavior to what they perceived their natural
fertility to be. Hence the inclusion of this variation
of the variable within our model.
The Costs of Fertility Control
The demand for children and the potential output
of children together determine a couple's motivation to
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use some method of fertility regulation — the third
factor in our theoretical framework. If the perceived
potential output of children is less than the demand
for children, there should be no desire to limit ferti¬
lity. On the other hand, if the perceived potential
output of children exceeds a couple's demands, that
couple should be motivated to regulate their fertility.
Motivation is, however, a necessary condition for a
couple to use birth control; it is not a sufficient
condition. Birth control itself imposes costs on the
couple: subjective costs (the displeasure associated
with obtaining and using a given contraceptive technique);
objective costs (the time and money necessary to acquire
the goods and the knowledge and skill to use them); and
health costs (the health risks associated with the
various contraceptive techniques). Whether or not a
couple will actually use a contraceptive technique —
and the degree of success they will have with its use —
will depend on their perception of the costs of fertility
regulation as opposed to their motivation to limit their
fertility.
In sum (and to repeat) fertility behavior in this
thesis is conceptualized as being influenced by both
normative and economic factors. It is posited that
couples have certain tastes for children which they
attempt to satisfy as best they can within the constraints
of income and prices. Their demand for children is
not, however, the sole determinant of their behavior.
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Their perceived natural fertility and their ability
(and desire) to use contraception all influence their
decisions regarding a family. The fertility model ve
intend using is also dynamic — dynamic in the sense
that our unit of analysis is not total family size but
rather the probability of couples deciding to have
(further) children at each parity level. All variables
are allowed to vary not merely between couples but over
time — in fact, it is predicted they will vary in the
sense that we expect the factors which lead to the first
birth, for example, to be different from the factors
leading to subsequent births.
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CHAPTER TWO RESE \RCH TECHNI ->l)ES
2.1 The Research Design
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the major
aim of this thesis is to explore the various patterns of
family formation within the context of a model which
stresses rationale, perceived fecundability and execution
factors. Moreover, we hope to conduct this exploration
within Weber's definition of sociology as "the science
which aims at the interpretative understanding of social
behavior in order to gain an explanation of its causes,
its course and its effect" (Weber, 1962: 29). As we
said in Chapter One, most studies of family formation
intentions'*" have been large-scale surveys in which a
number of independent variables have been correlated
against a dependent variable until a satisfactory amount
of the variance has been accounted for. We did not wish
to work solely within the conventional assumptions of
this accounting model of survey analysis, however. We
hoped, to use Hawthorn's words, to explain patterns of
family formation in terms "of the reasons that the actors
give or might have been expected to give for their
ideals or practice ... explanations (which) consist
of chains of reasoning in the actors themselves" (Haw¬
thorn, 1968: 73).
Our criticisms of the bulk of this existing litera¬
ture arise from a number of sources. The previous lit¬
erature has, as we mentioned before, been forced into
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taking a very static view of the dependent variable .
Couples are asked to state how many children they want
or will have at some future date, although one needs to
talk to only a few couples to realize that this is not
3how most people view family size . For them, the decision
is highly situational and can be considered only within
their perceived ability actually*have children and
their success or failure with birth control techniques.
Another criticism arises from our feeling that the
nature and importance of the independent variables can
not be satisfactorily dealt with in a simple accounting
model. Researchers tend to come up with "shopping lists"
of "important" independent variables and couples are
asked to put a price on the relevance of each to their
completed family size. No room is left for the couple
themselves to explain the processes through which their
family was formed — which may or may not include refer¬
ences to the researcher's "shopping list".
A further complaint is that often there is no dis¬
cussion of exactly how a set of norms and attitudes can
affect behavior -- of what it means, say, to find a
correlation between religious affiliation and family
size. We would agree with Blumer (1956) that it is not
sufficient to conclude analysis by pointing out how much
variance has been accounted for. Explaining patterns of
family formation is one area where it may also be infor¬
mative to examine the reasons couples themselves give
or might be expected to give when asked to account for
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their behavior — to consider the factors they themselves
see as important influences on their behavior.
The most telling criticism of these large-scale
surveys, though, may be their relative lack of "pay-off" —
"pay-off" in terms of how much more we know about family-
building patterns. After virtually thirty years of study,
many surveys still conclude with a reference to "the com¬
plexities of the phenomenon under investigation" (Vestoff
and Ryder, 1977: 3^0). Perhaps these large-scale surveys'
greatest contribution is the realization that we do not
know enough yet about the processes of family formation
k
to resort to a self-administered questionnaire . Fer¬
tility jis complex, and until we understand more clearly
the processes involved, then we really do not know what
to ask whom, when.
With these considerations in mind we decided that
close interviewing of a smaller sample would be our best
research strategy. By actually discussing their families
with couples, we felt we would stand a better chance of
uncovering the factors that had gone into their decisions.
Having decided to interview respondents, our choice was
between alternative techniques of interviewing and this,
in turn, involved decisions about the type of information
required and the type of analysis to which that information
would be subjected.
Interviews are normally classified on an unstruc¬
tured-structured continuum. The two extremes are, on the
one hand, a completely formal interview in which the
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interviewer merely reads out the questions and recoids
the answers and, on the other hand, an informal situation
which is given shape and form by the individual respondent.
The advantage of the structured interview is that
the respondent is offered the same stimulus in .the same
form as all the other respondents. The information
gained from a structured interview can also be more easily
coded and analysed and, thus, more easily replicated in
the future by other researchers. Its disadvantages are
pointed out by Denzins
Conveying meaning in the schedule standardized in¬
terview (that is, the structured interview) is
difficult to achieve, because respondents are from
different backgrounds and settings and frequently
a phrase or question does not elicit common meaning.
... When the problem of respondent motivation is
considered, the SSI form (the structured interview)
again raises problems. ... Last, the problem of
fabrication looms largest with the SSI (the struc¬
tured interview), for too frequently the interviewer
has no specific set of questions with which to
challenge the respondent's reply.
Denzin, 1970: 129-130
An additional disadvantage was pointed out by Grebenik
and Moser (1962: 2l): "verbal descriptions of individual
cases, institutions and the like can often give a more
vivid, richer and, in a sense, deeper picture of life
than the statistical tables to be found in conventional
survey reports". Busfield and Paddon (1977) confirmed
this view by pointing out that while their formal inter¬
views provided precise quantitative data within a limited
range, it was their intensive interviews which provided
the richer material.
Unstructured interviews, conversely, can provide
"vivid and richer" descriptions of individual cases.
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Other advantages are that the fieldworker can reformulate
the problem or modify his categories if necessary as he
proceeds with the research, he has a greater ability to
avoid misleading or meaningless questions, he has his
often very revealing impressions to refer to and he can
usually handle difficult to quantify variables better than
a structured questionnaire which must attempt to opera-
tionalize them. The disadvantages of unstructured inter¬
views are that the data are often difficult to treat
statistically, hence conclusions, "particularly in terms
of representativeness and reliability, ... are less
rigorous"(Bulmer, 1977s 228). There is also the possi¬
bility of bias: "Vith the USI and UI forms (both unstruc¬
tured interview techniques), ... untrained interviewers
will often reinterpret questions and restate them in a
manner quite different from that intended by the investi¬
gator" (Denzin, 1970: 130).
Merton and Kendall (19^6), in an attempt to get the
best of both types of interview, developed what they
termed the "focused" interview. In this, there is a
fixed framework of questions, and yet the interviewer has
a certain latitude within it. Its main value is that it
gives the respondent the opportunity to express himself
on matters of significance to him rather than those pre¬
sumed important to the interviewer. It also, because
there is some structure to the interview, allows for more
than "impressionistic" analysis and interpretation. Its
main disadvantage is pointed out by Denzin (1970s 125)s
"This form of the interview requires that each inter-
31
r
viewer be highly trained in the meaning of the desired
information and in the skills of phrasing questions for
each person interviewed". With a "highly trained" inter¬
viewer, this technique is likely unsurpassed (Denzin, 1970:
132). However, often an untrained (or poorly trained)
interviewer is involved in the data collection stage and
he may lead the interview
in accord with wrong impressions he has gotten from
the first informants contacted. Or his own personal
characteristics or personality needs may attract
him into stronger relationships with certain kinds
of informants than with others, and thus prepare
the way for his receiving an undue amount of infor¬
mation from persons who are biased toward one point
of view. Perhaps, too, the first hunches or hypo¬
theses that emerge attract the field worker to
instances that confirm these notions and blind him
to data that point the other way.
Dean, Eichhorn and Dean, 1967: 276
But, one can easily overstate the problem of interviewer
5
bias. Recent writers have commented on the false premise
that more formalized sociological methods are "value
free". Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook (1962: 239)
point out that social scientists are universally dependent
on data that have been collected by means of oral or
written reports and these are "invariably subject to
essentially the same sources of error and bias as those
collected by survey interviewers".
It was Merton arid Kendall's fairly unstructured
interview involving the flexible use of a schedule that
we finally decided to use. We felt that this type of
interview would provide the type of in-depth material we
wanted of the respondent's own perception of his or her
unique situation. Since only the one person was to be
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involved in the interviewing, there would be reduced
problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the
schedule, and of different questions being given varying
importance. Any bias would be constant throughout so
that the schedules, when complete, would have a degree
of uniformity.
The major problem — a problem common to all research
where the author, the interviewer and the data analyst
are one and the same person — is the tendency that the
very expectations that led to the promotion of the research
will determine the responses given. Particularly with
an unstructured interview technique, there is the very
real problem of "leading" the respondent — "leading"
in the sense that the respondent may elaborate on an issue
that is of little importance to him because of some show
of agreement from the interviewer. Where one wants to
explain patterns of behavior in terms "of the reasons
that the actors give or might have been expected to give"
(Hawthorn, 1968: 73)» this can be a very real source of
bias.
We attempted to overcome this problem of interviewer
bias to some degree by being aware of the tendency and
consciously trying not to give "cues" to the respondents
during the interviews. We attempted to "accept" the
respondents' information by being a sympathetic and curious
listener. General questions such as "Why did you have
your first child then?" were asked repeatedly in various
forms until it appeared we had fully covered the topic.
Dean, Eichhorn and Dean commented (1967: 293) that social
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interaction often takes place on two levels: "the socially
expected" and "what really goes on". This certainly
seemed to be the case with our respondents. The interview
normally began with the woman providing the "socially
expected", quick answer. As the interview progressed
and we covered the same ground over and over, the woman
usually relaxed, appeared to drop many of her pretenses
and gave us longer and, what seemed to be, more "realistic"
explanations of her behavior^.
Interviews were also done slowly (no more than one
a day) and we purposely did not analyse the data or reread
the literature whilst they were ongoing. During the pre¬
test stage, we found that there was a very real tendency
for us to "look for" tendencies and trends that other
interviews and our reading led us to believe might be
important. During the actual data collection period,
each interview was viewed as "unique" and we attempted to
suspend all previous feelings and facts we might have
had about a particular respondent to try and get them to
explain to us why they were in the situation they were in.
Our primary goal at all times was to spark the respondent
into telling us about her family building behavior in as
free and frank a manner as possible. It is difficult to
see how this problem of bias can be completely avoidedj
however, all things considered, we were very pleased
with the way respondents did respond and explain their own
unique situations. More times than not we left the inter¬
view situation feeling we had come to "understand" why
that particular couple had done what they had done.
3k
2.2 The Sample
Having decided that an exploratory study with fle¬
xible use of a schedule was the means that would best
be able to meet our needs, we had to decide on a suitable
population to investigate. Because the interviewing
had to be done by the author, we felt it necessary to
narrow down the potential population quite drastically.
After considering various options, we decided to concen¬
trate on couples who had just had a second child — that
is, couples who had one child at home and who had just
had a baby. This group, we felt, had a number of advan¬
tages :
a. The most popular family size is increasingly two
children. This is reflected both in terms of the number
of children couples are having (see Chapter Three) and
in their stated family size norms and ideals (see, for
example, Krishnan and Krotki, 1976 and Beaujot, 1975)•
By considering two children families, we would be dealing
with the most typical family situation.
b. Women who have just had a child should be best
able to remember reasons for having the child spaced as
it was. Moreover, most women just having a second child
will be physically capable of having many more. But,
most will not, at least immediately, be wanting the third.
By interviewing these people just after having their
second child, problems of controlling subsequent births
should be uppermost in their minds and, therefore, a good
discussion topic.
c. Women who have just had a second child are a group
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which can be identified and contacted for interview.
Cartwright, who also used as a sample women who had
recently had a child, outlines these advantages in more
detail:
The sample has a number of advantages. One is that
by defining the sample in this -way a relatively
high proportion of parents are likely to respond
and to have a feeling of involvement in the study.
People who have been selected because they have
recently had a baby seem to understand and accept
the basis of selection better and to identify with
the survey more, because they have been chosen for
a clearly defined positive reason, than people
chosen "at random from the list of voters". A
practical advantage is that mothers of young child¬
ren are often at home much of the time so are
relatively easy to contact and often prepared to
spend time being interviewed.
But probably the most important advantage is that
the interviews took place soon after people must
have made "decisions" about whether to have another
baby soon after the last one, and what method of
contraception, if any, to use at that particular
stage in their lives. These "decisions" may have
been taken after careful deliberation or they may
be negative ones in the sense that no decision and
no action was taken which has obvious implications
for likely future events. Either way, parents of
young babies will have inevitably passed through a
critical phase in their family building programme.
They were seen soon after this crucial phase and
therefore at a relatively good time to explain and
tell us about the decision-making process (or lack
of it) as they saw it. Moreover, the decisions
they were asked about were generally perceived as
important ones for them, so for the most part they
were interested and willing to discuss them.
Cartwright, 1976: 2
Our sample was drawn from births at the Royal Alex¬
andra Hospital in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. Edmonton is
the capital and largest city in the province of Alberta,
with a population of just over half a million residents.
The city is Canada's fastest developing economic area —
largely because of the vast reserves of oil and natural
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gas found to its north, but also because of the agricul¬
tural land which surrounds it. With its resources and
location — Edmonton is the northernmost major city in
the free world and is at the center of Western Canada ■—
the city is expected to become a key area in the country.
Because of its booming economy, Edmonton has become
the center of a great deal of in-migration, most of which
(given Canada's tightening restrictions on overseas migra¬
tion) has been from other, more deprived areas of Canada.
The city has a rich mixture of ethnic cultures — at least
fifty-four are officially organised and acknowledged by
the city. The British Isles contribute the greatest
percent of the population (^5 percent) with the Ukraine
and Germany (13 percent each) second and third.
The Royal Alexandra claims to be the largest mater¬
nity hospital in Canada. It is certainly regarded as the
major obstetric center in Western Canada and handles over
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fifty-five percent of the births in Edmonton . The
Hospital is owned and run by the City and is situated
within the downtown area. There are three other hospitals
which handle maternity cases in Edmonton — the University
Hospital, the Miscericordia and the General. The Uni¬
versity is a teaching hospital and deals primarily with
first births. The Miscericordia and the General are
smaller hospitals located away from the city center and,
although they undoubtedly handle a percentage of second
births, we had no reason to suspect that these were any
different from the births at the Royal Alexandra. The
Miscericordia is located in a more affluent area of the
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city and undoubtedly draws more well—to—do patients.
Most of our couples, though, even those with very bright
prospects, were not at the stage of being able to afford
gto live in these prosperous areas . The majority of
Edmonton obstetricians and gynecologists use the Royal
Alexandra Hospital and any family physician who wants
to confine his or her patients in the Hospital may do
so by applying for privileges.
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We were aiming for a sample size of one hundred
and we felt, from our pre-test experiences"^^, that we
could handle approximately five interviews per week.
Thus each week, from records kept in the delivery room
at the Royal Alexandra Hospital, we drew up a list of all
women who had just had their second child and randomly
chose six names from this list. We then approached
these six women and if they met our criteria — they
had a child at home, they had just delivered a second
child and they were sufficiently skilled in English —
we explained the study to them and asked for their co¬
operation. An extra woman was chosen each week because
through experience it was found that a percentage of women
who from their obstetric records had had their second
child, had no first child living with them. The first
infant they had given birth to had either died or they
had given it up for adoption. Since we were interested
in couples with a family size of two, these people were
not suitable for study. Similarly, a very small percen¬
tage of potential respondents could speak no English
(two, both of whom were recent immigrants from Pakistan)
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and ve eliminated these people also from consideration.
If the women met our criteria and were prepared to take
part in the study, we asked them for some preliminary
information and made arrangements to recontact them six
to eight weeks later in their homes. The results of our
contacts are as follows:
Total Percent
Total Selected 118
Interview successfully completed 105 89
Refused - in hospital 3 2.5
Refused - at follow-up 7 6
Non-contacts at follow-up 3 2.5
Two of the refusals at the follow-up were because
of the husband's objections. The remainder were because
the woman found herself too busy with two children to
spare the time to be interviewed. The non-contacts had
moved from the Edmonton area between leaving hospital
and their interview and could not be traced.
The Royal Alexandra Hospital draws its patients
from Edmonton and area and likewise for our sample:
66 percent (69) of the respondents were from Edmonton
proper, 25 percent (26) were from the surrounding "dormi¬
tory" towns, and 9 percent (lO) were from surrounding
farms and acreages.
In addition to the one hundred and five women suc¬
cessfully interviewed, we spoke with fifteen husbands —
thirteen completed the questionnaire with their wives
and two answered specific questions. We had initially
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wanted to interview all of the men but this proved to
be beyond our means. The interviews were carried out
between February 1977 and September 1977 and as the
summer approached fewer and fever couples were prepared
to be interviewed in the evening — the only time suitable
for most of the men. It was either "too hot" or they
had "too much yard work to do". The interviews that were
done with husbands also suggested that there were poten¬
tial problems in interviewing husband and wife together
and we had no resources to do other than this. Very few
of our couples lived in large, spacious homes and in the
two cases where we attempted to interview the husband
alone (interviewing the wives by themselves was easy
enough as they were normally home alone during the day)
the wife was put in the awkward position of not knowing
what to do with herself. In both of these cases the
wife joined the interview not long after it begun — it
became increasingly difficult to conduct the interview
with her hovering in the background and we did not feel
we could ask her to leave her own home.
When we did interview the husband and wife together
we ran into problems. With some, the husband refused to
take the interview seriously (a problem never encountered
with the women) and this made it difficult to complete
the interview schedule. Other couples seemed to try to
agree with each other so that if the husband gave his
views first, the wife would agree and if she spoke first,
he would nod and refuse to elaborate. They may well
have had similar views, but our impression was that they
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did not. Each co\iple was given a set of attitudinal
statements to agree or disagree with and very different
answers were given by the couples on these. Moreover,
many women whom we interviewed on their own were able to
outline^their ideas and plans for the future and
their husbands'. These often differed and the respondent
would laugh and suggest the way the conflict might be
resolved (i.e. "I might wait an extra year to please him
but, by golly, I'm going to have my boy!").
For the most part, we were never as happy with the
interviews with the couples as we were with the interviews
with the women alone. It was difficult to build as good
a rapport with the couples — the husbands never seemed
as interested in discussing their families with us which
in turn tended to put off their wives. It was almost
as if they thought the topic was more in their wife's
realm and they were only condescending to take part.
Possibly if they had been the initial contact, if they
had been interviewed separately from their wives or if a
female and male interviewer could have attended each
interview this problem could have been overcome. But,
as we mentioned before, we had no resources to do other
than what we did and under the circumstances, we felt it
better to get good interviews with the wives alone than
mediocre interviews with the couples.
Safilios-Rothschild (1969) has criticised family
sociology for becoming "wives' family sociology" — be¬
cause of the ease of interviewing wives, marital and
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familial decision making studies are often based on wives'
answers with the assumption that these can be used to
predict husbands' views. Safilios-Rothschild's (1969)
examination of Detroit and Athenian husbands' and wives*
perceived decision making patterns found that this was
not so — there was a considerable degree of divergence
between the spouses' points of view. This finding has
been repeated numerous times; most recently, Lolagene
Coombs (1978: 57) concluded that "the views about the
reproductive goals of one marital partner cannot with
confidence be assumed to represent the views of the
other". Our data, as we mentioned above, also showed
evidence of this. Many women reported that they and
their husbands held different reproductive goals but,
most interesting enough, and the reason why we decided
to continue interviewing the wives alone, the women were
able to outline the steps they and their husbands had
gone through in deciding how many children to have and
when. Our study, while primarily using wives for infor¬
mation, does not assume that the information the wives
gave to us about their own attitudes and behavior could
be used to make comments about their husbands'. It is
unfortunate we were unable to include more husbands within
our study and in future research we would make a greater
effort to deal with them (possibly by contacting couples
through the husband) but we feel that there was enough
to be gained from our study in spite of this drawback
with the sample.
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2.3 The Research Schedule
To some extent, every study is only as good as the
questions it asks, and the problems of schedule design
are legend. As Cannell and Kahn (195*0 point out, the
main function of any questionnaire is to trans'late the
research objectives into specific questions and to assist
the interviewer in motivating the respondent to communi¬
cate the required information. The aim of our question¬
naire was to build up a picture of the couple and their
family-building experiences. In order to do this, we
explained to the respondents that we wanted to hear about
their experiences in having their present family, what
their future fertility intentions were, and some general
information about themselves and their spouses. There
was a questionnaire from which we worked (a copy is pre¬
sented in Appendix B), but we found that many questions
were answered without the necessity of asking them speci¬
fically. Thus, we interviewed from the basis of the
questionnaire, but allowed respondents to direct the
conversation along their own lines so that the schedule
was filled in to suit their own order of preference.
Questions were asked and the conversation directed only
when the respondent was getting well off the topic or
when a particular concern had been fully covered.
The subjects covered in the interview — in the
order they appeared on the interviev schedule — were:
a. family size preferences and expectations at various
stages in the marriage, including future fertility inten¬
tions ;
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b. occupational behavior of the husband and wife
throughout the marriage, including the wife's future
occupational plans and desires;
c. the marital relationship with emphasis on leisure
pursuits and companionship;
d. each pregnancy, particularly the factors leading
to the decision (or lack thereof) to have a child and the
happiness with its spacing;
e. birth control behavior at various stages in the
marriage, including future contraceptive intentions; and
f. background factors.
There were also six sets of attitudinal statements
that we asked each respondent to agree or disagree with.
These were scattered throughout the interview; whenever
a natural pause seemed to develop, the interview was
halted and the respondent was asked to check in her res¬
ponses. Ve were worried that these sets of attitudinal
statements might disrupt the flow of the interview, but
in practice they helped build rapport. Breaking the
interview various times allowed the respondent to do
various small chores such as check her children, refill
our coffee cups, or get dinner in the oven. Without these
breaks, the respondent may well have felt the interview
was stretching too long and been more reticient in her
answers.
Each interview averaged between an hour and an hour
and a half to complete. We normally chatted with the
women both before and after the interview, so that we
were in their homes for approximately two hours. In
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those cases where we could not complete the schedule in
one sitting (for example, unexpected company arrived or
the children were acting—up to such a degree that the
mother could not concentrate), arrangements were made
for a second visit. All the respondents had been seen
for approximately fifteen minutes in the hospital, where
information on their pregnancies and some background
factors had been obtained, and they were interviewed in
their homes when their babies were between six and eight
weeks old.
All the interviews were tape recorded — we had
decided during the pre-test stage that this was the only
way we could probe the respondents' answers and keep the
interview progressing satisfactorily. After a disastrous
attempt at note-taking, we had to agree with Dean, Eich-
horn and Dean (1967: 296-297) that "note-taking is more
likely to interfere with the interviewer than the infor¬
mant. He needs all his wits about him to guide the inter¬
view, ask penetrating questions that will draw out signi¬
ficant data, and maintain a friendly relationship with
the informant", Each respondent was asked if we could
use the tape recorder; none said "absolutely not" and
most seemed oblivious to it, A few were less than happy
with the tape recorder and, for them, we left it on but
put it in a bag at our feet. This seemed to satisfy
them and the tapes were largely understandable^"'".
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2,k Methods of Analysis
The task of transcribing the tapes was undertaken,
by ourselves, during the interview period. We found that
the process was quickest (and the transcriptions most
accurate) if the tape was transcribed immediately after
the interview, and this was our aim. There were times
when we fell behind our schedule, although by never more
than a week. It took between six and eight hours to
transcribe each tape and we always ended the tramscription
by writing out our comments on the respondent and the
interview situation.
After the tapes had been transcribed, two approaches
were taken to their analysis. We began with a quanti¬
tative examination — each of the major topics the inter¬
view covered was coded and examined for its influence on
the timing and spacing of the couples* two children and
their future fertility intentions.
There are several approaches to the quantitative
analysis of interview data. On one hand, every item or
index can be intercorrelated and significant relationships
given ad hoc explanations; on the other hand, a set of
hypotheses can be delineated and then explicitly tested
and accepted or rejected. We attempted to take a middle
path. There were relationships between variables that
the previous literature had suggested which we investi¬
gated and then our analysis itself suggested further
relationships that we attempted to test. The coding of
variables reflected this approach to the analysis of the
U6
data. The coding was done question by question — that
is, we coded one question for all interviews, then pro¬
ceeded to the second question, and so on. This was done,
initially, so that there would be no tendency on our
part to make a respondent's answers inherently consistent
and, secondly, because we began analysing the data before
we had finished coding all of the possible variables.
The analysis and coding were quite interdependent. As
our analysis revealed new avenues to investigate, we
would code the suitable variables. The statistical
package SPSS was used in connection with the quantitative
analysis and the results are to be found in Part II of
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the thesis . How the variables were coded is discussed
as they are introduced into the analysis.
Alongside the quantitative analysis of the data, we
proceeded with a qualitative, "interpretive" analysis.
By this we mean that we sought patterns in the data from
reading the interviews as units. We had had much less
experience with this type of operation and found it chal¬
lenging both to carry out and to write up. While there
13
are numerous empirical accounts of qualitative studies
l4
and prescriptions on how to carry out their analyses ,
we found it a difficult and often frustrating task.
We began the qualitative analysis by drawing up
lists of recurrent themes and ideas about family formation
strategies that we had noticed whilst we were undertaking
the quantitative analysis. Whether this knowledge came
from the quantitative analysis itself, or from the fact
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that it had involved us in reading and re-reading the
interviews many times, we never were able to determine. Jt was,
probably both, but we would suggest that a completely
thorough acquaintance with the data is an essential pre¬
requisite for an interpretive understanding. We then
went back to the transcripts and went through each one
copying out stretches of conversation which mentioned
these themes. At this stage we had to narrow down some
of our interests — the task before us was assuming gar¬
gantuan proportions — and so we selected one or two
themes concerning each family formation stage to proceed
with. We then categorised and subcategorised the stretches
of conversation into some organisational framework. At
this stage we introduced various background considerations
and saw whether or not they were systematically related
to the categorisations we had developed.
Writing up this qualitative analysis was the final
task and this involved further difficulties. With the
quantitative analysis, results could easily be displayed
in the form of tables and charts. This was not so with
the qualitative analysis. Backett (1977) mentioned this
problem in regards to her research; because the qualita¬
tive research worker must turn to extensive quotation to
provide "proof", the written report can quickly become
very tedious. A further problem we felt was that the
written report tended to become a descriptive exercise
rather than a sociological analysis. However, we pro¬
ceeded the best we could and the results are presented
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in Part III. They are organised around the three ferti¬
lity decisions our couples have taken -- spacing to the
first child, spacing to the second child and future
fertility intentions. Before ve begin the presentation
of the results of our analysis, however, we shall provide
a brief demographic description of the fertility trends
of Canadian and Albertan co\iples. Vfe shall also present
in that chapter a description of our sample in terms of
their family building behavior and their stated future
fertility intentions.
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CHAPPER TJLREE DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
In this last chapter of the Introductory Section,
we shall present a brief demographic description of the
fertility trends of Canadian and Albertan couples. We
shall then provide a description of our sample in terras
of their family building behavior and their stated future
fertility intentions. The purpose of beginning the analysis
this way is to place our study in its wider context.
3.1 Fertility Trends in Canada and Alberta
Canada, like most developed countries, witnessed a
fall in its birth rate from the turn of the century"1".
As with other developed countries, there was a slight
increase in birth rates between 19^7 and 1959* commonly
referred to as the "baby boom", but, by and large, the
trend has been downward. In 1959* for instance, the
general fertility rate in Canada (live births per 1000
women aged 15 - 49) 119,39. Since then the rate has
fallen; it was 73.99 in 1969, 59.96 in 1973 and 56.67
in 1976.
The Albertan general fertility rate has followed
the Canadian pattern throughout the century, although
it has traditionally, and continues to be, slightly
higher than the Canadian average. The general fertility
rate peaked in Alberta in 1955 at 135.24. Since then
it has also fallen — to 84.83 in 1969» 68.22 in 1973
and 64.21 in 1976.
Demographers have debated whether the current fer-
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tility decline is due to a postponement of births, which
is an aspect of timing of fertility, or to the fact
that couples, currently of reproductive ages, intend
to have fewer children than their predecessors, thereby
curtailing their family size. In this regard, changes
in age-specific fertility rates, births to mothers of
various ages and births of various birth orders are
relevant. Also of concern are marriage rates (both
rates per 1000 population and average ages at marriage).
We shall consider each in turn.
The downward trend in fertility can be seen quite
clearly when age-specific fertility rates are examined.
From the "baby boom" peak in the mid-1950's, rates for
women of all ages have fallen quite dramatically. In
very recent years, there has been a slight increase in
the rates for women aged 25 - 29» 30 - 3^ and 35 - 39*
but the trend is so slight, and so recent, that it is
difficult to determine its stability or relevance. Table
3.1 summarizes the rates for the years 1955» 1966, 197^»
1975 and 1976 for Canadian and Albertan women.
Table 3.1 Age-Specific Fertility Rates, Canada and Alberta
CANADA
* Age Groups
1955 1966 197^ 1975 1976
15 - 19 5^.2 48.2 35.3 35.3 3.3. ^
20 - 24 218.3 169.1 113.1 112.7 110.3
25 - 29 215.1 163.5 131.1 131.2 129.9
30 - 34 153.8 103.3 66. 6 64.4 65.6
35 - 39 89.8 57.5 23.0 21.6 21. 1
40 - 44 32.3 19.1 5.5 4.8 4.3
45 - 49 2.9 1.7 0.4 0.4 0.3






1955 1966 1974 1975 1976
15 - 19 72.7 65.0 47.7 49.7 44.5
fo 0 1 ro -p- 275.8 196.7 140.4 142.6 130.7
25 - 29 242.4 168.6 142.2 138. £ l4o. 8
30 - 3k 167.0 103.9 64.3 64.6 66.5
35 - 39 92.4 58.4 21.8 20.2 21.0
40 - kk 33.3 19.0 5.2 4.9 4.2
■p- ut 1 -p- 3.1 1.7 0.4 0.4 0.4
* Data presented in tables are fertility rates per
1000 total women by age groups.
These changes in the fertility rate can be further
seen by examining the changes in the percent of live
births to mothers of various ages through time. For
instance, in 1961 in Alberta (the Canadian data show
similar patterns and thus will not be presented), 12.5
percent of all live births were to women thirty-five
years of age or older. In 1976, the corresponding percent
was 3.9. During the same time, the percentage of births
to women aged 20 - 24 and 25 — 29 years increased. In
1961, 32.0 percent of all live births in Alberta were
to women aged 20 - 2k years and 27.4 percent were to
women aged 25 - 29 years. In 1976, 36.1 percent of all
live births in Alberta were to women aged 20 — 2k years
and 3k.k percent were to women aged 25 - 29 years. The
percent of births to very young women also increased
during this time. In 1961, 10,6 percent of all live
births in Alberta were to women under the age of twenty.
In 1976, 12.8 percent of all births were to women this
young.
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The trend in Canada and Alberta thus appears to be
towards smaller families born to women when they are
under the age of thirty. We can be more specific than
this, however. Evidence of the movement towards a two
child family can be seen by examining the changes in the
percent of live births of various birth orders over time.
Again only the Albertan data will be presented, as the
Canadian statistics follow similar patterns. In 1951»
l4.1 percent of all live births in Alberta were of the
fifth birth order or greater. In 1974, only 5.1 percent
of all live births were of this birth order. Conversely,
29.4 percent of births were first births in 1951* while
in 1974, 40 percent of all births were first births. The
percentage of births that were second births also increased
between 1951 and 1974 — from 28.0 percent to 34.2 percent.
Third and fourth births decreased in relative frequency
of occurrence. In 1951» 18.3 percent of all live births
in Alberta were third births and 10.1 percent were fourth
births. In 1974, conversely, 15.0 percent of all live
births were third births and 5.6 percent were fourth
births.
The marriage rate in both Canada and Alberta has
fallen in recent years although it remains higher than
its previous trough in the 1960's. In Canada, for example,
the general marriage rate (marriages per 1000 population)
fell to 6.9 in 1963. From there, it rose to its peak
in 1972 at 9.2 and has since been falling — it was 8.9
in 1974 and 8.4 in 1976. The Albertan general marriage
rate has followed the Canadian trend although, as was
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the case with the fertility rates, generally shows
higher figures. The general marriage rate in Alberta
peaked in 1972 at 9»9 and has since fallen to 9*7 in 1976.
Mean ages at marriage for bachelors and spinsters
have also been showing recent increases. For Canada,
the mean age at marriage for spinster brides was lowest
in 1972 when it was 22.2. It has since risen to 22.3
in 197^ and 22.7 in 1976. The mean age for bachelor
bridegrooms was also lowest in 1972 at 24.7 and has since
risen to 25.0. Albertan brides and bridegrooms, by and
large, marry younger than their Canadian counterparts,
but they have been following the same changes in trends.
The mean age at marriage for spinster brides was lowest
in Alberta in 1972 when it was 21.6. It had risen to
22.1 by 1976. For bachelor bridegrooms, the lowest aver¬
age age at marriage was recorded in 1972 at 24.4. In
1976, it had risen to 24.7#
To sum up, the recent demographic trends in Canada
and Alberta have been;
1. A fall in the birth rate amongst women of all ages
(although there may be a slight increase in recent
years amongst women aged 25 - 29» 30 - 34 and 35 - 39)•
2. A fall in the proportion of births to women over the
age of thirty-five.
3. An increase in the proportion of births which are
first or second births.
4. A falling, but still relatively high marriage rate.
5. An increasing average age at marriage.
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From this compendium of trends it is difficult to
draw firm conclusions to the demographers' debates —
to decide whether the fall in the birth rate represents
a postponement of births and/or whether it represents
a decrease in average family size. This is largely
because the current fertility decline is still too novel
a phenomenon, and because we lack the proper time pers¬
pective to comprehend the extent and nature of changes
in the procreative behaviors that are taking place in
the society. It is hoped, however, that this study will
help, in some small way, to shed light on recent fertility
trends,
3
3.2 Family Building Behavior of Our Sample
As we previously mentioned, our sample was composed
of one hundred and five couples. Of the one hundred and
five, ninety-nine were married to their present spouse
at the time their first child was born. The average
age at marriage for these wives was 20.9, for the hus¬
bands it was 23.2. Three couples married between the
births of their two children and the other three women
had their first child with somebody other than the father
of their second child. One of these women had her first
child illegitimately; the other two had been divorced
between its birth and the birth of their second child.
A total of three women and seven men had been divorced;
however, other than the two cases mentioned above, no
children from a prior marriage were living with our
sample couples.
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The average interval between marriage and the first
14
live-bora delivery was two years and five months. The
average age of the women at first birth was 22,98 and
the average age of their husbands^ was 26,1. Excluding
those six women not married to their present husbands
at the time of the first birth, the exact breakdown of
the interval between marriage and the first child was
as follows.
Interval Between Marriage
and First Child N
Up to and including 8 months 22
Over 8 months, up to and
including 2 years 25
Over 2 years, up to and
including 3 years 20
Over 3 years, up to and
including 4 years 15
Over k years 17
The average interval between first and second child^
was two years and seven months. The average age of the
mothers at the birth of their second child was 25.6 and
the average age of the fathers was 27.8. The exact
breakdown of the interval between first and second child
was as follows.
Interval Between First and
Second Child N
Up to and including 18 months 16
Over 18 months, up to and
including 2 years 28
Over 2 years, up to and
including 30 months 23
Over 30 months, up to and
including 3 years 17
Over 3 years 21
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The average interval from marriage to the second
birth was four years and eleven months. Over 60 percent
of the couples had had their second child by the fifth
year of their marriage. For only 19 percent was there
a span longer than six years. The shortest interval
from marriage to the second birth was one year; the
longest was fourteen years and six months.
In order to determine the family size the couples
regarded as most likely for themselves, we asked the
women a number of questions.
1. You now have two children. Would you say you definitely
will have more children, you probably will, you're
uncertain, you probably will not have more children
or you definitely will not? What makes you think this?
2. Do you feel you would like to have more children some
time? Do you think you will? If so, how many?
3. What do you think will be the largest number of child¬
ren you will have? And the smallest? How certain of
this are you?
We found — not unexpectedly in light of the avail¬
able statistical data — that most people (fifty-two of
our couples) wanted, and thought they would have, two
children. The next most likely family size, chosen by
twenty-one couples, was "two or three", with the dis¬
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Nobody wanted (or thought they would have) a parti¬
cularly large family — over 75 percent of the sample
were planning on at most three children. If the couple
was planning to have more than two children, then it
was most likely that they were thinking in terms of no
more than three or four. In fact, the only respondent
who felt she might have more than five children would
not, for religious reasons, use any form of birth control.
For her, family size was "however many that come". The
strong downward trend in anticipated family size within
one generation can be clearly seen when you consider
that 69 percent of our wives and 53 percent of their
husbands came from families of four or more.
Eighteen of our couples were definitely not going
to be having further children, at least with their present
spouses — either the wife had been sterilized or the
husband had had a vasectomy. Another twenty said they
definitely did not want any more children and could think
of no circumstances under which they might change their
minds. Most were quite prepared to undergo sterilization
and it was simply a matter of finding a doctor that
would help them. A further seventeen respondents were
fairly sure they would have no further children but, in *
the words of one, "I wouldn't want to sign anything in
blood. Neither of us are rushing out to get something
done". Most felt, though, that they would have a third
child only if one of their present children should die,
or if they remarried and wanted children with their new
spouse.
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Looking at the other side of the fertility decision,
thirteen couples said they were definitely planning to
have more children and fourteen thought it highly likely
they would be adding to their present family. The re¬
maining twenty-three couples were undecided aboyt the
possibility of further children -- they were unable to
tell us if they would or would not be adding to their
families. Most were quite able to outline the push and
pull factors for a third child, and it was usually a
matter of having to "wait and see".
In this last chapter of the Introductory Section,
we have outlined Canadian and Albertan fertility trends
and our couples' patterns of family formation and their
stated intentions regarding a third child. We have seen
that most couples (Canadian, Albertan and Edmontonian)
are planning on having (and are having) two children.
In the following chapters, we intend to examine these
trends in more detail — to consider why most couples
want, and are planning to have, a family of two (and why
those with larger family intentions are anticipating
larger families), in the hopes of coming to a clearer
understanding of recent (and future) fertility trends.
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PART II FUTURE FERTILITY INTENTIONS AND
FAMILY BUILDING BEHAVIOR
CHAPTER FOUR ANTICIPATED FAMILY SIZE
The theoretical framework used in this thesis sees
fertility behavior as working through three factors:
the demand for children, the perceived output of children,
and the costs of fertility control. In this and the
following chapter we shall look at the demand for children.
We shall consider how a couple's income, the costs they
see attached to having and raising a family and their
tastes for children influence their intentions regarding
a third child and the spacing of their present two child¬
ren, In the chapter following, the perceived output of
children — that is, the number of children couples feel
they would have if they did not deliberately control
their fertility — will be considered. In the final
chapter of Part II, contraception will be examined —
how the subjective and objective costs involved in couples
learning about and using the different contraceptive
techniques influence their fertility behavior.
To begin the quantitative analysis, we shall examine
the couple's desire for a given number of children.
This is the traditional "problem" in fertility analyses"'",
with the traditional dependent variables being ideal,
desired, expected or actual family size. We have men¬
tioned previously that we have found none of these to
be entirely successful. The major problem, we would
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argue, stems from the idea inherent in these dependent
variables that couples have a reproductive target in
mind; that is, they knov in the early stages of their
marriage how many children they intend to have.. Our
analysis suggests that couples are more apt to "play it
by ear". There are, though, in addition, problems intrin¬
sic to the measures themselves. We shall outline some
of these before returning to a discussion of our dependent
variable.
The major problem with ideal family size, if used
to measure completed fertility, is that it overlooks
the conceptual distinction between ideal family size and
the number of children desired. Arthur Campbell points
this out (1969: 3^): "A major limitation of responses
to questions on ideal family size is that they do not
necessarily reflect personal family size desires. Ques¬
tions concerning ideal family size usually ask for the
respondent's opinion about how many children he or she
thinks the average family should have". Underscoring
this conceptual difference is the discrepancy researchers
such as Freedman, Baumert and Bolte(l959)» Woolf (l97l)»
and Namboodiri (1972a) have found between what women
consider to be the "ideal family size" and how many child¬
ren they themselves expect to have.
2
Current family size has occasionally been used to
overcome the problems associated with ideal family size.
The obvious difficulty with this measure, though, if it
is being used to estimate completed fertility, is that
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it cannot be specified without error until a woman reaches
the end of her childbearing life. One is faced with
either considering only women past the childbearing age
(a greatly reduced subsample with potentially poor memo¬
ries of past fertility decisions and events surrounding
such decisions) or in some way removing the effects of
age and marital status. Beaujot (1975) suggests measuring
current fertility as the difference between the actual
fertility to a woman and the mean family size for women
her age and marital status. This method enables one to
use all members of the sample, but it also has its dis¬
advantages. Any measure of current family size faces
the problem that some of the women may have more children
than they desire because of inadequate knowledge or use
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of contraception or fewer children than they desire
because of sub—fecundity. This first possibility is
particularly problematic because differential knowledge
of contraception is probably related to social class.
One possible way around this problem, and the solution
Beaujot employed, is to ask if each child was wanted and
subtract the unwanted births from the current family size.
Needless to say, there are problems both in the assumption
that births are classifiable into a dichotomy of "wanted"
and "unwanted" (our data would suggest that such a dicho¬
tomy does not exist) and because, as Ryder suggests
(1973a: 503): M conceivably we are measuring not so much
the incidence of unwanted births as the extent to which
the couple can summon up the resources necessary to cope
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with and rationalize such occurrences". This correction
also does not solve the problems associated with sub-
fecundity.
In accounting for why empirical applications of his
theory were not always supportive, Becker (i960) emphasis
the problematic influence of inadequate contraceptive
knowledge. He suggested that desired rather than actual
family size be used in testing the model but, again,
there are difficulties. The literature shows that ex¬
pected family size is a good predictor of completed fer¬
tility in the aggregate but a poor indicator when indivi¬
dual woman are considered separately. In the Princeton
study, for example, the wife's desired family size six
months after the second birth (i.e. at the time of the
first interview) proved to be the strongest predictor
of fertility over the next three years (Vestoff, Potter
and Sagi, 1963. 236). However, some two-fifths of the
women gave differing responses at the first and third
interviews. Moreover, responses to question variations
such as "If you were to live your life all over again,
how many children would you like to have?" may be influen
ced by the number of children the respondent already has
(George, 1973: 357)• Most people do not like to admit
that they are dissatisfied with their own present per¬
formance.
These traditional dependent variables, then, have
problems over and above our major criticism of them.
It was this major criticism, however, which led us to
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look for alternative dependent variables. We were not
convinced that couples adopt at the beginning of their
marriages "a utility-maximizing lifetime plan for child-
bearing, for expenditures of time and money on children,
and for other sources of parental satisfaction not related
to children" (Willis, 1973: S17). Hence, ve did not
feel their family size intentions could adequately be
summed up in a measure such as desired or expected total
family size. Our experience suggested to us that family
size decision making was highly situational and this
was confirmed to us when we began the pre-tests. Three
examples from our data at that stage should indicate this.
All were in response to the question of how many children
the couple wanted or intended to have in the future.
(R with boy and girl) (Do you think you will have more
children in the future?) I don't think so. My
husband says no and I say no, but if something hap¬
pened to one of these, I would have another one.
Or if I were to get pregnant, then I would have it.
(R with two girls) I'm undecided and probably undecided
for three or four years. I'm thinking now of having
a third, but I don't know. I really had a rough
time with this one and she isn't a very good baby,
so I'm really thinking about it. I'd like to try
for a boy, but ...
(R with two girls) At least one more, possibly two.
It depends how money is. And if we get into a
bigger house — this one only has two bedrooms.
I think four would be the very most.
With this personal dislike of the traditional
dependent variables, we read Namboodiri's 1972a article.
In this article, Namboodiri (1972a: 198) argued
against "considering family size as the decision problem
in the economic analysis of fertility" and for "fertility
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decisions taken at different points in time, and the
success or failure in carrying out those decisions ...
to be considered as dependent variables". As he suggested
(1972a: 198-199)t "at any point in time, for a couple
at parity n, the decision problem is whether to have a
child of parity n + 1". This captured for us the sequen¬
tial nature of family formation and allowed us to consider
each birth interval as a decision point. That is, rather
than using family size per se as the dependent variable,
we decided to use — in line with Namboodiri — the prob¬
ability of adding a child (or children) to a family at
parity two. Also, because we were interested in how
families were formed, we decided to have the couples look
back and reconstruct the decisions (or lack thereof) that
went into having their first and second child. Because
we were considering only couples who have had two child¬
ren, we were not able to consider "the probability of
adding a or another child to the family at zero-parity
and parity one", rather, we had to be content with an
analysis of the factors and circumstances which went into
each of these parity progressions.
In this chapter we shall consider the first dependent
variable — the probability of couples with two children
having a third child. The variable was measured by
examining the woman's discussion on whether or not, and
xander what circumstances, she would have a third child.
It was coded into three categories (which were outlined
in Chapter Three, section two): definitely or probably
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will not, definitely or probably will and undecided.
The definitely or probably will not category numbered
fifty-five and consisted of those couples who had been
sterilized, or were planning to be sterilized or who
thought it very unlikely that they would have a third
child. The definitely or probably will category num¬
bered twenty-seven and consisted of those people who
were fairly or positively sure they would be having an
additional child. The remaining twenty-three couples
were coded as undecided — they did not know when we
interviewed them whether or not they would be adding to
their present family.
Our analysis will proceed through income, price and
taste variables. We shall begin, however, by considering
the influence of the three background and control vari¬
ables age at marriage, religion and social class. Our
fourth control variable — wife's education — will be
introduced into our analysis when we discuss the taste
variable "sex-role norms and behavior". In one sense,
our control variables are "taste" variables in that they
are factors which influence a couple's "desire" or "taste"
for a given number of children. They are, however, of
a different nature to the factors we discuss as tastes.
In the first instance, they are temporally prior to our
taste variables. That is, in any causal sequencing they
would "come before" our taste variables. The result of
this, and the second distinguishing feature of the control
variables, is that they "influence" our taste variables —
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that is, they are taste-shaping factors. It is because
of their (potential) influence on our taste variables
that we use these variables as control variables.
4.1 Background and Control Variables
Age at marriage has consistently been shown in pre¬
vious fertility studies to influence family size; Peel
(1970, 1972), Cartwright (1976) and Westoff and Ryder
(1977)t f°r instance, all reported that as wife's age
at marriage increased, intended family size decreased.
Vestoff and Ryder, in fact, found that age at marriage
was the best single predictor of fertility uncovered in
the 1970 National Fertility Study — there was a strong
negative association of both wanted and unwanted fertility
with age at marriage. There has been, though, no simple
understanding of why there should be this relationship
between the two variables. Busfield outlined two pos¬
sible explanatory hypotheses in the following;
It would appear that the relation is not entirely
a "spurious" one, and that age at marriage still
has some direct causal effect on the family size,
through the operation of factors such as fecundity,
particularly in accounting for the low fertility
of those who marry over 30* On the other hand,
there is an important separation of the two vari¬
ables, and it is clear that contraception within
marriage has enabled couples to marry young and
yet have small families. The evidence indicates
that an important part of the association between
age at marriage and family size is due to differ¬
ences in the efficiency of fertility control within
marriage, those who marry young being more likely
to be more inefficient. It is possible that such
inefficiency may, in part, be a function of the
wife's age as well as of selection of more inef¬




Bumpass (1969) and Ineichen (1976) suggested a third
explanation for the effect age at marriage has on ferti¬
lity — women marrying when they are older have more
alternatives to the mother role and hence a greater in¬
vestment in limiting their family size. Westoff and
Ryder (1977: 338) concluded that likely all factors have
an influence on the relationship: "The reason that age
at marriage exerts such an influence on fertility is that
it combines mutually reinforcing biological and socio¬
logical selective factors such as fecundability and
education",
Our data, which are presented in Table 4.1, are some¬
what in line with the bulk of the previous literature,
but suggest that the explanation needs to be expanded.
We divided wife's age at marriage into three categories
for the analysis: under the age of twenty, twenty and
twenty—one, and twenty-two and older. These categories
are close together, but do reflect the narrow range of
variation within our sample. Moreover, using these
narrow divisions does capture the nature of the rela¬
tionship between the wife's age at marriage and future
fertility intentions that was apparent when wife's age
at marriage was not collapsed.
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Wife's Age at Marriage
Under 20 20, 21 22 and
Older
No More Children 44 $ 53 £ 6l
Undecided 32 23 9
Definitely/Probably 24 23 30
More Children
Total N* 4i 30 33
The total N equals 104 as one couple had not been
legally wed at the time of our interview. In this
and all tables, 0 percent is used when there are no
cases in a particular cell and — is used when the
total N is zero.
The table indicates that couples marrying when the wife
was over twenty-one were the most likely to consider
their families finished — 6l percent said it was unlikely
they would be having any more than two children as com¬
pared with 44 percent of those couples marrying when the
wife was under twenty. The interesting aspect of this
table, however, was the indication that couples marrying
when the wife was under twenty were not definitely planning
on having more children, but rather that they were un¬
decided at the moment about their future fertility inten¬
tions. The percentage of couples planning definitely to
have a third child showed very little relationship with
wife's age at marriage. Why the relationship between
wife's age at marriage and those definitely or probably
not wanting any more children was apparent was because
of the large differences in the percent undecided —
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32 percent of the women marrying when they were under
twenty were undecided about their future fertility inten¬
tions versus 9 percent of those marrying when they were
twenty-two or older.
An explanation which might help account for these
findings was suggested, indirectly, by Cartwright. She
found (1976: 113) in her data that a relatively high
proportion of mothers in partly skilled and unskilled
occupations did not have any clear idea about the number
of children they hoped to have. She referred to Askham's
(1975) suggestion to account for her finding: "lower
working class groups tend to have a present rather than
a future time orientation because for them the future
is more uncertain and insecure than it is for other social
groups ... their goals will be for present rather than
future gratification". In our data there was a strong
relationship between social class and wife's age at mar-
it
riage and hence the explanation about the orientation
of working class women might be appropriate here. The
women marrying when they were young (who tended to be
from the manual social classes) were the most likely to
be undecided and this might well have been because they
were more oriented to the present and less able to pre¬
dict whether they would or would not have a third child.
We did not measure the present/future time orientation
of our couples directly and so we can go no further with
this possibility, but it remains an interesting suggestion.
The greater percent of those couples marrying when the
wife was over twenty-one who knew they would not be
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having more children could be explained by the explana¬
tions Burnpass, Xneichen and Busfield offered above.
Because of mutually reinforcing biological and socio¬
logical factors (i.e. their age and possibly more alter-
r
natives to the mother role ), they were more likely to
feel they would not be wanting more than two children.
Religion has traditionally been a very important
variable in fertility analyses — the 1955 and i960
Growth of American Families Studies, for instance, sug¬
gested that religion and the age at which education was
completed were the two most important factors in distin¬
guishing between families of different sizes. Its in¬
fluence, though, appears to be weakening. The 1965 and
1970 National Fertility Studies found a convergence of
Catholic and non-Catholic fertility: "the fact of being
Catholic is becoming less significant as a factor in
shaping attitudes toward fertility ... and in the prac¬
tice of contraception itself" (Ryder and Westoff, 1971:
102). In Canada, the differentials between Catholics
and Protestants were in the order of 1.3 children in
1941 (Charles, 1948: 68), 0.8 children in 1961 (Henripin,
1968: 342), 0.4 children in the Toronto sample of 1968
(Balakrishnan, Kantner and Allingham, 1975: 3l) and even
less than this in the Edmonton sample of 1973 (Beaujot,
1975)* The Edmonton study also reported that religious
attendance had only a weak influence on current family
size, although higher values of religiosity were asso¬
ciated with higher fertility amongst Catholics.
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Our data, similarly, showed little evidence of a
relationship between probability of having a third child
and religious affiliation. We divided our sample couples
into four religious groupings: Protestant, Catholic,
other and no religious affiliation. Protestant included
Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Mennonite, Pentecostal,
Presbyterian, Quaker and United. Catholic included
Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Ukranian Catholic.
Other included Mormon, Jehovah Witness and the "People's
Church". This classification system was based upon
religious doctrine; the Protestant religions all see
the Bible as the "main authority" in the Church, the
Catholic religions value both the Bible and the Church
traditions, and the other religions, "Para-Christian"
in religious terminology, have some prophet who is ac¬
credited equal status to the Bible. This classification
system also reflects a difference in attitudes to marital
sexual relations. The Catholic and other religious
affiliations^ see the primary purpose of marital sexual
relations as procreation. The Protestant religions, on
the other hand, are more apt to emphasise the happiness
of the couple and, hence, allow (and often encourage)
the use of birth control. Table k,2 presents the rela¬
tionship between future fertility intentions and both
wife's and husband's religious affiliation.
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Total N 46 34 19
Men and women with other religions were more likely than
average to be planning an additional child, but this was
the only noteworthy occurrence. It was also easily
explained; there were only six couples with other reli¬
gions and two of them were active members of the Mormon
Church — a church which does not allow the use of birth
control.
A more refined measure than religious affiliation
is religiousity. The reason why any relationship is
expected between religious affiliation and family size
is because certain Churches promote large families and
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proscribe birth control. It is common knowledge, however,
that many people "belong" to a Church without any com¬
mitment to its doctrines and teachings. Religiosity
circumvents this problem by measuring more directly the
influence of the religious affiliation.
In our sample, two religions promoted large families
and prohibited the use of birth control (Catholic and
Mormon) and we hypothesized that couples who belonged to
these denominations and attended their services regularly
would be most likely to want, and expect to have, large
families. That is, we used frequency of church atten¬
dance to measure religiosity on the grounds that atten¬
dance showed some commitment to a particular Church and
provided a basis for exposure to that Church's teachings.
We found our hypothesis to be supported, as is indicated
in Table 4.3» In this table we consider those couples
where both the husband and wife are Catholic or Mormon
and investigated the impact of their church attendance on
their anticipated family size.
Table 4.3 Religious Attendance by Future Fertility
Intentions for Catholic and Mormon Couples
Religious Attendance




No More Children 64 £ 29 £ 36 £
Undecided 18 57 18
Probably/Definitely 18 l4 46
More Children
_ _
Total N * 11 7 11
* In only one case did husband and wife not attend church
with similar frequency and in this case we coded the
couple according to the wife's frequency of attendance
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Couples who never attended services were similar to
the rest of the sample in their future fertility plans —
6k percent were not planning to have additional children.
Those who attended services but not regularly were unde¬
cided about whether or not they would have more children
and those who attended services regularly were most apt
to be planning on a third child — k6 percent said they
definitely or very likely would be having more children.
It thus would appear that whilst the influence of reli¬
gious affiliation per se is declining, active adherence
7
to particular denominations which promote large families
still influences fertility intentions.
Turning now to the influence social class has on
differential fertility, we shall begin by noting that
g
we adopted the method employed by many social researchers
and used the occupation of the husband as the principal
indicator of social class background. Although criti-
9
cisms have been raised of this method of measurement ,
we would argue that it does provide a broad classification
of people into the conventional social categories (i.e.
middle and working class) and that this broad classifi¬
cation was sufficient for our purposes.
Hawthorn has argued against (1970: 82-83) the use
of "social class" or "socio-economic status" in studies
of fertility because he feels that as a variable it is
"far too crude for causal analysis" — "it (social class)
could be measuring the effects, some of them contradictory,
of a host of factors: absolute and relative income and
wealth, occupational security, occupational and community
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prestige and status, educational experience, consumption
patterns and so forth". His point is veil taken as many
of the influences on fertility appear to be of a very
specific nature and may be quite lost in a wide measure
such as class. However, the relatively plentiful data
on differential fertility by social class can specify
questions that need to be asked; the variable has been
used, as we mentioned, in many studies and we felt it
could provide the start to more detailed analysis in ours.
Using as our social class index husband's occupation,
we classified our couples into four groups: professional/
managerial, other non-manual, skilled manual and semi-
and unskilled manual. The professional/managerial occu¬
pational category was composed of the families of pro¬
fessionals (doctors, teachers) and executives who exer¬
cised important managerial authority. Professionals
comprised eight percent of the sample (8) and managers
thirteen percent (l^). There were three students in the
sample — one in education at the University, one a post¬
graduate student in Chemistry and the third in a business
management course in a technological college. For summary
purposes, they were included in the first occupational
category as that would appear to be where they would
eventually find employment. The other non-manual category
was composed of the families of white-collar workers who
were engaged in more routinized occupations, such as
salesmen, order clerks and office supervisors. There
were seventeen such couples and they comprised seventeen
percent of the sample.
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The skilled manual occupational category was com¬
posed of the families of workers with some recognised
trade (i.e. electrician, plumber). There were twenty-
six such couples — twenty-five percent of the sample.
An additional eleven couples (ten percent) were in an
apprentice to some recognised trade and they were in¬
cluded in the skilled manual category. The semi- and
unskilled manual category was composed of those families
where the husband worked at semi- or unskilled jobs
such as waiter, janitor or truck driver. This category
numbered twenty-six and comprised 25 percent of the
sample.
Looking at the influence social class has on dif¬
ferential fertility, we found that the available data
seems to indicate a shift from negative to U shaped or
positive relations. In Canada, for instance, Charles
(19^8: 102) documented a negative relationship between
occupation and fertility in 19^8 and Henripin (1968: 228
229) again found the relation to be negative in the 1950
In the Toronto sample of 1968, however, the relation was
found to be U shaped (Balakrishnan, Kantner and Ailing-
ham, 1975: 3l)• The Alberta study of 1973 also showed
a slight U shaped relationship, although the differences
were not significant and the conclusion was that there
was little relationship between occupation and fertility
Recent British studies (for example, Cartwright, 1976
and Peel, 1970, 1972) which have used father's occupatio
as an index of social class have reported that their
measures of family size vary with social class in a U
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or J shape -- those in skilled non-manual occupations
want fewest children and those in professional and un¬
skilled manual occupations want the greatest number.
As Table indicates, our investigation found
little recognisable association between social class
(measured by husband's occupation) and the probability
of further children. If there was any trend, it was for
the relationship to assume an inverse J shape — the
unskilled manual class was the class least likely to be
planning more children and the other non-manuals were
the most likely to be planning them.
Table k.k Social Class by Future Fertility
Intentions
_ . _ ,,,.. Occupational CategoriesFuture Fertility ^ &
Intentions Prof.- Other Skilled Unskillec
Man. Non—Manual Manual Manual
Probably/Definitely
62 £No More Children 60 53 £ 41 £
Undecided 16 12 32 19
Probably/Definitely 2h 35 27 19
More Children
Total N 25 17 37 26
In our earlier discussion of the influence of age at
marriage on future fertility intentions we had suggested
that the high percent ^of women marrying when they were
under twenty and who were undecided about their future
fertility intentions could be accounted for by their
time orientation — the lower working class groups tend
to have a present rather than a future time orientation
which makes planning for the future more difficult. On
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the face of it, this relationship between social class
and future fertility intentions seems to provide evidence
against this hypothesis. If it is the lower working
class groups who have the greatest tendency to a present
time orientation, then surely it should be this group
with the greatest percent undecided about their future
fertility intentions. The data indicate, however, that
it is the skilled manuals who are most likely to be
undecided — 32 percent of them could not say whether
they would be having additional children versus 19 percent
of the unskilled manuals.
Reading through the interviews, though, made us
reluctant to dismiss this time-orientation hypothesis.
The relationship between present or future orientation
and social class seemed to exist on a wide variety of
items — from casual remarks the women made about how
they did their shopping (day to day, usually, for the
working classes and week to week for the middle classes)
to their ability to predict what they themselves would
be doing in five or ten years time. We would suggest
that the relationship does hold, but the present time
orientation of the women whose husbands had unskilled
manual occupations made them feel they would not be having
more children while it made the women whose husbands had
skilled manual occupations undecided about their future
fertility intentions. Women in the unskilled manual
category were, by and large, poorly off. Their income
and housing was inadequate for two children and thus
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when we asked them if they wanted more, they were quick
to say no. They could not see forward enough to a time
when, possibly, things would be better and they might
want more children. Women in the skilled manual category
were, on the other hand, a little better off arid hence
less apt to reject outright further increases in their
total family size. With their present orientation, they
were "undecided" about their future fertility intentions.
Cartwxight, Beaujot and Peel, all of whom suggested
a U or J shaped relationship between class and family
size, were dealing with women of all parities. It is
possible that if we waited until the end of our sample's
childbearing years, we too would find a J or U shaped
relation. The two manual classes may all decide to have
additional children if circumstances change to suit them.
This is, however, untestable. Moreover, contraceptive
sterilization is, as we shall see, becoming increasingly
available to all women in Canada, when they want it.
Many of our couples from the manual social classes were
deciding on this method and this would effectively curtail
any future changes in their fertility intentions.
In this introductory section of the quantitative
analysis, we have looked at the relationship between age
at marriage, religion and social class and our couples'
future fertility intentions. We found that the older a
woman married, the more likely she was to feel her family
was complete. It was suggested that social and biological
factors were the reason behind this; as we progress into
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the analysis we shall investigate these suggestions more
thoroughly. Ve found that women who married when they
were young tended to come from the manual social cate¬
gories and these categories were the most likely to be
undecided about their future fertility intentions. We
accounted for this by Askham's (1975) suggestion about
the present time orientation of the working classes —
a time orientation which makes planning for the future
difficult. Religious affiliation per se did not influence
future fertility intentions, however, active adherence
to particular denominations which promoted large families
appeared to.
4.2 Income Variables
The relationship between income and fertility has
been frequently investigated in the fertility literature.
It is widely assumed that fertility should vary positively
with income; however, this assumption receives little
empirical support from the literature. It is true that
over the course of the business cycle the relationship
between income and fertility is positive, but most cross-
sectional surveys show negative associations^. That
income ought to influence family growth decisions seems
intuitively right. Since income determines the amount
of available resources, it seems only natural to assume
that families with high incomes will be able to "afford"
more children than those doing less well financially.
That low income families have almost invariably been
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found to have more children than high income families
has generally been attributed to "a cultural lag in the
acceptance of small families, and in the mastery of the
means to attain them" (Coale, 1960s 5).
Since no direct or simple relationship between income
and fertility has been uncovered in cross-sectional studies,
some sociologists (for example, Blake, 1967; 1968) have
argued for the hypothesis to be dismissed. However, as
Simon outlines (1969: 3^l)* this argument misunderstands
the intricate nature of the economic thesis. Because
of the interaction between income and tastes, the thesis
can make no a priori predictions about the total effect
of income on fertility. That is, since income's effect
through tastes could be in either direction, the direct
positive effect on fertility could be nullified. More
to the point, to conclude that income and fertility need
not necessarily be positively related does not imply that
the income variable can be ignored all together. As Haw¬
thorn points out (1970s 78-79) "the nature and extent of
the offsetting process is an empirical question to be
determined afresh for each sample". Moreover, our study
found, as have others who have used an open-ended interview
technique (see, for instance, Cartwright, 1976), that
income ranks highly as a reason women give for both the
timing and spacing of their families and for the number
of children they desire. The impact of income on fertility
decisions must remain part of the analysis.
There are many facets of income that can be inves¬
tigated11. Traditionally, income has been measured as
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observed income at one point in time. More recently,
Easterlin (1970), following Becker (l965)f has argued
against this representation of the income concept. He
suggests that household decisions, particularly decisions
on items involving substantial outlays, are geared to the
longer term income prospects of the household. Easterlin
argues that the income concept that should be used is
potential income flow through time. We would agree that
potential income is a factor that couples take into account
in their fertility decisions, but would argue that observed
income at the present point in time is also a relevant
variable, particularly in regards to timing and spacing
of children. Its importance can be seen in the example
of two couples with similar tastes, price constraints,
and both with highly satisfactory potential incomes. One
couple may, however, delay the birth of their third child
because their present income is, for some passing reason,
unacceptable.
In addition to these income concepts, one needs to
gauge the anticipated variation of income around the
expected trend. Numerous researchers (see, for instance,
T. Paul Schultz, 1969 and Namboodiri, 1972b) have pointed
out that families that are not reasonably confident of
their future income potentials will respond differently
to fertility decisions than families that are reasonably
confident. Schultz, for example, writes:
The main source of family income is typically that
of the male head of the household. A change in his
income may have a variety of effects on parents'
desires for children, depending on whether the change
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in income is anticipated and whether it is permanent.
Because children represent a long-terra irreversible
commitment, parents are not likely to respond to a
change in income by adjusting the final number of
children they want unless they view the change as
permanent.
Schultz, 1969: 156
A final income related variable that appears worthy
of consideration is relative income. Deborah Freedman
(1963) investigated the relationship between economic
status and fertility and concluded that husband's income
does make a difference in the number of children a couple
will have if it is considered in relation to the average
income for the husband's occupational status and age.
An income that was above average was associated with more
children, but being in a higher absolute income class
meant fewer children if the higher income was only what
was usual. From Freedman's data, it appears that what
counts is not income per se but income relative to that
of others in one's age, occupational and educational
categories. Viewed this way, relative income can be seen
as income controlling for selected taste-forming factors.
In our research, observed income at the present
point in time was measured through the husband's income.
We debated whether to consider the wife's or the family
income, but past research has tended to use husband's
income. One good reason for this is that it keeps the
"income effect" separate from the "substitution effect",
which we discuss below. Also, we interviewed our women
six to eight weeks after the birth of their child and
many were undecided as to whether or not they would be
8b
returning to (or taking up) paid employment. We felt
that there would be an unacceptably high level of unre¬
liability if we used family income before the second child
was born to measure observed income now. There were too
many women changing their employment status between when
they had only the one child and now. Certainly, in this
day and age, a wife's income can make a very important
contribution to the family's standard of living, but, for
our sample, we felt it better to continue the analysis
12
using only husband's income .
There are always problems in the measurement of
income, particularly, as here, when we are considering
only the husband's income and when the wife is taken as
the source of that information. For this reason, two
"proxy measures" were also used. These were a measure
of current savings and the respondent's feeling of finan¬
cial success.
Suppose your husband lost his job tomorrow and
neither you nor he could find work for »ne month.
Do you feel that you could pay all your usual bills
for that month out of your family savings? Two
months? Three months?
How would you rate your family income at the moment?
Would you say it was enough for your needs, more
than enough, or less than what you really need?
Potential income flow through time and anticipated
variation of income around the expected trend were gauged
by the nature of the husband's occupation and education.
This was supplemented by questioning the respondent dir¬
ectly on her feelings regarding her family's potential
income.
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In about five years time, do you think that your
family's standard of living will go up a great deal,
go up slightly, be about the same or be worse than
it is now?
Relative income was measured by a comparison of the
husband's actual income with the income that was to be
expected given his age, occupation and education. Again
we supplemented the objective measure by questioning the
respondent directly on her feelings.
How would you compare yourself, financially, with
your friends? Would you say you are slightly better
off than they are, about the same, or worse off,
financially, than most of them are?
The respondent was also asked to discuss the reasons
why she wanted the number of children she did, and why
she decided (if there was a decision involved) to have
her children when she did. These open-ended questions
were also examined for references to economic influences.
Many researchers have commented on the difficulty
of obtaining information on a husband's income from his
wife —— either the wife does not know her husband's income,
or if she does know, she is not prepared to tell the
researcher. Anticipating such difficulties, we presented
our wives, at the end of the interview, with a card
with seventeen income categories listed on it and asked
her to circle first her income group and then her hus¬
band's. In practice, few seemed hesitant to circle
their income categories and, in fact, in a number of
cases, went to considerable lengths to find their old
income tax form so as to get the information correct.
The range of husbands' incomes was from $4,000 - $4,999
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to over $35,000. Four women did not know their husband's
income and three couples were in a situation where "annual
income before tax" made little sense — they ran farms
or businesses where they "took what they needed" rather
than a fixed income. The seventeen income categories
were collapsed to four for analysis: under $12,000;
$12,000 and over but under $15,000; $15,000 and over
but under $20,000; and $20,000 and over. Under $12,000
was chosen as the first category because, in Edmonton,
households earning this amount are eligible for public
assistance (i.e. subsidized housing, free medical and
dental care). The other three categories were decided
upon by listing all reported incomes and looking for
reasonable breakpoints. Inflation has been so rampant
in Canada that our original plan of using Statistics
Canada's 1970 Census categories was not feasible.
Those earning under $12,000 were clearly "poor".
There were eleven such couples and five were living in
subsidized housing. Two were living with parents and
two were renting in very old, run-down communities. One
couple was buying a condominium (the Canadian equivalent
of terraced housing and one of the less expensive forms
of housing) with the mortgage subsidized by the city;
however, they seemed to be over-reaching their financial
limits. The respondent made a number of references to
"going under month by month" and both husband and wife
were looking for additional work. The eleventh couple
owned their home outright but were exceptional in a number
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of ways ■— they had married in their late thirties and
had had both children in their forties. The home had
been acquired years previously by the husband. The hus¬
band was self-employed and seemed to be easing up on the
amount of work he did — and thus the salary he earned —
so as to finish a University degree and spend time with
his new family.
Twenty-eight couples were earning between $12,000
and $15,000. These couples were not as financially poor
as the first group, but were far from wealthy. Thirteen
of the couples were living in rented accomodation and
three were living with parents. The remaining twelve
were buying their own homes; however, 58 percent of these
homes were in the surrounding towns (where prices are
substantially cheaper) and 80 percent of those buying
in the city were buying condominiums.
There were thirty-seven couples earning between
$15,000 and $20,000 and they appeared to be comfortably
well-off. Only five such couples were renting and the
rest were buying their own homes. In contrast to those
earning $12,000 to $15,000, 75 percent of these couples
were buying detached houses and 53 percent of these houses
were in the city. Four couples were living on an acreage
(a small rural property); the first group where any
couple was able to afford to invest in land.
The highest income category was over $20,000 and
twenty-two couples were earning this much. They were
clearly "well-to-do" — all but one were buying (or had
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bought) their own home and the one couple that was renting
were looking to buy. Me asked each couple if they owned
a washer and dryer, two cars, a freezer and a colour
television and in this highest income group, 6k percent
owned all commodities. None of the couples in the lowest
income category owned all of the commodities and only
27 percent had three. The percentages of people owning
all four commodities for income groups $12,000 to $15,000
and $15,000 to $20,000 were 21 percent and 35 percent
respectively.
The relationship between husband's income and the
probability of having further children is, as we hinted
at in the beginning of this section, troubled by the
problem of unwanted births. Vestoff and Ryder outline
the dilemma:
The basic hypothesis, simply formulated, asserts
that the decision to have a child, or an additional
child, is a function of the preference for "pur¬
chasing" or "investing" in children vs. preferences
for other consumer durables, which in turn is a
function of resources (discretionary income) vs.
competing demands on those resources. The element
of uncertainty introduced by an unintended "invest¬
ment" (an unwanted birth) has been an embarrassment
to the decision model implicit in the theory. The
traditional finding, that income and fertility are
negatively related, has been interpreted as a con¬
sequence of this unintended component; if only
wanted births were isolated and analyzed, a positive
association between income and fertility would
emerge.
Westoff and Ryder, 1977: 296
Those studies that have attempted to isolate wanted
births have not found, however, a positive association
between income and fertility. Beaujot (1975), for in¬
stance, found both the wife's income and the family income
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to be negatively related to current fertility and Westoff
and Ryder (1977: 299) concluded with "the only generali¬
zation that can be offered with any assurance within the
limits of this analysis is that there is no evidence of
a positive correlation between actual income and the
number of births wanted for the cohort whose fertility
was nearly completed in 1970"• Even when Westoff and
Ryder (1977) controlled for education (on the grounds
that since income and education are directly related,
allowing education to vary dilutes the strength of any
positive association), they were unable to alter the
slight negative relationship of income and wanted ferti¬
lity. The conclusion in the light of such findings is
that no simple association between income and fertility
can be predicted — the association between education
and income confounds the relationship, as does the pos¬
sibility of parents investing in the "quality" of children
rather than simply their "quantity".
The relationship between husband's income and the
probability of having a third child, for our sample,
is outlined in Table ^.5* All births — wanted and
unwanted — are included.
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No More Children 73 £ 46 io 51 £ , 50 £
Undecided 18 25 19 32
Probably/Definitely
More Children
9 29 30 18
Total N * 11 28 37 22
* Total N equals 98 because information could not be
obtained from seven women about their husband's income.
As the table indicates, there was some evidence of
a positive or inverse U shaped relationship between the
two variables. Those earning under $12,000 were the most
likely not to be planning further children — only one
such couple thought they would be having a third child
and the respondent stressed that this would be "only when
we're really set up nice. Where we can afford it". The
relationship was not strictly linear, however, as the
other three income groups were very similar in their
intentions for more children; 46 percent, 51 percent
and 50 percent in the income groups $12,000 to $15»000,
$15,000 to $20,000 and over $20,000 respectively said
they were fairly sure they would be stopping with the
two children.
The inverse U shaped relation can be seen if less
attention is paid to the majority who wanted only two
children and if undecided is taken as a category midway
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between definitely no more and definitely more children.
Those earning between $12,000 and $15,000 who were not
settled on a family of two were almost equally divided
between "undecided" and definitely planning more children.
Those earning between $15,000 and $20,000 were more apt
to feel they would be having a third child, whilst those
in the highest income category were the most likely to
say they had not yet decided whether or not to have more
children. That is, the lowest income group was least
likely to be planning more than two children and the
$15»000 to $20,000 group were most likely. The highest
income group was most likely to be undecided.
These data are difficult to interpret theoretically
with any degree of certainty. Education has not been
controlled for and all births — wanted and unwanted —
13
are included . The evidence appears to suggest, however,
that it is the middle income couples who are most likely
to be considering a third child. The lower income couples —
possibly because of their lower incomes — are least
likely to be considering more children. This is also the
case with the higher income couples — possibly because
of their wider exposure to alternative rewards.
Turning now to relative income, Deborah Freedman
(1963s ^lU), as we mentioned previously, hypothesized
that relative income might affect fertility independently
of actual income because "the costs of rearing children
are related to the socioeconomic reference group of the
parents"• From her data it appeared that those doing
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well in relation to their peers (people of similar age,
occupation and education) had more children than those
doing poorly. Bernhardt (1972) in a Swedish study found
that relative income and fertility were positively related
at the higher end of the income scale, but the relation¬
ship was reversed at the lower end. Bernhardt had in¬
cluded all births, planned and unplanned, and used this
to account for the reason why her data did not entirely
support Freedman's. Westoff and Ryder (1977: 301), how¬
ever, did isolate wanted births and found no support
for Freedman's hypothesis — "substituting relative for
absolute income seems to . . . reduce the overall variance
of fertility, but not to alter the slight negative rela¬
tionship of income and wanted fertility".
To investigate the influence of relative income in
our data, we looked at the relationship between the like¬
lihood of a third child and income for each of our occu¬
pational categories. Because of small cell sizes we
present data for only those women who felt they likely
would not be having additional children. Table k.6 pre¬
sents the results; an asterick (*) marks the modal
income category for each occupational category, and total
N's are included because cell sizes are so small.
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Table h.6 Percentage of Women Who Feel They Probably
or Definitely WTill Not Have a Third Child by







Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
Man. Non-Manual Manual Manual
100 £ 100 $ 50 i 67 i>
67 1o 33 i * 36 i * 62 i
^5 i * 67 i * kO i 75 i
67 $ 50 i ko i 50 i





Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
Man. Non-Manual Manual Manual
2 1 2 6
3 6 11 8
11 6 10 10
6 k 10 2
* marks modal income class for each occupational
category.
When we were looking at the relationship between
class and decisions for more children, we found that the
unskilled manuals were marginally more likely to feel
their families were complete. This appeared to hold
regardless of the income they were earning. The modal
category for unskilled workers was $15»000 to $20,000
and 75 percent of these couples felt it was likely they
would stop with two children. The percentage who felt
the same way who earned less than the mode and who earned
more than the mode were respectively 62 percent and 50
percent — little suggestion of support for the relative
income hypothesis. The majority of the professional-
managerials were also planning on having two children
9*+
and, again, relative income, at least when it was mea¬
sured in this way, did not appear to change this. The
modal income category for the professional-managerials
was $15,000 to $20,000 and ^5 percent of this category
anticipated a family of two children. The percent who
wanted a family size of two and who earned less ($12,000
to $15,000) increased to 67 percent but so too did the
percent of those earning over $20,000. This and the
other data in the table indicated anything but support
1^
for a relative income hypothesis .
This finding was reinforced when we looked at the
relationship between the probability of a third child
and the respondent's feelings about her income in relation
to the income of her friends. This was likely to be a
better measure of relative income, but because we did
not collect systematic data on the average family size
of the respondent's friends, the rejection of the relative
income hypothesis must be undertaken with care. Table
k.7 presents the results; thirteen couples had to be
excluded because the wife said they had friends both
better and worse off than themselves.
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No More Children 67 % k3 i 76 io
Undecided 19 26 12
Probably/Definitely 14 31 12
More Children
Total N * 21 3b 17
* The total N equals 92 because 13 couples felt they
had friends both better off and worse off than them¬
selves.
Those who judged that they were doing better than
their friends and those who thought they were doing worse
than their friends were pretty sure they would not be
having more children. It was those couples who felt they
were no better or no worse off than their friends who
both wanted more children and who were undecided about
their future fertility plans.
A problem arises in using the data in this table to
reject the relative income hypothesis because to do so
we would have to assume that the average family size of
friends is similar for all groups. If we did not, we
could be misinterpreting the data. For example, if those
who were worse off than their friends nevertheless had
friends whose normal family size was four or five, then
they might still be expecting to have a third child and
yet, in relative terms, end up with fewer children than
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their friends. When we were conducting the interviews,
most women were asked how many children their friends
had and the common answer was two or three. To this
extent, the relative income hypothesis is rejected.
However, not all women were asked the question and there
were exceptions. Some religious groups (i.e. Mormons)
had friends with larger families and many of the women
who had married when they were teenagers had friends
with no children. To this extent, the data can not be
used to comment on the relative income hypothesis. The
empirical findings do stand, however — it was the middle
income groups which were most likely to consider a third
child problematic. The relatively rich and the relatively
poor, because of income, differences in tastes or what¬
ever, were most apt to feel their families were complete.
Because we had no independent check of how accurate
our wives1 estimations of their husbands' incomes were,
we asked each respondent two "proxy" questions -- one a
measure of current savings and the other a measure of
financial success. The current savings question did not
differentiate between the sample couples in any recog¬
nizable way. There was a very real problem with using
this measure with couples at this stage in their marriage —
many were in the midst of buying a house and their savings
were, temporarily at least, nonexistent. If they were
not buying, they were often looking and would volunteer
such comments as "well, we have lots of savings now,
but ask me that in a month and it'll be a different story".
97
If there is any "life-cycle" in the marriages of middle
income couples, then buying the first home comes around
the time the second child is born. For this reason,
this question was not analysed further.
The measure of financial success provides further
insight into our previous finding that it is the middle
income couples who are either planning or are undecided
about larger families. The measure of financial success
asked couples if they felt their present income was more
than enough, enough or less than they really needed.
Table 4.8 presents the results of the cross-tabulation;
three women did not answer the question and hence had to
be excluded.
Table 4.8 Perceived Adequacy of Income by Future
Fertility Intentions
_ , ..... Perceived Adequacy of IncomeFuture Fertility ^
Intentions Income More Income Income Less
Than Enough Enough Than Enough
Probably/Definitely
No More Children 67 i° 49 64
Undecided 25 20 27
Probably/Definitely 8 30 9
More Children
Total N * 12 79 11
* The total N equals 102 because three women felt
unable to assess the adequacy of their income.
Whereas 30 percent of those couples who felt their
income was enough for their needs were definitely or
probably planning more children, only 8 percent of those
who felt their income was more than enough and 9 percent
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of those who felt their income was less than what they
really needed felt this way. The couples who felt their
income was just enough were also the least likely to
feel their families were definitely or probably completed.
It could be argued that this relationship was simply
a function of the relationship between social class and
perceived adequacy of income — because the majority of
the professional-managerials felt their income was more
than enough and the majority of the unskilled manuals
felt their income was less than enough, ve really have
just replicated the original relationship between social
class and future fertility intentions. This does not
appear to be the case however. As Table 4.9 indicates,
the majority of couples in each social class grouping
felt their income was adequate.
Table 4,9 Social Class by Perceived Adequacy of
Income
_ _ Occupational CategoriesIncome Is 13
Felt To Be: Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
Man. Non-Manual Manual Manual
More Than Enough 13 6 $ 22 % 0
Enough 79 94 67 80
Less Than Enough 8 0 11 20
Total N * 24 17 36 25
* The total N equals 102 because three women felt
unable to assess the adequacy of their income.
Moreover, when the relationship between perceived adequacy
of income and future fertility intentions was controlled
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for class it was found to hold to some degree in each
occupational grouping"*^. In all categories, the majority
of women who felt their income was more than enough and
who felt it was less than enough were not planning to
have additional children. It was those couples; regardless
of their social class grouping who felt their income was
enough who were more likely to be planning or undecided
about a third child. Amongst the professional-managerials
and the unskilled manuals, it is true that the majority
who judged their income to be adequate were planning to
stop at two children, but there was a sizable minority
(much larger than amongst those who felt their income
was more or less than what they really needed) who were
definitely or probably planning on a third child. It
appears that our original finding that it was the middle
income couples who were either planning or were undecided
about larger families can be elaborated further — it
is those couples who feel their income is not too much
and not too little (and who, by and large, have average
incomes1^) who are most likely to be considering a third
child.
The last income concept we outlined as potentially
important to fertility decision making was the anticipated
variation of income. Researchers (for instance, Nam-
boodiri, 1972b and T. Paul Schultz, 1969) had argued
that couples, in deciding how many children to have, take
into account their long term income prospects. Since
children involve continuing expenditures, couples are
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more apt to use their anticipated future income than
their present income in determining hov many children
they should have. We measured this concept, as Cart-
wright (1976) did, by asking the couples if they thought
they would be better off, about the same, or worse off
in five years time. Cartwright found (1976: 132) that
expectations about being better or worse off were unrelated
to the sample womens' intentions about having further
children. The data for our sample are presented below;
six respondents had to be excluded as they were unable to
decide what would happen to their standard of living in
the future.
Table 4.10 Anticipated Income Trend by Future
Fertility Intentions
In 5 Years Your Standard of Living Should?
Future Fertility _ _ _ _
... Go Up A Go Up Remain Become
11 1 "
Great Deal Slightly the Same Worse
Probably/Definitely 58 $ 54 55 $ 0
No More Children






Total N * 19 61 18
* The total N equals 99 because six women were unable
to decide what would happen to their standard of
living in the future.
The table indicates, as Cartwright's data did, that
there is no relationship between the anticipated income
trend, at least as it was measured here, and future
fertility intentions — 58 percent, 54 percent and 55
percent of the couples who felt that in the next five
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years their standard of living- would go up greatly, go
up slightly, and remain the same respectively were fairly
sure they would not be having additional children. We
are, however, hesitant to use this data to reject the
hypothesis that a couple's anticipated future ihcome
trend influences their probability of having a third
child. Only one person thought her family's standard of
living would be lower in five years than it was now and
this was because she wanted a third and possibly a fourth
child. She knew that in five years she would definitely
have three children and thus not be able to continue
working — she trusted only her mother to babysit and her
mother had told her she was prepared to take care of no
more than two children. Comments the occasional woman
would make — for example, from a woman whose husband was
still at University, "We had the knowledge that when he
did finish school, money hopefully would not be a problem.
It wasn't as if we thought we were going to be poor all
of our lives." — suggested that the variable did have
an influence, but that our measure was not tapping it.
The results of the qualitative analysis of the comments
that the women made regarding their families are forth¬
coming in Part III, but we shall point out here some of
our findings on the income variable. When we reviewed
the women's comments on why they wanted a particular
family size, an interesting paradox emerged — 67 percent
of the women mentioned economic factors as an influence
on their family size decision making, and yet 76 percent
were quite adamant that they would not have more children
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than they were presently planning if they were substan¬
tially z'icher. Again and again, women would make the
following type of comment:
(Do economic factors play any part in your family
size?) Yes, yes they do. We're farmers and we're
not doing that well. We were in pigs and we lost
quite a few. We're just recuperating now. And we've
just got a two bedroom house and we'll have to build
on eventually .... (if wealthier, would you have
more children?) No, definitely no. I didn't mind
being pregnant, the only thing I didn't like about
being pregnant was being fat. That really, really,
really bothered me. And I just don't want to go
through all that again. (So even if you could afford
more children, you wouldn't be willing to have
them?) Right.
(Why two children?) It's what we can afford. We
have a three bedroom condo and that gives them a bed¬
room each and that's what my husband's salary can
afford. We can afford to feed them and clothe them
and that's the important things. (if wealthier,
would you have had more children?) I don't think
so. My husband comes from a family of two and I
come from a family of three and that's all we know,
so we like small families.
(Why two children?) Well, financially, that's what
we feel we can afford. (Would you have more children
if you were wealthier?) No, I don't think so, no.
I'm really satisfied with two kids. Everybody has
their limit as to what they can handle and I think
I'd be pushing myself as far as patience and being
able to give them both the attention we want them to
have .
It appears that for various reasons couples had
decided they wanted two children, and then they perceived
economic factors as influencing that decision. However,
economic factors did not appear to act in any direct way
on individuals. As we mentioned above, over 75 percent
of the respondents said they would not have more children
if they were wealthier and, when asked how many children
they could afford, an equally high percentage gave a
figure higher than what they actually planned. It is
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entirely plausible (and we would argue qtiite likely)
that economic interpretations were seen by the women as
good rationales to give to the interviewer — and to use
for themselves — to account for complex and probably not
fully examined series of decisions and actions.* Thus,
although many people appeared to see money as a major
factor in their decisions about a third child, the data
indicated that its influence was far from direct. Cart-
wright (1976) found a similar paradox in her data and her
summary paragraph captures our conclusion:
It is difficult to make sense of these findings
without being wildly speculative. It may be that
when mothers said they did not want more children,
or only wanted two children because of the expense,
this is more a reflection of cultural norms and
expectations than of their own individual situation.
For various reasons they had decided they wanted
two children and they perceived economic factors
as influencing that decision, but there is no
evidence from this study to show that economic pres¬
sures act in any direct way on individuals.
Cartwright, 1976: 128
In this section of the thesis we have examined the
influence of a variety of economic factors on the couple's
decision regarding a third child. From the comments the
women made, it appeared that the income variable would
be a very important influence on the decision regarding
a third child. The data indicated, however, that its
influence was far from direct. The one finding that did
emerge from a number of different indicators was that
it was the middle income groups who were most likely to
be considering a third child. Cartwright (1976) found
a similar trend in her data and accounted for it as follows:
10*4
These general economic influences seem more likely
to operate on the middle range of families, with
those at the two extremes being rather less affected.
At one end money and influence may enable families
to ignore norms, at the other end, lack of money
and influence may mean families do not share the
same norms.
Cartwright, 1976: 166
This is one possible explanation; an alternative
explanation refers back to our basic hypothesis (Westoff
and Ryder, 1977: 296): "The basic hypothesis ... asserts
that the decision to have a child ... is a function of
the preference for "purchasing" ... children vs. pre¬
ferences for other consumer durables, which in turn is
a function of resources (discretionary income) vs. com¬
peting demands on these resources". It could be argued
that couples whose income was less than adequate (be it
measured through actual income, relative income or per¬
ceived adequacy of income) were less likely to want three
children because they lacked "resources" or "discretionary
income". Further, couples whose income was more than
adequate (measured by the same three indicators) were
also less likely to want three children but because they
had greater "competing demands" on their resources. It
was the middle income couples who were the most likely to
be in a position to be considering a third child — they
did not have as many competing demands, but they were not
as constrained by income. This is, in fact, one of the
organising themes of the qualitative analysis and the
reader is referred to the fuller discussion in Part III.
Little other than the finding that middle income
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couples were most likely to be considering a third child
was uncovered in the analysis. "We found little support
for the relative income hypothesis, although this may
well have been due to problems with our measure. This
was also the case with the consideration of the' influence
of long-term income prospects. Our measure showed that
this variable had very little impact on the decision for
a third child, but our feeling was that this was as
likely to do with our indicator as with the variable.
Although the qualitative reading of the interviews did
not give any indication to support a relative income
hypothesis, comments the women made did suggest that a
couple's long-term income prospects were a contributing
factor in their decision regarding a third child.
4.3 Price Variables
There has been a growing realization in fertility
17
literature that the costs of children must include
both the direct outlays required for childbearing and
rearing and the indirect (or opportunity) costs involved
in the time required for these activities. With respect
to direct costs, theorists (see, for instance, Easterlin,
1970; Duesenberry, i960) have more or less concluded
that the minimum expenditure per child that parents can
reasonably consider rises with income. There have been
some differences of opinion about the reasons for this,
but there seems to be growing consensus that the expen¬
diture in any social class is a constraint imposed by
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the respective reference groups. For example, Easterlin
writes:
It is sometimes argued ... that the fact that the
rich spend more per child than the poor is indicative
of the operation of a differential, higher price
constraint, adverse to fertility. . . . Clearly,
differences in observed expenditures per child do
not necessarily reflect differences in the set of
prices constraining household choices, because
expenditures contain both price and quantity com¬
ponents. If household incomes or tastes differ,
then expenditures per child can vary even if the
price tags attached to each potentially relevant
quantity is the same for all households, simply
because different quantities may be purchased. . .
it seems that there has been a tendency to infer
that expenditure differences imply price differences,
when they really reflect variations in tastes.
Easterlin, 1970: 130-131
Easterlin's argument is that the fact the rich spend
more per child than the poor does not necessarily mean
the prices of goods are higher for them. The set of
prices confronting households is likely more or less
uniform for all income groups, and if the rich spend more
per child than the poor, then it is no doubt due to dif¬
ferences in tastes. Higher income groups have more ex¬
pensive tastes — items such as summer camps, music
lessons and advanced education are, for instance, con¬
sidered mandatory. Thus, under direct costs of children,
we need to consider not actual monetary outlays but
rather child-quality standards. By this we mean the
level of material comfort with which the couple feel it
18
is necessary to provide each of their children .
Indirect costs have increasingly been suggested as
important considerations in regard to prices. This has
primarily been a function of a new version of the economic
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theory of fertility, derived chiefly from a 19^5 article
by Becker and distinguished by the use of a "household
production function". This version of fertility theory
(typified by the articles in the 1973 (81: 2) Paft II
edition of the Journal of Political Economy) was "designed
primarily to analyze the effects of the differences in
the price of the time of parents that enter directly or
indirectly into the production of children" (Theodore V.
Schultz, 1973: S7). The theory argues that there is a
difference in the value of time of mothers in bearing
and rearing children associated with the difference in
the human capital of mothers — well-educated mothers
(using education as a measure of potential earnings)
stand to lose more, in economic terms, by having children.
This version of the economic theory of fertility has
come tinder increasing attack by both economists and
sociologists. For example, Gronau writes:
The adage "time is money" has, since Becker's path-
breaking article of 1965* become a part of economic
theory. The answer to the question, "How much
money is time?" leads, however, a shaky life within
the framework of economic analysis. More and more
economists ... have come to question the tradi¬
tional answer that the value one places on his time
is equal to the person's marginal wage rate. This
contention drew fire from two directions — from
those arguing that this equality ignores any possible
differentials between the direct utilities associated
with work and nonwork activities, and from those
attacking the presupposition that time can be shifted
freely between the market and nonmarket sector.
Gronau, 1973: S170-S171
Both criticisms are relevant to sociologists working
on fertility models. With regard to the first criticism,
although economists generally admit the existence of a
1 of)
diversity of preferences with regard to childbearing
and working in the market, the theory is developed and
the empirical applications are conducted as if all families
19have the same preferences . This, as Namboodiri has
clearly pointed out, is not the case — the cost of a
woman's time is not always determined by market forces.
Consider a woman who attaches very great importance
to participating in activity A (e.g. developing a
career) and relatively much less importance to
participating in activity B (e.g. having another
child). To this woman the cost of time that she
may have to take from activity A in order to par¬
ticipate in activity B would be considerably higher
than for another woman to whom both the above acti¬
vities are of equal importance.
Namboodiri, 1972b: ^72
This type of reasoning leads us to suggest that in mea¬
suring indirect costs we should consider the relative
priority attached to bearing and rearing a third child
as opposed to participating in extra-familial leisure
and work activities, taking into account the desire to
work and the ability to find both adequate employment
and childminding services. This we consider a taste
factor and is discussed in the following section.
There remains the concept of indirect costs intended
by the economists. Theoretically, we question whether
or not there is such a concept, distinct from the taste
concept. However, it has received considerable attention
from economists and, thus, we shall attempt some measure
of it here. By including such a measure we hope to
clarify some of the ambiguities that we feel surround
the variable.
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Direct costs, as we outlined above, were measured
as child-quality standards. Myra Woolf (1971: 105-108),
ir» an English study of family intentions, conducted
lengthy unstructured interviews with seventy women about
their attitudes and ideas on motherhood, children and
the family. From comments made by the women, measures
were constructed illustrating four attitudes that might
have been related to family size. These measures were
then included in the more formal pilot stage of the
investigation and answers to the attitude statements were
subjected to a factor analysis to see if they combined
to form comprehensive indices of attitudes. Items illus¬
trating three attitudes proved quite stable and were
included in the final questionnaire. The answers to the
relevant questions in the final questionnaire were again
factor analysed and when the solution was rotated, re¬
sulted in five dimensions which Voolf described as illus¬
trating: (l) children are an encumbrance, (2) there is
a concern with overcrowding and overpopulation, (3)
material considerations are relevant where children are
concerned, (4) motherhood and children are satisfying,
(5) children need siblings and training in sharing.
The third dimension — material conditions — appeared
to be an adequate measure of child-quality standards.
It measured how important women thought new clothes,
separate bedrooms, a nice home, toys like other children's
and individual attention from the parents were for child¬
ren. We used the first four of these questions(we re¬
garded the fifth question, dealing with the necessity
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of spending time with children, as an indirect cost)
and introduced a fifth and sixth question on the importance
of a backyard and the importance of a yearly holiday.
These were two concerns that young Canadian couples had
repeatedly mentioned to us when we had informally dis¬
cussed the topic of "what do children need" with them.
Since we wanted the index to include a "behavioral" aspect
as well as an "importance" aspect (that is, not only how
important the item was, but whether it would be purchased
or not), we outlined three response categories for the
women to choose from:
a. very important — the item was so important that
they really would not have a child unless the com¬
modity could be provided.
b. important — the item was important and they would
try to provide it for their children, and
c. unimportant — the item was unimportant and no
special attempts would be made to supply it to
their children.
Each very important was scored two, each important one
and each unimportant zero, so that a composite score
for each woman was derived. Half values were allowed
as some women felt certain commodities were "halfway
between" the various categories. The total scores ranged
between twelve and two, and we classified those women
scoring 5*5 or less as having low child-quality standards
and those scoring above 5»5 as having high child-quality
standards. This seemed a reasonable break-point and
yielded two roughly equal size categories for our analysis.
The problem with this measure was that it was very
difficult to validate; that is, it was difficult to
111
show that the six items we included were items that a
significant proportion of Canadians in all occupational
groups believed to be relevant for children. If this
requirement is not met, then the data are difficult to
interpret. For example, women may have scored low on
our indicator not because they held low child-quality
standards but because they did not see the items that
we asked about as being particularly relevant. They may
well have had other, equally expensive, items that they
did feel were important for children. Moreover, we
included this measure after reviewing literature (see
our earlier discussion) which argued that the minimum
expenditure per child that parents can reasonably con¬
sider rises with social class. This implies that child-
quality standards should have been positively associated
with our social class measure — the tastes of the non-
manuals should have been such that they assessed the
direct costs of children as higher than the manuals did.
As Table 4.11 indicates, however, this was not borne out.
Table 4.11 Social Class by Child-Quality Standards
Occupational Category
, ,, ... Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
j !> 7 Man. Non-Manual Manual ManualStandards
High 56 % 53 # 54 io 54 £
Low 44 47 46 46
Total N 25 17 37 26
The respondents in the professional-managerial category
were no more likely than the respondents in the unskilled




Faced with these difficulties we had to revise
our initial intentions of examining the influence of
child-quality standards on fertility intentions in the
sample as a whole. We decided to investigate the rela¬
tionship between child-quality standards and the pro¬
bability of having a third child only within occupational
categories. We felt that this would, to some degree,
control for selected taste-forming factors; that it
was more likely that our six items were similarly being
assessed as relevant (or not relevant) by women in simi¬
lar occupational strata. We also reanalysed the data
using the components of the index to see if any of the
subitems showed different patterns of association.
Table 4,12 presents the relationship between child-quality
standards and future fertility intentions for non-manual
and manual occupational groups. We collapsed our social
class indicator into two categories to increase cell
sizes and because the professional-managerials and other
non-manuals showed a similar pattern of relationship
as did the skilled and unskilled manuals.
Table 4,12 Child-Quality Standards by Future Fer¬
tility Intentions for Non-Manual and Manual
Occupational Categories
Non-Manual Category Manual Category
Child-Quality Standards
High Low High Low
Probably/Definitely
No More Children 74 £ 37 50 £ 48 #
Undecided 13 16 32 21
Probably/Definitely 13 47 18 31
More Children
Total N 23 19 34 29
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As the table indicates, there was a relationship
between child-quality standards and intentions regarding
a third child but only amongst the non-manual workers.
The majority of the non-manuals who felt it was important
to give their children many material comforts were planning
on having two children — 7^ percent said this was their
intention versus 37 percent of those who assessed the
direct costs of children as low. Conversely, approximately
50 percent of the manual workers were intending to stop
with two children regardless of their child-quality
standards.
In our attempt to explain these results, we examined
21
the relationship for each of the sub-items . Amongst
the non-manuals, the relationship held for each of the
commodities except "new clothes rather than hand-me-
downs" where there was little association. Amongst the
manual workers, however, two items (new clothes and
separate bedrooms) showed the expected relationship,
two items (a nice home and new toys) showed an opposite
relationship, and two items (a backyard and a yearly
holiday) showed no relationship.
Interpreting these results must remain highly specu¬
lative. If we assume that all the women in the non-
manual occupational category assessed the items we included
in our index as relevant for children, then it appears
that those with high child-quality standards were less
likely to be considering a third child than those with
low child-quality standards. This could provide support
11*1
to the hypothesis that parents invest in the "quality"
of children at the expense of "quantity" — that is, as
child-quality standards increase, child "quantities"
decrease. This is highly speculative, however, as we
can refer only to face validity to assert that our items
are relevant to a non-manual occupational category.
As to the data concerning the manual workers, there is
little we can conclude. We have no way of independently
checking how relevant our index*s sub-items were and hence
are not in a position to comment on the influence or
lack of influence of child-quality standards. With
regard to some items, the expected relationship between
child-quality standards and probability of a third child
was found, but no relationship and even opposite rela¬
tionships were found for other items.
Turning to the indirect costs of childcare, we found
that economists (see, for instance, Gregory and Campbell,
1976; Willis, 1973? Michael, 1973) have largely meant
the indirect costs to the wife, that is, her potential
earnings in the market place. The higher the wife's
potential earnings, the higher the price of a child. By
and large, the woman's education is used as a measure
of the price of her time, (it is for instance in Willis
(1973) and Michael (1973) noted above). The danger with
this, however, is that level of education is many-faceted
and seems to be "interpreted in empirical work as a good
proxij variable for whatever is of interest to the re¬
searcher" (Robert Michael, 1973: Sl^O). Moreover, these
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measures of indirect costs overlook Easterlin's (1970)
criticism that a woman contemplating a (another) child
does not necessarily assess the costs of childcare in
terms of earnings she must forego, but rather in terms
of the price of pertinent child-minding services she has
access to. He suggested that opportunity costs could
approach zero if there was a relative available for child-
minding or public provision of free day-care centers.
Taking these considerations into mind, we measured
indirect costs by asking the woman how much she would
stand to gain — economically — by returning to work.
We prefaced this question by asking about the types of
employment the woman could find and the kind of child-
care she would use if she did return to work, so that
these factors would be uppermost in her mind when she
made her assessment. The women's responses were coded
into four categories: it would be profitable for her
to return to work; the woman would be ahead financially,
but only slightly; the woman would be breaking even if
she returned to work; and the woman would actually be
losing money if she returned to work.
According to the economists, as the indirect costs
of a child go up so too should the desire to limit the
size of one's family — well-paid mothers (i,e, those
for whom the indirect costs of a child are high) stand
to lose more, economically, by having children. Using
our measure of indirect costs, this hypothesis gains
no support. Table 4.13 shows the lack of relationship
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between indirect costs and future fertility intentions.
Table 4.13 Indirect Costs by Future Fertility
Intentions
By working, women would:
Future Fertility 1x5se ®reak Sm^ Profit
Intentions Money Even Profit
Probably/Definitely
No More Children 54 74 % 47 £ 47 £
Undecided 15 17 27 27
Probably/Definitely 31 9 27 27
More Children
Total N * 13 23 13 45
* The total N equals 96 because nine women felt
unable to answer the question.
Women for whom it would be very profitable to return
to work were no more likely to feel that they had finished
childbearing than women who would only be breaking even
by returning to work — 47 percent of the women for whom
indirect costs were high said they likely would not be
having further children as compared to 34 percent of
those women who would actually lose money by attempting
to return to work. Conversely, 31 percent of the women
who would lose money by working thought they would be
having more children as compared to 27 percent of those
who were "losing money" by not working.
In the introduction to this section on prices, we
questioned whether there was such a concept as indirect
costs as the economists used the term. Certainly con¬
ducting the interviews did nothing to dispel our doubts.
Economists have found that a woman's education correlates
117
vith her anticipated family size and we would not dis¬
agree such a relationship does exist. However, to con¬
clude that this relationship indicates the influence of
indirect costs seems far too simplistic to us. When we
measured indirect costs more directly (i.e. through the
woman*s estimation of how much money she was losing by
not working), no relationship with fertility intentions
emerged. Moreover, in the interviews themselves, many
fee io
women would have to(really prodded - even/answer
how much they would stand to gain by working — it was
clearly a question they had never thought about and,
furthermore, did not want to think about. They had no
intention of working (or conversely, were working for
their "sanity") and found it hard to put a price on their
time. If by probing we did come up with an answer, the
woman was sure to qualify it; "Even if I did make money
I'd never go back to work when the kids are at home.
Why have kids?" or, conversely, "Sometimes I have to
work just to get out. Even if it was just money for the
babysitter, I'd have to get out. There's no price you
can put on that". The level of a woman's education no
doubt influences her decisions regarding family size
but, we would argue, only in isolated cases because of
the indirect costs of her time. In the next section we
consider tastes for children and this we feel is much
more useful in accounting for the relationship between
education and fertility intentions than indirect costs.
In this section on the prices of children, we have
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considered both direct and indirect costs. With respect
to direct costs, we were unable to answer the question
we had initially set for ourselves. It remains a matter
for investigation whether or not wealthier couples feel
under greater pressure to spend money on their-children
and, further, whether this influences the number of children
they have, WTe did investigate the influence six material
commodities had on our couples' intentions regarding a
third child and found, for the non-manual members of our
sample, that the more these commodities were valued, the
less likely a third child was planned. This may well
have revealed some "play-off" between "quality" and
"quantity" of children; however, as we could not validate
(other than by inspection and casual conversation) the
relevance of the commodities to the couples, the results
must be considered speculative. For the manual members
of the sample, a variety of relationships was uncovered,
but because of difficulties with our indicator, there
was little we felt we could conclude. Indirect costs,
at least as we measured them (through the woman's esti¬
mation of how much money she was losing by not working),
showed no relationship with fertility intentions. From
the interview data, we concluded that the economists'
emphasis on the financial benefits women forego by not
working (or gain by working) and the influence this has
on fertility intentions may be misplaced. None of our
women appeared to be considering the "substitution"
effect in their considerations regarding a third child.
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*4 .*4 Faste Variables
The final factor in our theoretical framework to
be considered is tastes. It is also the facet of the
socioeconomic theory of fertility that has received the
most criticism. Measurement of theoretical concepts is
difficult at the best of times, but becomes even more
difficult when "tastes" or "preferences" for children are
being considered. As T. Paul Schultz (1969: 176-177),
for instance, has noted, these are conceptual variables
for which empirical counterparts are difficult to find.
This said, however, we have in our favour a large body
of previous research which has attempted to measure tastes
and from which we could cull useful questions.
It became very obvious when we were reviewing the
literature on motherhood, children and families, that
the dimensions of attitudes concerned with such subjects
were numerous. After considering this literature, we
decided to organise our discussion of taste factors impor¬
tant in influencing fertility decisions around the
following four factors: size and composition of the
ideal family, the conjugal relationship, sex-role norms
and behavior and antipathy towards children. This divi¬
sion into four factors is quite arbitrary and, although
based on a careful review of previous research, it
should be seen more as an aid to reduce confusion, than
as a comment on the dimensions of tastes. Our feeling,
in accord with Banks (195^: 1-2), was that "although
it is always possible to think of a number of likely
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explanations for any kind of phenomena, a real advance
in knowledge begins only when a serious attempt is made
to evaluate these claims". Moreover, "an empirical
investigation which tried to carry along every conceivable
influence upon the fall in fertility would become tediously
involved and complicated. If we are to make any progress
at all, some kind of selection of the main influences
is necessary" (195^5 8), The taste factors we selected
for consideration appeared to be central to the decision
making behavior of our couples and there were certainly
no factors which a large number of the couples mentioned,
but which we ignored. However, as we said, the division
is arbitrary (although based on the previous research)
and is intended more as an aid to the presentation of
the data than as a comment on the dimensions of tastes.
Size and Composition of the "Ideal Family"
The importance of the size and composition of a
couple's "ideal family" to decisions concerning the birth
of a third child is readily obvious. No doubt these
"ideals" change over the course of a couple's reproductive
lifetime in response to actual experience with child-
bearing and rearing (see, for instance, Cartwright, 1976),
but we would argue that at any given point stated family
ideals will be a factor influencing couples to try or
not to try for a child, Ve measured this factor through
the following set of questions:
Thinking about couples more or less like yourself,
what do you think is the ideal number of children
121
for them to have nowadays?
What do you think is the ideal number of children
for a couple in this country nowadays, supposing
they had no particular worries about money or any¬
thing like that?
Some couples want a certain minimum number of boys
and girls. For instance, they continue to have
children until they have a son or a daughter. Would
you continue to have children until you had at
least one boy? And how about at least one girl?
The inclusion of questions on ideal family size is
common in population surveys (see, for instance, Cart-
wright, 1976; Askham, 1975) and most have found that
the family size couples consider ideal for people "more
or less like themselves" is lower than what they consider
to be ideal for those with "no particular worries about
money or anything like that". Some surveys mention in
passing that there are couples who will not answer the
question — in Cartwright's study, for instance, 8 per¬
cent of the women felt the best number of children was
"up to the couple to decide" — but this is never presented
as an overwhelming problem. In our survey, the problem
was overwhelming — the majority of women answered the
questions on ideal family size with "it depends on the
person" or "I can't say for others — it's whatever they
can manage". We may have set ourselves up for this lack
of response by stressing previously in the interview
that we were interested in individual feelings and atti¬
tudes; that everyone had different views but theirs
were what we wanted. When it became evident that the
questions "were not working", we reworded them to:
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What is the ideal family size for you and yotir
husband?
Say you were substantially richer, how many children
would you have; that is, what would be the ideal
family size then?
The reworded question on ideal family size followed
the discussion on why the couple were planning the number
of children they were and many took ideal and anticipated
family size to be synonomous. We tried to differentiate
between the two concepts but, for many, the distinction
did not seem to be fully grasped. As it was, 63.5 per¬
cent (5^, 20 women were not asked the question) said
that their ideal family size was what they were planning
to have -- they felt fairly comfortable that they would
be able to meet, and not exceed, their ideal family
size. The majority of the remaining 36.5 percent (31)
of the women who gave differing numbers for ideal and
anticipated family size had given a multiple answer for
what they anticipated and were more firm in what they
saw as ideal — for instance, nine women anticipated
two or three children whereas their ideal was two; they
saw the ideal family as a boy and a girl and, because
they either had two boys or two girls, were debating
whether to try for a third or not. Only six women gave
what seemed to be contradictory answers — their ideal
was two children, but they anticipated more than two or
three. No one in this group, however, felt that they
22
would exceed their ideals due to contraceptive failure —
it was more likely that they were going on to have children
of the sex they wanted or to have children when they
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could better afford them and thus enjoy them more. In
fact, half of the six women who apparently gave contra¬
dictory answers could be said to have misunderstood
what was intended by the question. The ideal family
size was two for them — at the moment. But they anti¬
cipated three, four or five children in the future, when
and if they could afford them — and, most likely, when
their ideals were also three, four or five.
The responses to the question of ideal family size
if the couple was substantially better-off were referred
to in the income section of this chapter. Eighty-eight
women were asked the question and 76 percent were quite
sure they would not have additional children if they had
more money. The majority of the remainder thought addi¬
tional money would increase their family size, but three
said if they were wealthier they would not have any
children. Their feeling is captured by the woman who
said "oh, if I were super-wealthy, I'd be too busy tra¬
velling and doing what I wanted to do to have any children".
Those who did feel they would have more children if they
had more money were usually thinking in terms of an
additional two or three children. Nobody, even in this
case where money was no barrier, claimed an ideal family
size of over six children.
It is difficult to compare these results with those
from other surveys, not only because of the changes in
the question wording, but because the previous surveys
cover different societies and different periods in time.
I2h
The results suggest, though, that among our women, two
is the most common anticipated and ideal family size.
The majority of the respondents felt they would be able
to attain their ideal family size and those who antici¬
pated having more than their ideal were thinking in terms
of no more than one or two additional children. Only one
woman said one child was ideal and to that extent the
sample conformed to previous samples who uniformily
dismiss the one-child family as undesirable. Income did
not seem to affect significantly the stated ideal family
size. Over seventy-five percent of the respondents
thought the ideal family size was what they were planning
to have and this remained firm regardless of what their
economic position might be.
Turning to the sex composition of the ideal family,
the previous research suggests contradictory conclusions.
Vestoff, Potter, Sagi and Mishler (1961: 29*0 » in their
study of American couples with two children, found that
their data "provided unequivocal evidence of a relation¬
ship between sex of offspring and the number of addi¬
tional children desired. On the average couples having
children of the same sex desired the most children".
Cartwright (1976), likewise, found that among British
couples with two children, those where the two children
were the same sex were more likely to be hoping for a
larger family than those where the two children were the
opposite sex. She concluded that "a desire for a mixed-
sex family contributes to that decision (the decision
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concerning future fertility)" (1976: 29). Askham (l975)»
on the other hand, did not find that the sex of offspring
greatly influenced a couple's future fertility intentions —
among her Scottish couples, there was not a greater
tendency for the first two children to be the same sex
amongst those with four children. In fact, because the
sex of the first two children did not help account for
differential fertility, Askham did not explore the question
further.
For our couples, concern about the sex of children
did seem to enter, to some degree, into attitudes about
a third child. Table ^.l4 shows the future fertility
intentions of our couples controlling for the family they
presently have.
Table k.lk Sex Composition of Present Family by
Future Fertility Intentions
„ , , . , , , Present FamilyFuture Fertility J
Intentions Two Boys Two Girls Boy and
Girl
Probably/Definitely
No More Children h2 <$> 52 58 #
Undecided 27 26 17
Probably/Definitely 31 23 25
More Children
Total N 26 31 hS
Those with a boy and a girl were most likely to be
stopping with two children (58 percent compared to k2
percent of those with two boys and 52 percent of those
with two girlsalthough the differences were not that
large. Those with two boys or two girls were more likely
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to be undecided about their future intentions; the
percentage of those definitely planning to have more
children was fairly uniform across the three sex compo¬
sition classes.
We asked those respondents who had two children of
the same sex and were planning additional children, what
they would have done if they had had a boy and a girl.
There were twenty-eight such couples, and 6l percent of
them said they would have stopped at two if they had had
a boy and a girl. An additional 11 percent said they
might have stopped with a boy and a girl, which left
only 29 percent who said they would have gone on regardless
of the sex of their first two children. We also looked
at the reverse of this — we asked those couples with a
boy and a girl what they would have done if they had had
two boys or two girls. Amongst those who were planning
to stop with their present two children, 43 percent said
they would have gone on if they had had either two boys
or two girls. Our data, thus, seemed to indicate that
sex composition did influence couples in their desire for
children. While it may not necessarily have made them
claim, at this stage, definitely to want more children,
it did appear to make them more undecided about how many
children to have. It seems that the desire for a mixed-
sex family was one taste factor couples considered when
they planned how many children they would have.
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The Conjugal Relationship
Our second taste factor was the conjugal relation¬
ship and by this we meant the nature of the relationship
between the husband and wife and its influence on the
decision regarding a third child. Rainwater (1*965)
organised his study of family design around the concept
of "conjugal role relationship" which he defined as
"their (i.e. the husband and wife's) typical ways of
organizing the performance of tasks, their reciprocal
expectations, their characteristic ways of communicating
and the kind of solidarity that exists between them"
(1965: 29). Rainwater found that no combination of in¬
dicators did a better job of discriminating medium-size
from large-size family preferences "than the single
factor of jointly organized versus medium-segregated
conjugal role-relationships" (page 199)# By jointly
organised and medium segregated conjugal role relation¬
ships, he meant, following Elizabeth Bott (l957)» how
interwoven the interests and concerns of the husband
and wife were. In a jointly organised conjugal role
relationship, the husband and wife undertook many acti¬
vities (recreation as well as task performance) "together
with a minimum of task differentiation and separation of
interest. They not only plan the affairs of the family
together but also exchange many household tasks and spend
much of their leisure time together" (Bott, 1957s 53)#
There was also an intermediate conjugal role relationship
and here the husband and wife "value sharing and inter-
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changeability of task performance but they do not carry
this as far as do the couples with joint relationships"
(Rainwater, 1965: 3l) • These relationships are, as the
name suggests, "not sharply polarized in either the
jointly organized or highly segregated direction" (page 31)•
As we mentioned, Rainwater found that "the more
interwoven the interests and concerns of the husband and
wife the more likely the wife is to want a small or
medium-sized family; the more separate are their interests
and concerns, the less they see their marital roles as
interpenetrating and the more likely the wife is to want
a large family" (page 193). He accounted for this by an
alternative-rewards argument — a woman who lives a sepa¬
rate life from her husband was "less likely to find
relating to him and sharing activities with him a source
of validation as a woman, and the more likely to seek
this in mothering" (page 192). Women in joint relation¬
ships, on the other hand, "are more involved with their
husbands in common interests and activities, and more
identified with the husband and his accomplishments" (page
192)23.
The whole issue of conjugal role-relationships has
been subject to a number of enquiries and the conclusion
from these is that the topic is more complicated than
either Bott or Rainwater implied (see, for instance,
Piatt, 1969; Turk and Bell, 1972; Broderick, 1972;
Cromwell and Wieting, 1975)• It was Bott 's impression
(1957: 52) that sharing or non-sharing in the various
areas of family life tended to coincide and Rainwater's
12 9
impressionistic classification system reflected this.
More recent studies (there are many such studies. Almost
any issue of the Journal of Marriage and the Family will
have some paper dealing with the issue. See in parti¬
cular Volume J,b, 1972) have shown, though, that, this is
not so -- answers to a series of questions on conjugal
roles are usually not related in such a way as to suggest
the presence of an underlying dimension of jointness/
segregation. There is also the problem of "whonyou ask
what" — husbands and wives seem to have differing impres¬
sions of "their typical ways of organizing the performance
of tasks, their reciprocal expectations, their charac¬
teristic ways of communicating and the kind of solidarity
that exists between them" (Rainwater, 1965s 2q; see,
also, Safilios-Rothschild, 1969). It seems to be an area
where "objective reality" has to be clearly differentiated
from "subjective reality" and the consequences fully
acknowledged. Moreover, there is the problem of dis¬
tinguishing between dogma and praxis. Women and their
husbands may well hold a theoretical "proper" code of
conduct while engaging in substantially different patterns
of behavior. Impressionistic measures which simply ask
"tell me something about your family" (Rainwater, 1965:
333) may well be getting some mixture of the theoretical
and the actual code of conduct.
Whilst the area of conjugal role-relationship is
beset with measurement problems, this seemed insufficient
reason to dismiss the variable entirely, particularly
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when its influence on decisions concerning family size
has been so intriguing. After a careful review of the
literature, we decided to continue with the topic of
conjugal relationship but divide it into four components:
task performance, decision-making, leisure activities
and communication and understanding.
Sixteen questions were used to measure task perfor¬
mance and all asked the respondent to identify who did
certain tasks. The response categories were wife always,
wife usually, one or the other, together, husband usually
or husband always. Because previous studies employing
this measurement technique have found that this is not
a unidimensional variable (for instance, F. Campbell,
1970), we worked with three different task performance
categories:
a. Household Tasks — grocery shopping, repairing minor things
around the house, washing the evening dishes, taking
out the garbage, tidying up the house, getting things
from the basement or attic, preparing the evening
meal and the family's laundry;
b. Childcare Tasks — getting breakfast for the children,
putting the children to bed, discipling the child¬
ren, and getting up with the children at night; and
c. Financial Tasks — keeping track of the money and bills,
paying the rent, handling financial affairs at the
bank and dealing with the mortgage company (or land¬
lord ) .
Fourteen questions were used to measure decision
making. In previous research (for instance, Oppong,
1970; Mitchell, 1972; Larsen, 197*0, decision making
has been used as a measure of the distribution of power
between the husband and wife. For our study, no such
claim is being made. It is our feeling that the execution
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of power occurs well before an overt decision is taken.
A measure of power would have to investigate the "moves
and countermoves, threats and promises, aggression and
appeasement" (Sprey, 1971: 237) which serve to guide
either the husband or wife to make a given decision.
Thus our measure was concerned with how women perceived
decisions to be made and no comment was intended on how
family policy was formulated. The response categories
for the decision making questions were wife always,
wife usually, one or the other, together, husband usually,
and husband always and, again to circumvent problems
of unidimensionality, the set of questions was divided
into three:
a. Economic Decisions — Which house or apartment to
take? What job the husband should have? Whether
or not to buy life insurance? How much money the
family can afford to spend per week on food? Whether
the wife should work? and How much money should be
spent on major purchases?
b. Childcare Decisions — How much money should be spent
on the children? What the child should be allowed
to do? At what time the children should be sent
to bed? and How the children will be disciplined?
c. Social Decisions — Where to go on vacation? Which
friends are seen the most often? How often they
should go out for an evening? What television (or
radio) programmes to watch?
The nature of the couple's leisure activities was
measured by having the woman discuss, first, the nature
of her husband's leisure (whether she knew his friends,
what he did with his leisure time, and how often he
went out either on his own or with his friends) and then
how she spent her leisure time (what she did with her
spare time, whether her husband knew her friends and
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how often she went out on her own). This was followed
up by asking if the couple went out together and, if so,
how often. This discussion followed two lines — initially
visiting with friends and then visiting with relatives.
The degree of communication and understanding between
the couple was measured through four questions (derived
from Scanzoni, 1975): How do you feel about the ways
you and your husband can confide in each other, talk
things over and discuss anything that comes up? (com¬
munication) ; How do you feel about the way your husband
understands your problems and feelings (understanding);
How do you feel about the physical love and sex relations
you experience with your husband? (physical relations);
and How do you feel about the companionship that you and
your husband have in doing things together? (companion¬
ship). The response categories for the four questions
were very good, okay and not so good.
The questions measuring task performance and decision
making were scored into three categories: the wife usu¬
ally makes most of the decisions or does most of the
tasks, the husband usually makes most of the decisions
or does most of the tasks, and the activities are either
shared or the husband is as likely to do them as the
wife. If Rainwater and Bott's hypothesis is supported,
then those couples sharing tasks and decision making
should be most likely to want no more children. The
rationale, to repeat, is that common interests and acti¬
vities are incompatible with a large family. Alterna-
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tively, those couples not sharing tasks and decisions
should be most apt to be considering further children
because a large family in this case is not inconsistent
with their life-style and, in fact, may provide "the
source of validation as a woman" (Rainwater, 1965: 192)
that is missing because of the lack of a jointly-organised
marital relationship. Table *4.15 shows the percent of
women who do not want any more children broken down by
who does the various chores (task performance and decision
making). If there were less than five cases in a parti¬
cular category, the percentages are not included.
Table 4.15 Percent of Women Who Feel They Probably
or Definitely Will Not Have a Third Child by
Who Performs Certain Tasks and Who Makes Vari¬
ous Decisions (Wife's Evaluation)
Wife Together Husband
Usually Usually
Household Tasks 52 £ (?4) 52 io C2S) 2/3
Childcare Tasks 57 i (55) 48 ^ 2/4
Financial Tasks 50 io (30) 58 ^ (53) 50 i, (42.)
Economic Decisions 60 $ (5) 50 i (86) 64 i, 614)
Childcare Decisions 50 $> (26) 53 i CIS) 2/4
Social Decisions 1/3 54 i (85) 00-5f
To-fai Nis m b/CAC&iis.
Little, if any, support for the Bott-Rainwater
hypothesis is apparent from Table 4.15. An equal per¬
centage of couples did not want further children regardless
of who did the household, the childcare or the financial
tasks. Likewise, who made the economic, childcare or
social decisions had little influence on the desire for
more children. Moreover, this lack of relationship
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persisted when husband's occupation was introduced into
the analysis — none of" the occupational groupings showed
any greater degree of association than the original
table.
Lack of support for the Bott-Rainwater hypothesis
is not limited to our data. Stokes (l973)» for instance,
found that socio-economic status was a better predictor
of fertility both before and after the effects of family
structure were controlled. While family structure did
influence reproductive behavior, it was not particularly
dominant. Cartwright (1976), likewise, found that women
whose husbands helped with the household and looking
after the children neither had nor wanted different sized
families than those whose husbands did not play this
role. Any differences were in achieved family sizes of
over three and seemed to stem from the differential use
of contraception. Husbands and wives who shared the
household and care of children also tended to discuss
their problems and decisions, be more effective contra¬
ceptive users and consequently have smaller families.
A large part of Rainwater's classification system
seemed to stem from the nature of the couples' leisure
activities and when we looked at this variable for our
data, we found more interpretable results. Coding the
women's discussions of their leisure activities was
rather difficult —- for instance, "Quite a bit" was the
most common answer to "how often do you go out" and on
probing we found that "quite a bit" meant more than
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three or four times a week to some women and once or
twice a month to others. Some women counted "coffee-
ing" with their neighbours during the day, grocery shop¬
ping or going to the launderette as "going out" whereas
others were adamant they never got out — even though
they did the same activities, they viewed them in an
entirely different light. Others felt their husbands
never or seldom went out on their own, whereas some
women saw the simple fact of their husbands going to
work as their being able to "get out". After reading
through all the interviews, we felt a four-fold classi¬
fication system captured most of the responses:
a, the husband and wife went out together, but neither
socialised by themselves. The majority of our couples
(fifty-three) fell into this category;
b, the husband and wife went out together, but each had
their individual interests which took them out on
their own at least once a month. There were twenty-
six such couples;
c, the husband and wife went out together, and the hus¬
band, but not the wife, had outside interests. Fif¬
teen couples fell into this category; and
d, the husband and wife went out together and the wife,
but not the husband, had outside interests. This
category included six couples,
"Coffee-ing", grocery shopping and the like were
not classified as an outside interest unless the acti¬
vity was set up as a social activity — that is, it was
something done with friends and without children and
was seen as a pleasurable excursion.
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The extent to which a couple's leisure activities
influenced their intentions regarding a third chile is
indicated in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16 The Nature of a Couple's Leisure Acti¬
vities by Future Fertility Intentions
Leisure Activities
_ , „ , . - . , Visit as Each Have Husband Wife
Future Fertility _ , _ , _ , „ 17





No More Children 55 £ 38 73 1o 33 £
Undecided 21 23 13 50
Probably/Definitely 2k 38 13 17
More Children
Total N * 53 26 15 6
* The total N equals 100 because we were unable to
assess the nature of a couple's leisure activities
in five cases.
Those women whose husbands had outside interests,
but they themselves did not, were most apt to not want
a third child — 73 percent said they definitely or pro¬
bably would not be having further family. Those couples
where both the husband and wife had independent outside
interests as well as socialising with each other, were
most apt to be planning more children. Of this group,
38 percent said they likely would be having at least
one more child. Those couples where the wife, but not
the husband, had outside interests were least likely
to be planning on a family of just two — only 33 per¬
cent felt they would definitely or probably be stopping
with their present two children.
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These findings can be explained in some measure
by Rainwater and Bott's theory — their hypothesis would
suggest that those couples where both the husband and
wife have their own interests would be those couples
where the wife is more likely to want a large family.
This is certainly borne out. The theory cannot explain
though why it is that those couples where the husband
has outside interests and the wife does not are those
couples most apt to want no more children. It would
seem logical from their hypothesis that these couples in
particular should want a large family -- it is especially
true that these women live separate lives from their
husbands and are thus "less likely to find relating to
him and sharing activities with him a source of valida¬
tion as a woman, and the more likely to seek this in
mothering" (Rainwater, 1965: 192).
Reading through the interviews and observing the
women in interaction with their children suggests an
alternative hypothesis which would account for all the
findings. This hypothesis has to do with the woman's
"ability to cope". Women who felt "tied down", "cooped
up" or just generally unable to cope with the two children
they had were least likely to want more children — two
were "more than enough". Women, on the other hand, who
seemed to be managing two children without trouble and
who had the time, energy and motivation to have interests
outside their home, were much more likely to contemplate
additional children, at least under some circumstances.
This explains why in our classification system, those
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women whose husbands had outside interests but they them¬
selves did not felt most apt to stop with two children.
These women in particular felt "trapped" — their husbands
were going out on their own regularly whereas they were
"stuck at home". They definitely did not want more
children. Alternatively, women who had outside interests
were least likely to feel "tied down" and least likely
to feel they would definitely or probably not have more
children. They had an organised social life apart from
their homes and husbands and they seemed much more able
to accomodate additional children. Women who did not
have outside interests, but whose husbands likewise
were very home-centered, were intermediate. They were
less likely than the women whose husbands only were able
to get out on their own to be considering just the two
children, but more likely than the women who were them¬
selves able to fit in socialising.
We were unable to find a similar hypothesis to this
in the literature — many studies of fertility do not
consider the influence of a couple's leisure activities
(for instance, Askham, 1975; Woolf, 1971) and those
that do tend to consider other aspects of the relation¬
ship — but we would suggest that it has more explanatory
power than Rainwater and Bott's alternative-rewards
hypothesis. At least for our sample, the woman's ability
(or lack thereof) to manage both a home and outside
interests tells us much more about her fertility inten¬
tions than how interwoven are her and her husband's
leisure activities.
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When we introduced our social class indicator into
this analysis, small cell sizes hindered us from making-
more than the most tentative of conclusions. As Table
4.17 indicates, the relationship did appear to hold when
we introduced husband's occupation.
Table 4.17 Percent of Women in Each Occupational
Category Who Feel They Probably or Definitely
Will Not Have a Third Child by the Nature of
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Prof.-Managerial cot- ft) 57 1° 3/5 0/1
Other Non-Manual 64 <£> IK) 0/1 l/l 1/2
Skilled Manual 47 £ (/<?) 30 io cio) 3/3 0/1
Unskilled Manual 67 1° (°i) 3/5 4/4 1/2
All 55 £ 38 io 73 1> 33 £
Percentages are not included when a category has
fewer than five cases. ,
In each of the occupational categories except the
professional-managerials 100 percent of the couples
where the husband, but not the wife, had outside interests
felt they definitely or probably would not be having
further children. Moreover, in all of the occupational
categories, the couples where both the husband and wife
had outside interests were those couples least likely
to feel their families were finished. Amongst the pro¬
fessional-managerial occupational category the expected
pattern was broken in that it was the couples where
i4o
neither the husband nor the wife pursued individual out¬
side activities who were the most likely to feel they
would only have two children.
Considering the small cell sizes, the initial rela¬
tionship appears to be remarkably stable with the intro¬
duction of our measure of social class. The professional-
managerials were the only group which did not completely
conform to the pattern and this could, indirectly, provide
support for the original interpretation we offered of
the data. We had suggested that it was the woman's
"ability to cope" which accounted for our results —
women who felt "tied down" or unable to cope were least
likely to want three children and this feeling was re¬
flected in the patterns their socialising took. From
family literature (see, in particular, Hannah Gavron,
1966) we would expect children to disrupt the lives of
both middle and working class women, but for middle
class women to be better able to maintain control and
some independence. We are working with very small cell
sizes and hence our conclusions are extremely speculative,
but it may be that the original relationship between
patterns of socialising and future fertility intentions
was least likely to hold for the professional-managerial
wives because these wives were least susceptible to
problems of coping or best able to overcome them.
The final measure of husband-wife communication
that we considered was the wife's evaluation of the rela¬
tionship between herself and her husband. The four
1^.1
questions from -Scanzoni (l975» outlined above) were used
with the response categories very good, okay and not so
good. These response categories proved rather unsatis¬
factory — women did not want to choose "okay" to des¬
cribe the relationship between themselves and their
husbands and yet "very good" was slightly too positive.
It would have been useful to have had a fourth category
"good" as many women volunteered that they were "somewhere
between very good and okay".
As it was, the three-fold classification showed
a relationship with future fertility intentions, parti¬
cularly on the understanding and physical relations
dimensions. Table 4.18 presents the percent of couples
who definitely or probably do not want a third child by
the nature of their conjugal relationship.
Table 4.18 Percent of Couples Who Definitely or
Probably Do Not Want a Third Child by the Nature
of the Relationship Between Them (wife's Evaluation)
Components of
Wife's Evaluation of Conjugal
Conjugal Relationship yery GoodRelao£°y8hXN0t So Good
Communication 51 ^*S) 54 &) 2/3
Understanding 46 °fo 56 ^ (4&) 71 ch ^
Physical Relations 46 ^ ^ 78 ^ (23) —
Companionship 51 56 (2?) l/l
Percentages are not included when the category
contained fewer than five cases. . , . 1 l.
Tdt<J M* 1^ wud2dl
A clear pattern was evident on the understanding
and physical relations dimensions — a decline in the
quality of the communication between the husband and wife
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was associated with an increase in the desire for two
and only two children. This trend was also evident on
the communication and companionship dimensions, although
the interpretation was hindered by small cell sizes.
Without making a value judgement on the relative
satisfaction to be derived from segregated and joint
conjugal relationships, Rainwater and Bott's theory is
of little use here. The most "rational" explanation for
the association is that couples with poor relationships
are least likely to want to bring additional children
into the family in case the family should disintegrate.
If things are not going well with two children, then
it would be foolish to have any more. Some women did
suggest this reasoning when they were discussing under
what conditions they would or would not have more children
(for instance, "I suppose if there started to be problems
in the marriage I would think twice about having more
kids because they would probably just add more to the
strain that was already developing"); however, no one
mentioned this as the reason why they wanted no more
family. Economic problems and coping difficulties would
be suggested, but never marital difficulties. The women
may have been simply reluctant to admit this was why
they only wanted a family of two and, although we never
had the feeling that they were "covering-up", this remains
the most plausible explanation. It could also simply
be that a poor marital relationship manifested itself
in economic problems and coping difficulties.
Ik 3
Introducing our meastire of social class into this
set of relationships again proved difficult because of
small cell sizes. Most women assessed the relationship
between themselves and their husbands as being very
2k
good and thus analysis was tentative with no control
variables. When we did look at the relationship between
husband and wife and future fertility intentions within
the occupational categories, it appeared to hold. Cer¬
tainly with regard to physical relations and understanding,
a decline in the nature of the relationship between the
husband and the wife was associated with an increase in
the desire for two and only two children in each social
grouping.
In this taste subsection we have examined the in¬
fluence of four components of the conjugal relationship
on a couple's decision regarding a third child. The four
components were task performance, decision making, leisure
activities and communication and understanding. Rain¬
water's previous research had led us to expect that the
more interwoven a couple's activities, the more likely
they were not to be planning a third child. With regard
to task performance and decision making, Rainwater's
hypothesis was not supported. Amongst our sample and
with our indicators, who did or decided what was unrelated
to future fertility intentions. Rainwater's hypothesis
gained some support from the leisure dimension\ however,
there were results which could not be accounted for.
From the ongoing qualitative analysis, we hypothesized
lkk
an alternative explanation. It appeared that future
family size intentions were connected with how well a
woman was "coping". If she was having difficulties
coping with two children, then she was less likely to be
planning a third child. Conversely, if she was managing
two children without difficulty, then she was more likely
to be planning a third child. This coping dimension
seemed to tie in with the leisure variable. Women were
most apt to feel that they were not coping if they had
no outside interests and this was magnified amongst those
women whose husbands did socialise on their own. Hence
the relationship that we found in the data. The final
measure of husband-wife communication that we considered
was the wife's evaluation of the relationship between
herself and her husband. It appeared that a decline in
the nature of the communication between the husband and
wife (particularly on two dimensions — understanding
and physical relations) was associated with an increase
in the desire for two children. Rainwater's hypothesis
was of little use here because we could not make a value
judgement on the relative satisfaction to be derived
from segregated and joint conjugal relationships. The
most promising explanation was that women with poor rela¬
tionships with their husbands were most hesitant about
having a third child either because this child would
add further strain to the relationship or because, in
the event of a marital breakdown, there would be an addi¬
tional child involved.
1^5
Sex Role Norms and Behavior
The third taste factor we considered was sex role
norms and behavior. With the expansion of female educa¬
tional and occupational opportunities, and the increasing
availability of reliable contraceptives, women have
been provided with choices they previously did not have.
Family formation is now more likely than ever to be the
outcome of individual and specific desires. Xn this
regard, the women's sex role attitudes and behavior are
of importance. We shall consider two aspects of this
taste factor which have been shown to be of importance
to family formation: the woman's past, present and
future work behavior and her attitudes towards tradi¬
tional and modern role behaviors. We will begin the
analysis with our fourth background (control) variable —
the woman's educational level.
As we pointed out in the section on indirect costs,
female education is many things to many people. As
Ryder suggests, "the data are blind to the concepts of
the theorist, and wife's education means whatever it
means, . . ." (Ryder, 19736s S68) . In its relationship
with fertility, previous surveys have generally found
a negative association. In Britain, Cartwright (1976)
found that mothers who had no further education after
leaving school wanted more children than the other mothers.
Askham (1975) found that the majority of her working class
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Scottish wives had no further education, although those
in social class III (skilled manual) with two children
were more likely than the, others to have had some. In
Canada, Beaujot's Edmonton-based data showed an inverse
relation between wife's education and fertility and this
was in agreement with previo\is Canadian studies (the
Toronto study; Charles, 19^8; Henripin, 1968). For
instance, among women who were aged forty-five to fifty-
four in 19^1, there was a difference of two children
between those who had zero to eight years of schooling
and those who had thirteen or more years (Charles, .19^8:
68). In 1961, education of wife was second only to
residence in its importance to fertility (Henripin, 1968:
3^5) and in the 1973 study (Beaujot, 1975)» the range
of differences due to education were the largest encoun¬
tered for any of the background factors. American sur¬
veys have, by and large, found negative relations between
education and fertility as well (Adelman, 1963; Fried-
lander and Silver, 1967; Heer, 1966; Janowitz, 197l)
although more recent reviews have been suggesting mixed
results (Bumpass, 1969, Janowitz, 1976).
The generally negative relationship between education
and fertility is open to many interpretations. The effect
may be direct — a higher educational level may mean
women are more efficient about acquiring knowledge of,
and using, reliable forms of birth control, thus lessening
the divergence between desired and actual family size.
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Rindfuss and Westoff (197^) for in stance found that
women with higher levels of education were more likely
to use contraception before their first pregnancy, while
Michael (1973) reported that the more edxicated couples
selected the more effective birth control techniques.
Alternatively, education may have a direct effect on
decreasing fertility by widening a woman's horizons
beyond marriage and a family and influencing her pre¬
ference for children (janowitz, 197&: I89). Education
may also be playing an indirect role in decreasing family
size. Women with more education usually have better
employment opportunities (in terms of job satisfaction,
monetary rewax-ds and working conditions) and hence there
may be incentives to spend more time working and less
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time bearing and rearing children . Finally, education
affects age at marriage which in turn has been shown to
inflxience family size. Women marrying later have a wider
variety of work and educational experience than women
who marry young and hence a greater acquaintance with
non-familial roles.
It is difficult to separate the effects of education
on fertility into its components, even supposing we
have outlined all of the components. However, when
looking at this variable in our sample, we shall keep
in mind the four avenues through which we suggested it
may be working and attempt some decomposition of its
influences in any relationship we should find.
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The increase in female labour force participation
in recent years has been rapid and has occurred among
women in all stages of the family formation process
(Groat, Workman and Neal, 1976). Its effect on fertility,
though, still remains unclear. Opinions vary on every¬
thing from "the existence of a relation between employ¬
ment and fertility" to "the direc tlon of the assumed
relation and the explanation of the relationship" (sty-
cos and Weller, 1967: 210).
In developed countries such as Canada, United States
and the United Kingdom, a negative relationship between
working women and fertility has been fairly well estab¬
lished (Reed and Udry, 1973)• The causal directions
of this relationship, though, remain unclear. The pri¬
mary question is whether women purposely limit their
family size so they may work or work because their family
size is limited (i.e. through problems of sub-fecundity).
Moreover, some women may have to work for economic reasons
regardless of their family size desires. It is widely
assumed b}1* sociologists that employment outside the
home and motherhood are incompatible roles so that women
who wish to work will curtail their fertility to avoid
role conflict. One school of thought argues, however,
that this incompatibility will not be felt by any but
the elite (see, for instance, Peipmeier and Adkins, 1973)•
For women who must work because their contribution to
the family income is essential, it is possible that role
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conflict will be minimal and that the two variables
(employment and motherhood) will be unrelated. For
women who neither need tor are expected to work outside
the home, role conflict may arise and, for them, this
explanation remains open for investigation. Other ex¬
planations of the relationship between fertility and
wife's occupational activity suggest increased awareness
and use of contraceptives among the employed (Kupinsky,
1971) and greater contact with rational values and
attitudes (Freedman et al., 1959$ Ridley, 1959; Freed-
man, 1962; Glick, 1967).
In addition to problems of explanation, Safilios-
Rothschild (1970) has pointed out that the majority of
studies that have considered the relationship between
fertility and female labour-force participation have
used few analytical subcategories or distinctions — all
working women are grouped in one category and all non-
worlcing women in another. This global division groups
greatly heterogenous types of married working and non-
working women and may be a factor confusing the initial
relationship. In our data, for instance, there were
women who had worked between the births of their two
children because their husbands were on strike and the
income was necessary, because they felt their first
bora was becoming too reliant upon them and this was one
way of having the child learn some independence, and
because their old bosses had begged them to "help out"
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over a company reorganisation. There were women working
nights (and whose husbands therefore babysat), women
working forty hours a week and commuting twenty miles
daily, and women whose work was delivered to their doors
and picked up at their convenience. To group all these
women in one category and expect it to show some con¬
sistent relationship with fertility overlooks the many
and varied reasons why a woman works and the conditions
of her possible empl03Trient (i.e. hours, location and
the nature of the duties performed).
When looking at the relationship between female
employment and fertility desires in our data, we will
try to use more refined subcategories than working/non-
working, We shall also consider the problem of causality
(does employment lead to fertility limitations or does
sub-fecundity lead to employment) and attempt some measure
of the assumption of role conflict generated by compe¬
titive sets of familial versus extra-familial obligations.
The final aspect of sex role norms and behavior that
we shall consider is the woman's attitudes towards "tradi¬
tional" and "modern" role behaviors. A common explana¬
tion for the fall in the birth rate stems from the issue
of changing sex roles. This was, in fact, one avenue
through which we suggested both education and employment
might be working amongst our sample. Either through
education or employment, a woman's horizons are widened
be3'-ond marriage and a family and consequently her pre-
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ference for children is reduced. In the studies that
have considered the impact of value orientations on
fertility behavior (William Clifford, 1971; Arnott,
1972; Katelman and Barnett, 1968), the evidence appears
clear that women who rate the more modern sex roles
positively are more likely to want smaller families.
Beaujot (l975)» in the Edmonton study, developed a scale
measuring attitudes toward the childbearing role; women
scored low on the scale if they preferred working than
being at home, disagreed that the husband should be the
main achiever, disagreed that the woman was happiest
wdth her children and envied couples with no children.
Women scoring high had the opposite views and Beaujot
found a positive relationship between this variable and
future fertility intentions.
Information concerning the wife's education was
asked in the last set of questions (all of which dealt
with background factors) and was coded into five cate-
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goriess less than grade twelve , grade twelve, post-
secondary training of less than a year's duration (i.e.
hairdressing, six-month secretarial course), post-secon¬
dary training of over a year's duration (nursing through
a hospital, training at the Institute of Technology)
and university. Five women had no post-secondary training
as such, but had taken a number of classes since leaving
school. We classified these women in the third category —
post-secondary training of less than a year's duration.
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The woman1s employment history and future employ¬
ment intentions were gauged by having the woman discuss
the positions she had held before the birth of her first
child, between the births of her two children (and if
there had been any miscarriages, through that period)
and at the present. The type of work, the hours it in¬
volved, the childcare facilities she used and reasons
why she had decided to work or not work were covered.
Future employment intentions were gauged by asking the
women what they saw for themselves in the future. To
help the women with their discussion we divided "the
future" into three time periods; What do you think you
will be doing in six years, in twelve years and in twenty
years? If the woman did not specifically mention employ¬
ment, we asked if she would ever consider returning to
work and under what conditions this might be feasible.
Sex role norms of wife, husband and mother were
measured through a series of scales developed and tested
by Scanzoni (1975; 130—1^*0 • With regard to the wife
role, a set of twelve pertinent items were factor analysed
separately for men and for women and eventually two
dimensions emerged for both sexes; traditional wife
role (TW) and wife self-actualization (SA) role. The
TW role was de'fined as "representing an emphasis in which
the interests of husband and children are placed ahead
of those of the wife" (Scanzoni, 1975: 13l) and was
measured through eight items;
1. A married woman's most important task in life should
be taking care of her husband and children.
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2, She should realize that a woman's greatest reward
and satisfaction come through her children.
3. If she works, she should not try to get ahead in the
same way a man does.
b. A wife should not have equal authority with her hus¬
band in making decisions.
3. If she has the same job as a man who has to support
his family, she should not expect the same pay.
6. A wife should realize that, just as a woman is not
suited for heavy physical work, there are also other
kinds of jobs she is not suited for, because of her
mental and emotional nature.
7. A wife should give wip her job whenever it inconveni¬
ences her husband and children.
8. If a mother of young children works, it should be only
while the family needs the money.
The second dimension (SA) was defined as "an empha¬
sis in which the wife's interests are equal to those of
husband and children" (Scanzoni, 1975s 13l) and consisted
of four items:
1. Having a job herself should be just as important as
encouraging her husband in his job.
2. She should be able to make long-range plans for her
occupation, in the same way that her husband does
for his.
3. If being a wife and mother isn't satisfying enough,
she should take a job.
b. There should be more day care centers and nursery
schools so that more young mothers could work.
Role modernity on these and the following dimensions
was indicated by stronger preferences for the wife's
individualistic interests and role traditionalism was
indicated by a greater concern for the interests of the
husband and children.
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The second group of items wei'e pertinent to the
husband role and upon factor analysis throe dimensions
emerged separately for both sexes: problematic husband
alterations (PHA), institutionalised husband-wife equality
(XE) and traditional husband role (Til). The PJIA scale
was comprised of five items and the emphasis was on
"the tentative, temporary, and problematic alterations
that a husband might make in connection with a wife's
occupational efforts" (Scanzoni, 1975: 132):
-*-• her j0^ sometimes requires her to be away from
home overnight, this should not bother him.
2. If a child gets sick and his wife works, he should
be just as willing as she to stay home from work and
take care of the child.
3. If his wife makes more money than he does, this should
not bother him.
4. On the job, men should be willing to work for women
supervisors,
5. A married man should be willing to have a smaller
family, so that his wife can work if she wants to.
The second dimension — IE — consisted of twro items
and the emphasis here was on "permanent, institutionalized
behavior performed by the husband in response to his
wife's occupational endeavors ... behaviors which are
not at all in keeping with traditional male expectations"
(Scanzoni, 1975: 132):
1. If his wife- works, he should share equally in house¬
hold chores such as cooking, cleaning and washing.
2. If his wife works, he should share equally in the
responsibilities of childcare.
The TH role was defined as "a form of the "patriar¬
chal ideology" in which the greater significance of the
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husband's interests and authority are legitimated via
positions ascribed to him on account of gender" (Scan-
zoni, 1975: 132) and also consisted of two items:
1. A married man's chief responsibility should be his job.
2. The husband should be the head of the family.
The third group of items described the maternal
role and two dimensions appeared separately for both
sexes upon factor analysis: religious legitimation of
the mother role (Rill) and traditional mother role (TMR).
RLM was defined as "the degree of sacredness attached
to marital and familial patterns" (Scanzoni, 1975: 133)
aid was measured through two questions:
1. Do you believe that the institution of marriage and
family was established by God?
2. Do you feel that being a mother is a special calling
from God?
The TM role was defined as a role in which "the
interests of children are of greater significance than
and are placed ahead of those of the mother" (Scanzoni,
1975: 133) and Scanzoni measured it through five ques¬
tions. The factor loadings on three of these five ques¬
tions were so low though (on average, of a magnitude
below .20) that we proceeded with just two of the questions:
1, Do you think that a working mother can establish just
as warm and secure a relationship with her children
as a mother who does not work?
2. Do you feel a pre-school child is likely to suffer
if the mother works?
All statements were answered with Likert-type res¬
ponse categories (strongly agree to strongly disagree
156
for wives' and husbands' roles and definitely yes to
definitely no for mothers' roles) and a woman's responses
were combined in sumscale fashion. Her total score was
further assigned a "modern" or "traditional" code.
¥ife's education was the first variable we considered
in relation to future fertility intentions and the re¬
sults are shown in Table J+,19.














No More Children bO 53 £ 69 29 £ 6b $
Undecided 20 26 15 21 27
Probably/Definitely
More Children
bo 21 15 50 9
Total N 20 3b 26 1** 11
The table indicates that the relationship between
wife's education and fertility is in line with the pre¬
vious Canadian data — there was a slight inverse asso¬
ciation such that the woman's educational level increased
as her proposed family size decreased. The one excep¬
tion to this relationship was those women with a trade
training. They, more than any other educational group,
were planning to have an additional child — 21 percent
were undecided about, and 50 percent were definitely
planning, a third child. Other than this exception,
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though, the educational groups followed the expected
pattern. Women with less than a grade twelve education
were most likely to feel they would be having a third
child (^0 percent) and women who had attended university
were least likely to feel this way (9 percent).
We had suggested in the review of the literature
that education's influence may work through a number of
different avenues. It might be that better educated
women want fewer children because they are more efficient
contraceptive users, or because their horizons go beyond
marriage and a family or because they have better employ¬
ment opportunities which discourage them from having
children. The relationship might also be a function
of the wife's age at marriage. We will consider the
first avenue when we examine the couples' use of contra¬
ception and the second and third avenues when we look
at the woman's work behavior and role orientation, but
we will examine the influence of the wife's age at mar¬
riage here. The two variables — wife's age at marriage
27
and education level — are related and so we looked
at the relationship between wife's education and future
fertility intentions controlling for age at marriage.
Table ^.20 presents the results.
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Table h.20 Percent of Women Who Feel They Probably
or Definitely Will Not Have a Third Child by
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33 % OS) 50 io <n) h3 io & l/l 1/2
1/2 50 $ 69 fitel o/'f- l/l
2/3 57 100 ioCO 33 ^ 63 % c£>
Percentages are not included when the category
contained fewer than five cases.
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Although the interpretation is hindered by the small
cell sizes, it appears that both variables have some
influence on future fertility intentions and that this
is particularly so amongst those who married when they
were young and those without a trade or university train¬
ing. In each of the educational classes except trade
training and university, educationally similar women
who married when they were under twenty were less apt
to feel they would not be having additional children than
those who married at over twenty-one. Also, in each
age Category except marriage when over the age of twenty-
one, those with less than a grade twelve education were
less likely to feel their families were finished than
those with university or trade training. For example^
of the women with less than a grade twelve education who
married when they were under twenty, only 33 percent
felt they would have no more children. Among their edu¬
cational peers who married when they were over twenty-one
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years of age, 67 percent felt this way. Among the other
women who married when they were under twenty, 50 percent
of those who attended university, and 100 percent of
those with a trade training felt they woxxld probably
be limiting their families to two. Thus both vaxdables --
age at marriage and educational level — appear to have
an influence on the woman's future fertility intentions.
Women who marry when they are older normally have more
edxication which may influence them to have smaller fami¬
lies, but amongst women with similar levels of education,
age at marriage continues to have an influence.
When we looked at the woman's emplojmient history
and her fertility intentions, the pattern we had anti¬
cipated did not emerge. We had expected that the longer
the woman had worked, the less likely she was to be
planning a third child. This, however, was not borne,
out by the data. We classified the woman's employment
history into four time periods: employment before the
first child, employment between the two children, employ¬
ment within a year of the birth of the second child,
and future employment intentions. From these four time
spans, we created a seven category work index:
1. the woman has never worked and never intends to,
2. the woman hAs never worked, but intends to do so as
her children are growing up,
3. the woman worked until her first child was born, but
does not anticipate returning to work (or will return
when her children are grown-up),
h. the woman worked until her first child was born and
plans to return when her children are in school or
playschool,
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5. the woman worked until the birth of her second child,
bvit does not intend to return,
6. the woman worked up until the birth of her second
child and plans to l^eturn when her children are in
school or playschool,
7. the woman worked throughout her married life and the
births of both children.
As Table 4.21 indicates, this work index showed no
relationship with intentions regarding1 a third child.










No More Children 0/3 50 £ 43 ch 56 £ 1/3 76 $, 38 io
Undecided 0/3 38 29 21 0/3 12 33
Probably/Definitely
More Children
3/3 12 29 23 2/3 12 29
Total N * 3 8 7 43 3 17 21
* The total N equals 102 because we were unable to
determine the work history of three women.
Work Index headings are given in the text on this
and the previous page.
Although those women who had never worked and never
intended to all wanted a third child, those women who
had always worked and always planned to were not simi¬
larly clustered around only planning two children. In
fact, only 38 percent felt it was likely they would stop
with two children and 29 percent were fairly sure they
would be having at least one more child.
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In order to gain a clearer understanding of this
relationship, we looked at the four time periods separ¬
ately. The relationship we expected — that is, an
increase in the amount of time spent working being asso¬
ciated with a decrease in anticipated future fertility —
was evident in the first time span. Of the women who
had not worked before marriage, 33 percent planned to
stay with two children, 20 percent were undecided, and
'+7 percent intended additional family. Of those who
worked full-time more or less up until their first child
was bora, ^6 percent planned to have no further children,
23 percent were undecided and 21 percent were going on
for at least a family of three. This relationship held
even when age at marriage was controlled for. Certainly
a higher percent of women marrying under the age of
twenty had not worked before their first child (29 per¬
cent compared to 6 percent of those marrying at over
twenty—one years of age), but, even so, those that had
were more likely than those that had not to want only
two children.
In the second time period, the relationship dis¬
appeared, Women who had worked full—time between their
children were the least likelyr to feel they would not
be having additional children — 31 percent claimed this
as their intention versus 52 percent of those who had
not worked during this time period. Conversely, bh per¬
cent of the full-time workers were planning a third
child versus 25 percent of the non—workers. This was
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also the case with the third time period. Those women
who were planning to return to full—time work within a
year of the birth of their second child were the women
most likely to claim they were planning more than two
children — percent of the full-time workers said
they were pretty sure they would have more children as
compared to 24 percent of those who were not planning
to return to work. Only 22 percent of the full-time
workers were planning to stop with two children, whereas
55 percent of the women who did not anticipate working
within a year of the birth of their second child were
planning to limit*their families.
The fourth time period likewise showed little rela¬
tionship between fixture employment and fertility inten¬
tions, Women who never intended to work again were more
likely to be planning additional children (75 percent)
but, other than this, nothing was apparent. A similar
percentage of women were planning to stop with two child¬
ren, and have more than two children, regardless of when
they saw themselves back in the workforce.
In the introduction to this section we suggested
that sociologists have accounted for the usual relation¬
ship between fertility and employment either through
the notion of role conflict or through the differential
use of contraception. This second avenue will be exa¬
mined when we consider our couples' experiences with
birth control. Here we shall consider the notion of
role conflict. The hypothesis was that because employ-
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merit outside the home and motherhood were incompatible
roles, women who wished to work would curtail their fer¬
tility. We qualified this hypothesis by suggesting that
it was possible that it would hold only for those women
who had some control over whether they would work or
not — if working was a necessity then it might be that
the two roles would not be seen as incompatible. In
order to help account for our divergent- findings we
looked at the reasons the working women had given for
their working.
The first, and likely most important reason why we
failed to find a relationship between employment and
fertility was that our sample were all, by and large,
devoted to familial roles. By looking only at women
with two children, we appeared to have excluded the
28
"working wives" — those women who are "primarily
oriented towards the occupational world and who take
time off from actual or potential employment to have
children" (Tien, 1967: 226). Our women were not "career
women" planning their families to fit in with fixed
workforce participation intentions. Their priorities
lay with childbearing and rearing and if they worked
it was because the supplement to the family income was
necessary or because the work was such that it in no
way affected their primary role identification of wife
and mother. For instance, the second time period was
representative of the two other time periods and when
we looked at the reasons the working women had given
16k
for their working, 33 percent cited solely economic
pressures — if it were not for the necessary income,
they would not work. Another 36 percent were working
for economic and personal reasons but, in almost all
of these cases, the primary push was economic;
(¥hy work?) Money-wise. Mostly money-wise. And
it was just nice to get out of the house one day a
week. It wasn't until after I had gone in a few
times, that I found myself kind of looking forward
to it.
The remaining 30 percent were working for personal rea¬
sons, but in no case did we get the feeling of a woman
"oriented towards the occupational world". The most
common reason for working other than economic was "coping":
I was just ... we were just in a one bedroom
apartment and it was just too small. I had to
get out.
M3' nerves were getting bad. I had to get out.
The baby was so colick-y and my husband had broken
both his legs and it was too much. It was just
too much. I had to get away so I could feel myself
to be a person. I couldn't cope.
The other major reason we likely failed to find a
relationship between employment and fertility intentions
was that the -women most likely to put emphasis on their
own career were the women with professional training
and these women were at a relative disadvantage with
regard to employment, particularly when they had young
children. In their discussions of their futures, they
29
came closest to the "working-wives" , but virtually all
were quite prepared to take a few years off work to give
their children "a good start in life". They were less
apt to work, particularly with young children, because
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the type of employment they had been tr^ained for, and
were planning to return to, would have involved them in
a fairly demanding, time-consuming commitment. Condi¬
tions such as part-time or evenings-only were not nor¬
mally available to them. Also, most of the university
30educated women were married to men with good jobs and
so, economically, they could afford to take four or five
years out of the labour force.
On the other hand, the women most likely to be plan¬
ning additional children were the women most likely, at
this stage in their life-cycle at any rate, to find
taking employment least upsetting to their primary roles
of wife and mother. The occupational categories most
likely to be planning the largest families were the
other non—manuals and the skilled manuals and the wives
in these families were, compared to the professionally
trained, at a real advantage with regard to work. The
majority had either a short training course or simply
grade twelve and they were able to find part-time evening
employment — where the husband could babysit — that
was quite in line with what they had been doing before
they started their families. The nature of the work
tended to be undemanding — work worries would not be
carried over to the home — and it was fairly easy to
locate a convenient job — local shopping centers are
always trying to recruit these women. Hence, work,
which for our potential "working wives" would have been
very upsetting to their familial role, could easi ly be
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accommodated by these women.
In concluding this section on the relationship bet¬
ween our women's employment histories and their future
fertility intentions we would suggest that our results
can not be used to accept or reject the role-conflict
hypothesis. Our negative findings would appear to stem
from the nature of our sample (the highly career-oriented
were largely excluded) and from the point in time when
the women were interviewed. Those women who were rela¬
tively more career-oriented than average were also more
apt to want, and be able, to stay home with their children
through the first few years. Those women who were working
either had to work for economic reasons or were able to
find work that did not really conflict with their pri¬
mary role-identification as wife and mother.
The final aspect of sex role norms and behavior
that we considered was the woman's attitudes towards
"traditional" and "modern" role behaviors. Seven scales
were used and all but two — problematic husband and
traditional husband — showed some relationship with
future fertility intentions. Rather than reproduce all
the scales here, we created a role index from the five
scales showing some relationship; women who scored
"traditional"- on three or more of the five scales and
had no "modern" scores were receded traditional, women
who scored "modern" on three or more of the five scales
and had no "traditional" scores were recoded "modern",
and all others were assigned undecided. Table 4.22 pre-
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sents the relationship between this index and future
fertility intentions.
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The table indicates a relationship between attitudes
toward role behaviors and future fertility intentions.
Women who showed themselves to be modern on the role
scales were most likely to feel they would have only two
children — 69 percent claimed this to be their intention
versus percent of those who were more traditional.
Conversel3r, 30 percent of the traditional women wanted
a third child and only 1^ percent of the more modern
women felt inclined this way.
The relationship was not as strong as we had anti¬
cipated, though, and seemed to stem in part from a re¬
luctance on the part of oxir women to select answers
indicating a traditional orientation. We became aware
of this problem about half-way through the data collection
period when we had to read out the sex-role scales to
a woman who was unable to read them herself. From her
conversation with us, we predicted she would have a
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traditional orientation in the way Scanzoni (1975) used
the term — her concern, from her conversation and beha¬
vioral patterns, was decidedly in the interests of her
husband and children. However, she began choosing res¬
ponses which showed a mixed or modern orientation, Intri¬
gued, we finally asked her to explain "why" she hold
the attitudes she did and her answer indicated that, in
this day and age, it was in some way "embarrassing" to
admit to traditional orientations.
You hear all this talk about woman's lib. It's
like it's kind of embarrassing just to have your
family. Sometimes I don't know what I should think.
When wre reviewed our interviews it did appear that
there was a bias towards choosing answers which revealed
a more modern orientation than we would otherwise have
predicted. However, most of these women appeared to be
choosing answers which would move them into the "undecided"
category rather than the "modern" category; that may
be why the "traditional" and "undecided" categories
showed such similar response patterns. In light of this
apparent bias, we collapsed the "traditional" and the
"undecided" categories into one. Although this new scale
was unable to reveal the range of attitudes we had ori¬
ginally wanted it to, we felt it would provide a more
accurate assessment of our sample's attitudes toward role
behavior.
We had stiggested in our initial discussion that
sex role orientation might be the avenue through which
education influenced fertility intentions; through
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further education women would widen their horizons beyond
marriage and a family and wish to limit the number of
children they had. As we have already pointed out, all
our women seemed to value their families greatly and
their careers minimally, but we did follow through to
see if with the available range of attitudes there was
any support for the thesis.
We initially looked at the relationship between the
wife's education and her attitudes towards various role
behaviors. Our hypothesis was that as education increased,
so to would the percentage of women holding modern orien¬
tations. As Table b,23 indicates, this was more or less
borne out.





Less Than Grade Short Trade Univer¬
Grade 12 12 Course Course sity
Traditional 70 62 ^ Co69 £ 79 1o 45 ^
Modern
(.(/)
30 38 "5) 31 li*>21 55 w
Total N 20 34 26 14 11
The table indicates that as level of education
increases, so too does the percent of women holding modern
orientations. For instance, 70 percent of the women
with less than a grade twelve education had traditional
orientations as did only k5 percent of the women who
had attended university. The one exception to the trend,
and an exception which provides further support for our
hypothesis, was the women with a trade training; the
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majority of them held traditional views (79 percent).
The reader may recall that when we previously considered
education, we found that the women with trade training
Afere most likely to he planning a third child. Xt does
appear now that this might well be because the majority
of them held a traditional orientation.
To clarify the patterns of association, we looked
at the relationship between the wife's education and
her intentions regarding a third child controlling for
sex role norms. Table ^,2h presents the results.
Table k. 2h Percent of Women Who Feel They Probably
or Definitely Will Not Have a Third Child by
Wife's Education and Attitudes toward Role
Behavior
Wife's Educational Level
pjQ2e Less Than Grade Short Trade Univer-
_ . , .. Grade 12 12 Course Course sityOrientation
Traditional 36 $^38 °jo ^ 6l $ 36 <fi l" ^*0 £ ^
. (&) .Hi) ^ Lj\ . (.U)
Modern 50 $ 77 88 $ 0 <$> 83 #
ToioJ /\)'b, '■* bvtvcfcuh-
The table indicates that role orientation does
appear to be one medium through which education influences
future fertility intentions. In each educational cate¬
gory (except amongst those with a trade training), those
women with more modern attitudes were those more apt to
feel their families were complete. Controlling for sex-
role orientation reduced the impact education had on
future fertility intentions. In fact, among those with
a traditional orientation toward sex role behavior, edu¬
cation had virtually no influence — more or less equal
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pei*centages of vomen vere planning to have only two
children regardless of their educational level. Among
those with a modem orientation, education had a slightly
greater effectj however, not as great as it was when sex
role orientation was not being held constant. Our con-
«
elusion is that there is some validity to the thesis
that sex role orientation is the medium through which
the influence a woman's education lias on her fertility
intentions operates.
The one remaining problem is why women with a trade
training held such traditional views, We had hypothe¬
sized that increased education exposed a woman to more
liberalising influences. Women with trade training
certainly had more education than average, but they did
not appear to hold more liberal attitudes. Our explana¬
tion is purely speculative, but when we looked at the
fourteen women with a trade training we found that eleven
of them were nurses. It could we11 be that exposure to
a nursing course is unique — rather than fostering
liberal attitudes, it encourages traditional ones. It
might also be, of course, that women with traditional
orientations are particularly likely to take nursing
courses.
In this 'J sex role norms and behavior" subsection,
we have examined the influence a woman's educational
level, her employment history and her attitudes toward
traditional and modern role behaviors have on her future
fertility intentions. We argued that with the expansion
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of female educational and occupational opportunities,
and the increasing: ability to control unwanted fertility,
a woman's behavior is more likely than ever to be the
result of her own individual desires. With regard to
education, we found that the probability of having a
third child decreased as educational level increased.
The one exception to this trend was the women with a
trade training; they, more than any other educational
group, were planning to have a third child, When we
introduced sex-role orientation into the relationship,
we found a partial explanation for our pattern of results.
With sex role orientation held constant, the range of
variation due to education was sharpljr redticed. The
relationship we had initially found was because most
women with a university education had modern orientations
(defined in our terms as having stronger preferences
for the wife's individualistic interests) and most women
with less than a grade twelve education had traditional
orientations (defined in our terms as having a greater
concern for the interests of the husband and children).
The women with a trade training appeared to be exceptional
on the educational dimension because they held tradj-
tional orientations. We had hypothesized that women with
more education would have more modern orientations because
education has a liberalising influence. However, the
majority of our women with a trade training were nurses
and we could only suggest that training as a nurse is
unique either particularly traditional women are drawn
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to the course and/or the course itseli fosters tradi¬
tional views. Our employment variables, by and large,
did not show the pattern of relationships we had expected
them to. The length of time a woman had worked was not
related in any systematic way to her future fertility
intentions. We had hypothesized that because employment
outside the home and motherhood are incompatible roles,
at least amongst those who work for other than solely
economic reasons, women who worked would cuxTail their
fertility. Our lack of empirical support might well
have stemmed from the fact that, with general levels of
female employment increasing, the hypothesis itself is
faulty; it could also have been due to the fact that
most of our women were primarily oriented to their child¬
ren and husbands and if they were working, it was because
the extra income was essential or because the nature
of the work did not interfere with their primary role
identifications. The women who were less traditionally
oriented than average (but still, we should point out,
far from the stereotyped "career woman") were the uni¬
versity educated and, although their employment oppor¬
tunities would likely have been financially profitable,
this extra income was not normally needed and the nature
of the vork would have interfered with their basic iden¬
tifications as wife and mother.
17^
Antipathy Towards Children
The fourth, and final, taste factor ve considered
was "antipathy towards children". By this we meant how
well the woman liked children. Although the variable
does not appear to have received much attention in the
literature (for instance, it was not included in studies
by Cartwright, 1976; Askham, 1975; Beaujot, 1975 or
Westoff and Ryder, 1977)» there appeared, in the pre¬
tests, to be a relationship between a woman's intentions
regarding a third child and her general antipathy towards
children.
We measured the factor through an attitudinal scale
that Woolf (l97l) first outlined. Through a series of
steps five attitudes related to family size were outlined,
one of which was termed "antipathy to children", (The
previous section on direct costs discusses her measures
in greater detail). Women scoring high on this attitudinal
measure endorsed the view that children were an encum¬
brance — they "tied you down", "got on your nerves"
and so on. Women scoring low on the measure disagreed
that children were a btirden and, in fact, found them
quite "satisfying".
Woolf found that women with one child expressed the
least antipathy towards children, and that the extent
of the antipathy increased with an increase in family
size, except for the very largest families. The greatest
degree of antipathy, however, was expressed by women
with no children. She accounted for this surprising
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x^e lationshi p by suggesting that "antipathy 5s a conse¬
quence of having a larger family and not a determinant"
(Woolf, 1971: 108).
Ve decided to use this measure because all our
women had the same number of children and, as we men¬
tioned, in the pre-tests, various degrees of antipathy
were expressed and seemed to be related to future fer¬
tility intentions. Women were asked if they agreed or
disagreed with the following set of questions:
1. Children tie you down too much.
2. Children get on your nerves, most of the time.
3. Children are selfish; it's all give and no take
having children,
b. Women only have babies because they feel they ought
to have babies.
5. Most women find motherhood satisfying.
Those endorsing the view that children were an en¬
cumbrance (i.e. agreed with the first four questions
and disagreed with the last) were scored "high" and those
rejecting this idea were scored "low". In actual prac¬
tice, nobody had a perfect "high" score, so all women
who felt children were an encumbrance on two or more of
the statements were scored "high". Table b.2$ presents
the relationship between antipathy towards children and
future fertility intentions.
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As the table indicates, there does appear to be
a relationship between the two variables. ¥omen who
had a high degree of antipathy towards children were
more likely to feel their families were complete — 62
percent of those with a high antipathy score said it
was unlikely they would have a third child compared to
hj percent of those with a low score. Alternatively,
32 percent of those with a low degree of antipathy felt
it likely they would have more children versus 13 percent
of the others. This relationship held at all levels
of wife's education; however, when the husband's occu¬
pational level was introduced into the anal3rsis, an
interesting interaction effect appeared. Table h,26
presents the results. The professional-managerials
and other non-manuals were combined into one category
because they showed a similar pattern of association.
This was also the case with the skilled and unskilled
manuals and they were likewise combined.
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Table '4.26 Antipathy Towards Children by Future








Low High Low High
Probably/Definitely
No More Children '4'+ £ 00O b9 % 50 io
Undecided 16 13 2b 32
Probably/Definitely
More Children
bo 7 27 18
Total N 27 15 4l 22
The table indicates that the relationship between
antipathy towards children and future fertility intentions
holds only for the non-manual occupational categor)'.
For the manual class, there appears to be no relationship
between the two variables — women were as apt to be
stopping with two children if their antipathy score
was high or low.
As we mentioned previously, this variable — "anti¬
pathy towards children" — has been relatively ignored
in the literature and this makes it difficult to know
how to assess our results. Askham (1975) suggested that
the lower social classes have unique motivations and
rationalities'in regard to fertility intentions and this
might be one area where there is a difference between
the social classes. Studies such as Hannah Gavron's
(1966) have found that working-class women have greater
difficulties coping with their children than middle-class
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women. Certainly, women who batter their children are
more apt to come from the lower social classes (see,
for instance, S. M. Smith, 1975). It is possible that
our pattern of results stems from the fact that level
of antipathy towards children does not influence the
decision a woman in a manual social class makes regarding
a third child because children are "expected" to be
31
troublesome . Whether she herself likes or dislikes
children is not a factor in future fertility considera¬
tions. A woman in the non-manual social class, on the
other hand, may be more apt to consider her own feelings
regarding children before deciding on a third one because
children are generally not expected to disrupt the couple's
lives.
This is frankly speculative. Jn the interviews,
"personal stress" seemed an important factor in the
desire for more children. Women, particularly women
in the non-manual social class, who seemed to find it
difficult to manage their homes and their present two
children were least likely to consider going on for three.
Our measure of antipathy certainly singled out the ex¬
treme cases and this is reflected in the above relation¬
ships; however, as we mentioned, the majority of women
gave answers ^indicating very low levels of antipathy.
In observing the women we knew there was a greater range of
antipathy than was expressed, but our qiiestdons were
unable to pick this up. Ve would suggest that antipathy
towards children is an important factor in fertility
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decision making and deserves a more comprehensive exam¬
ination in future fertility studies. Our feeling is that
we have only begun to uncover its influence in this
present investigation.
h ,k Summary
In this chapter of the thesis we have examined the
impact of various income, price and taste factors on our
couples' future fertility intentions. ¥e had argued
that, at any given point in time, couples have certain
tastes which they attempt to maximize, as best they can,
given what they know about their incomes and the prices
of children. As our dependent variable we used the
probability of a couple having a third child. We did
not believe that asking about completed fertility was
acceptable — it assumes couples have a reproductive
target in mind and does not allow for the highly situa¬
tional nature of fertility decision making to be ade¬
quately assessed.
Our quantitative analysis indicated that it was
middle income couples who were most likely to be con¬
sidering a third child. Couples whose incomes were
greater than average and couples whose incomes were less
than average had a greater probability of wanting only
the two children. This was reflected in our social
class differences. Using the husband's occupation as
our indicator of social class, we found that it was the
professional-managerials and the unskilled manual workers
who were least likely to want or be planning a third
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child. It appeared that the primary reason for the
unskilled manuals not wanting a third child was economic.
They all had inadequate (or barely adequate) resources
for two children, few had any realistic hopes that their
economic situations would greatly improve, and hence
two children were "more than enough".
Our analysis of costs was far from adequate. Our
indicators of direct costs did not differentiate between
the social classes in the way we pr-edicted they would —-
that is, the higher social classes did not show them¬
selves, on our indicators, to be under greater social
pressure to spend money on their Children than the lower
social classes. In our re-analysis of the data we con¬
fined our examination to the specific social classes and,
amongst the non—manual social class, there did appear
to be some "play-off" between the "quality" and "quantity"
of children. Non-manual couples who felt that many
commodities were important for children were less likely
to be considering a third child than non-manual couples
who felt commodities were unimportant for children.
This relationship did not hold for the manual couples,
however, and because of the difficulties in validating
our indicators, the results must be considered speculative.
Indirect costs, at least in the manner we measured them,
did not appear to influence the decision regarding a
third child. There were undoubtedly differences between
women in the indirect costs of bearing and rearing
children, but we could find no evidence of those women
standing to lose more, in economic terms, by having
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children being less likely to be considering a third
chiId.
A vide variety of taste variables appeared to in¬
fluence our couples' intentions regarding a third child
and we will present these in point form.
a. The couples' ideal family (in terms of size
and sex composition) was the first taste factor we con¬
sidered and it appeared that sex composition did influence
the probability of a couple having a third child. Most
couples wanted at least one boy and one girl, and hence
those whose first two children were of the same sex were
more likely than average to be considering a third child.
Couples whose ideal family size was larger than two also
showed a greater likelihood of considering a thix^d child;
however, since most couples* ideal family size was two,
there was very little variation to consider.
b. Couples where the wife had interests outside
the home (that is, she socialised at least monthly with¬
out her husband and children) were more likely to be
considering a third child than couples where the wife
did not have interests outside the home. We accounted
for this empirical finding through a "coping" dimension.
From the qualitative analysis of the data, it appeared
women who vere having difficulties coping with their
present two children, were least likely to be considering
a third child. Further, it appeared that, by and large,
women who were coping well all had outside interests.
Women who vere not coping, and who were less likely to
want a third child, were also less likely to have interests
outside their homes.
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c. A variable related to the coping consideration
was antipathy towards children. We found, although only
amongst the non-manuals, that the more a woman did not
like children the less likely she was to be considering
a third child. To what extent antipathy towards children
and ability to cope are related, remains open to inves¬
tigation. We would suggest that theoretically they are
distinct, although our measure of antipathy did include
coping elements. These two variables have not been
thoroughly or systematically examined in the literature
and hence our rather indirect (and possibly confusing)
attempts at measurement. Our analysis suggests that
both variables are important in fertility decision making,
though, and deserve a more direct examination.
d. A decline in the wife's satisfaction with her
relationship with her husband was positively related to
the probability of having a third child. Women in all
social classes who assessed the relationship they had
with their husbands as less than good were less likely
to be considering a third child. Our suggested explana¬
tion for this was that women who were having difficulties
in their marriage with two children would be most hesitant
to have a third either because this child would add
further strain to the relationship or because, in the
event of a marital break—up, there would be an additional
child involved.
e. Wife's education (the one control variable we
considered in the taste section) was found to be nega¬
tively related to the probability of having a third
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child, with the exception of those women with a trade
training. A large part of this relationship appeared
to operate through the woman's attitudes towards "tradi¬
tional" and "modern" sex role behavior. Women with a
university education, by and large, held a "modern"
orientation (which, by our definition, meant they were
\
largely oriented towards the wife's individualistic
needs) and this, we hypothesized, was why they had a
low probability of wanting a third child. Conversely,
women with less than a grade twelve education held more
"traditional" orientations (which, by our definition,
meant they were more oriented towards their children and
their husbands) and hence they had a greater probability
of planning a third child. Women with a trade training
appeared to show a high probability of wanting a third
child because they tended to hold "traditional" orienta¬
tions .
f. The one other taste variable we considered was
the woman's work behavior. This did not show the rela¬
tionship we had hypothesized it would; women with the
longest and most intense (i.e. full-time versus part-
time) work experience did not show any unique probability
of having or not having a third child. During the quali¬
tative analysis it appeared that this lack of results
was because'all our women were, by and large, .devoted
to familial roles. Women with greater work experience
had not, and were not, planning their families to fit
in with fixed work force participation intentions, but
because their work was essential for economic reasons
18k
or was such that it did not conflict with their primary-
role identification as wife and mother.
In conclusion, in this chapter we have seen that a
variety of taste and income factors influence the pro¬
bability of couples having a third child. In the next
chapter, we shall consider the influence of these factors
on the timing and spacing of the couples' two children.
We shall then consider the couples' perceived fecundabi-
lity and their experiences with birth control so that
in the final section, with the aid of the qualitative
analysis, we can accomplish the task we set for our¬
selves — that is, we can explore the various patterns
of family formation; why women have the families they
have and why they want the families they are planning
to have.
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CHAPTER FIVE TIMING AND SPACING OF PRESENT FAMILY
In the last chapter we considered the influence
of income, prices and tastes on a couple's future fer¬
tility intentions. Ve saw that people do have certain
tastes in regards to children which they attempt to
maximize subject to the constraints of income and prices.
In this chapter we shall consider how these three fac¬
tors influenced the timing and spacing of the couples'
two children. Here, as in the previous chapter, we
shall begin the analysis by considering the influence
of the three background variables: age at marriage,
religion and social class. Our fourth background vari¬
able — wife's education — will again be examined when
we consider the influence of the woman's sex role norms
and behavior.
Timing to first and second birth can be visualized
in two separate ways; one may consider timing to the
actual births or timing to when the couples first began
"trying" for a child. Most studies"1' have used the first
measure — the time period under study has been the time
period ended by the birth of a child. We, on the other
hand, are intending to use the second measure — our
study time period will be ended by when the couples
2
first began "trying" to conceive .
We began our analysis by trying to use the tradi¬
tional measure and quickly found that very few variables
had any recognizable influence on the timing and spacing
dimension. Through the ongoing qualitative analysis,
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however, we were suspicious of the lack of results.
Our interpretive understanding- of the questionnaires led
us to believe that couples did vary in how they wanted
their families built up and that these differences could
partly be explained by income, price and taste consid¬
erations. It did not take us long to realize that the
analysis of the timing and spacing dimension was being
confused through problems of sub-fecundity, foetal mor¬
tality from involuntary causes and the failure of con¬
traceptive techniques. Couples who held very similar
ideas about, for example, when a family should be begun
often ended up in very different coding categories be¬
cause of one or the other's failure with contraception
or problems with conception. Using time periods which
ended when the couples began trying for a child, rather
than when they actually had a child, circumvented this
problem.
The only difficulty encountered using these coding
categories was with women who did not "planM their first
or second child — the child was conceived either through
a contraceptive failure or when a "chance" was being
taken. With regard to first births, only five children
were conceived within marriage as a result of a contra¬
ceptive failure and these five cases were not included
in the analysis. The women's comments on when they would
have liked this first child, though, were examined to
see if they conformed to the observed trends. There
were, in addition, twenty-six children conceived pre-
maritally, of which only seven were said to be "planned".
187
We considered all of the premaritally conceived first
children separately and not in great detail; there is
a long and interesting literature on premarital preg-
3
nancy, and we were more interested in this study in
marital fertility. Finally, the three women who were
no longer with the father of their first child had to
be excluded from analysis because we had not asked them
about why they had wanted their first child when they
did. The exact breakdown of time periods between mar¬
riage and first trying for a child for the women who
had planned this child was as follows;
Interval between marriage and beginning to try for
first child;
N
6 months or less 13
7 months to 18 months 23
19 months to 30 months 19
Over 30 months 16
With regard to the second birth, fifteen couples
had to be excluded from analysis because their second
child was not planned, but as in the case with the first
births, their questionnaires were examined to see if
their comments on when they would have liked their sec¬
ond child conformed to the observed trends. The exact
breakdown of spacing categories between the first child
and beginning to try for the second child was as follows;
Interval between birth of first child and beginning
to try for second child;
N
9 months or less 21
10 months to 14 months 26
15 months to 23 months 25
Over 23 months 18
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5.1 Influence of Background Factors
As we have said, most research on fertility deci¬
sion making has concentrated on anticipated family size;
concerns such as timing and spacing may he mentioned,
but little analysis of the trends has usually been under¬
taken. Our research is, moreover, not strictly compar¬
able to previous research because of the nature of our
dependent variable. Hence, we shall refer to the pre¬
vious literature in this chapter where possible, although
in many cases this may appear far from satisfactory.
Age at marriage and the relationship this has with
the timing to the first birth has been a concern with a
number of researchers (see, for example, Cartwright,
1976; Peel and Carr, 1975) and the primary conclusion
of their studies has been that the younger a couple is
at marriage, the more apt they are to be prenuptially
pregnant^, Cartwright, for instance (197^: 3k), found
that two-fifths of the mothers who married while they
were still in their teens were pregnant at the time and
that teenage marriages accounted for 6k percent of the
premarital conceptions. This also was the case with
our sample couples. Approximately seventy-five percent
of our premarital pregnancies were to women under the
age of twenty, and forty-five percent of the women who
married when they were still teenagers were pregnant
at the time. An equally interesting finding, though,
is revealed in Table 5»1* In this table age at marriage
is cross-tabulated with when the couple first began
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trying for a child — all premarital pregnancies are
excluded as well as contraceptive failures.
Table 5*1 Wife's Age at Marriage by Months Between
Marriage and Time Couple First Began Trying
For a Child
Wife's Age at Marriage
Timing to First Under 20 20, 21 Over 21
6 Months or less h2 k $ 15 1°
6 - 18 months 26 38 31
18 - 30 months 21 31 27
Over 30 months 11 27 27
Total N 19 26 26
Table 5»1 indicates that women who married young
were most likely to begin their families immediately —
h2. percent of the women who married when they were teen¬
agers started trying for a child within six months of
their marriage, as compared to only h percent of those
marrying when they were twenty or twenty-one and 15 per¬
cent of those marrying when they were over twenty-one.
Thus it appears that there is more to be explained in
the relationship between age at marriage and family size
than a reference to differences in the efficiency of
fertility control would imply"'. There is still a rela¬
tionship between age at marriage and timing to the first
birth amongst those planning their families, and to
this extent some notion of social selection would be
appropriate. Women who married young wanted families,
and began trying for families, sooner than women who
married later.
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We could find 110 study which looked at the rela¬
tionship between age at marriage and the spacing between
children, although both Cartwright (1976: ^l) and
Askham (1975s 30) commented that women who had their
first pregnancy in their teens had more children on
average than those who started their childbearing later,
even when controlling for length of mari-iage. This
might imply closer birth spacing and, in fact, in
Askham*s study does. For our women there was little
relationship between age at marriage and when the
second child was wanted. Most couples — regardless
of the age they married — wanted their second child
to be born one and a half to two and a half years after
their first. Women who married when they were still
teenagers were no more likely than those marrying when
they were over twenty to want their children closely
spaced. We are, of course, concerned with the couples
who did plan their children and it may be that most
teenage wives are inefficient contraceptive users and
hence do have their children more closely spaced than
average. Amongst our women, though, this explanation
was not satisfactory. More or less equal percentages
of women in each of the age at marriage categories (21
percent, 20 percent and 10 percent in the age groups
under twenty, twenty or twenty-one and over twenty-one
respectively) had an unplanned second child, and hence
we would have to conclude that age at marriage had little
impact on the timing of the second child.
191
Religion and its influence on the timing and
spacing of children has been a relatively ignored topic;
Balakrishnan, Kantner and Allingham (1975) commented
that, in their Toronto study, variations of half a year
or more in child spacing were observed by religion;
however, no further information was px^ovided as to the
nature or direction of the differences or to the reli¬
gious groups involved. Amongst our sample there was
little diffei*ence between Protestants and Catholics
(either using husband's or wife's religion) in when they
began their families — for instance, 7 percent of Pro¬
testant wives and 13 percent of Catholic wives began
trying for their families within six months of their
marriage and 26 percent of Protestant waves and "j>0 per¬
cent of Catholic wives de3.ayed for over thirty months.
There did appear to be some tendency for those with no
religion or a I'eligion other than Protestant or Catholic
to be prompt starters. As we have commented before,
most of the couples in our sample who had other reli¬
gions held high family size aspirations. Three of the
five couples also did not believe in birth control and
hence the high percent (50 percent of the wives and
60 percent of the husbands) of those with other religions
who began trying for a family immediately after marriage.
Women and men with no religion were also more likely
than average to begin their families quickly — for
instance, 31 percent of the wives with no religious
affiliation began trying for children within six months
of their marriage and only 8 percent delayed for over
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thirty months. We have no explanation for this as yet;
the women who married when they were teenagers were no
more likely to have no religious affiliation than their
£
older counterparts , and there was no apparent reason
for why they tended to begin their families so quickly.
Looking at the spacing between children, Table 5«2
suggests a slight tendency for Catholics to space their
children closer than Protestants — for instance, 31
percent of Catholic wives began trying for the second
Table 5*2 Husband's and Wife's Religious Affi¬
liation by Space Between First Child and
When Couple Began Trying for Second
Wife's Religious Affiliation
Timing to Second Protestant Catholic Other None
Under 9 months 18 # 31 $> 60 £ 6
10 - l^f months 38 19 20 31
15 - 23 months 26 31 20 25
Over 2k months 18 19 0 38
Total N 35 3k 5 16
Husband's Religious Affiliation
Timing to Second Protestant Catholic Other None
Under 9 months 23 £ 31 1o 60 0 '
10 - 14 months 36 21 0 35
15 - 23 months 23 31 ko 29
Over 2k months 18 17 0 35
Total N 39 29 5 17
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child within nine months of the birth of the first child
versus 18 percent of the Protestant wives. This dif¬
ference quickly disappeared though; more or less equal
percentages of Protestants and Catholics were trying
for their second child by fourteen months. The biggest
difference was with the coup 3 s with other religions.
Sixty percent of them began tx^ying fox- their second
child within nine months of the birth of the first one
and again the explanation appeared to stem fx-om their
large family size ideals and their dislike of contracep¬
tion. The women and men with no religious affiliation
were the most likely to wait before having their second
child — approximately 35 percent waited until their
first child was at least two years old before trying
for their second and, as before, we have as yet no
explanation for this. Religious affiliation was not
related to age at marriage and there was no apparent
reason why couples with no religious affiliation had
their first child quickly, then waited for their second.
Social class and its effect on the timing and
spacing of children has received more attention than
religion, but analysis often ends by pointing out the
high rate of prenuptial conceptions amongst the semi-
and unskilled working class (see, for instance, Askham,
1975? Cartwright, 1976). In our survey, this relation¬
ship between premarital conceptions and social class
was also apparent — the husbands of k6 percent of the
premaritally pregnant women had semi— or unskilled occu¬
pations — however, as Table 5»3 indicates, there was
a relationship beyond this.
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Table 5*3 Social Class by Months Between Marriage
and Time Couple First Began Trying for a Child
Occupational Categories
Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
Timing to Fix^st Man» Non-Manual Manual Manual
Under 6 months 5 £ 0 £ 30 io 33
6-18 months 30 25 33 k2
18 - 30 months 20 67 22 8
Over 30 months h5 8 15 17
Total N 20 12 27 12
Jt is apparent from Table 5«3 that there was a cor¬
relation between social class and timing to the first
child, not only amongst those conceiving the first child
premaritally, but also amongst those who planned this
child. Working class couples were more apt than middle
class coiaples to begin their families within the first
year and a half of marriage — for instance, 75 percent
of the semi- and unskilled occupational class began
trying for a child within the first eighteen months of
max*riage as compared to 35 percent of the professionals
and 25 percent of the other non-manual workers. Con¬
versely, h5 percent of the professionals delayed 30 months
or more before beginning to try for a child as compared
to only 15 percent of the skilled manuals and 17 percent
of the semi- and unskilled workers. Clearly social
class had an influence on when the first child was wanted.
Cartwriglit (1976: 109 - 110), possibly to circumvent
problems with sub-fecundity and foetal mortality, asked
her respondents whether they felt it was "appropriate
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to start a family straight away after marriage". In
a way inflective of our results, more working class
mothers felt it was appropriate to begin a family imme¬
diately than middle class ones. Their ideas also sup¬
ported their actions: more social class V mothers had
children within the first two years of marriage than
social class I mothers. Cartwright continued her
analysis of the relationship between social class and
spacing to the first child to include age at marriage
because of its relationship with social class and spacing
to the first child. She found that both variables —
age at marriage and social class — were independently
related to the mothers' views and experiences of the
interval between marriage and the first child.
For our women, as well, there was a correlation
7
between social class and age at marriage , and hence
we expanded our analysis to sort out the relationships.
Table presents the percent of women who began trying
for a child within six months of their marriage,
and the percent who delayed trying for thirty months
or more, by the women's age at marriage and their social
class. Social class was collapsed into two categories;
as before, middle class included the professional-
managerials and the other non-manuals and the working
class included all the manual workers.
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Table 5.h Age at Marriage and Social Class of
Women Beginning to Try for Child Within Six
Months of Marriage and After Thiz^ty Months
of Marriage
Age at Marriage
Under 20 20, 21 Over 21
Percent Beginning to Try for
First Within Six Months
Middle Class 0 £ ( k) 0 % (10) 6 $ (l8)
Working Class 57 5° (15) 6 # (l6) 37 1° ( 8)
Age at Maxoriage
Under 20 20, 21 Over 21
Percent Delaying to Try for
First for Thirty Months or More
Middle Class 25 $ ( *0 30 cJo (10) 29 # (18)
Working Class 7 £ (15) 25 $ (16) 19 $ ( 8)
Figures in brackets are the number of mothers on
which the percentages are based (= 100 °Ja) ,
It appears from Table 5,h that working class couples
were more likely than middle class couples to begin
their families quickly after marriage, regardless of
the age they married. In all age at marriage categories,
more working class couples than middle class ones began
their families promptly. Age at marriage, interestingly
g
enough, lost much of its predictive power , There was
a slight tendency for those with similar social class
backgrounds who married younger to begin trying for
their families sooner than those marrying when older
(for instance, 57 percent of the working class women who
married when they were under twenty started trying for
a child within six months of their marriage versus 37
percent of those who married when they were over tvrenty-
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one)J however, the differences were not as distinctive
as they were when social class was not involved in the
analysis. Our conclusion would have to be that it is
social class in particular which has an important in¬
fluence on when couples begin trying for their first child.
Social class also helps explain the tendency we saw
earlier for the women with no religious affiliation to
begin their families quickly after marriage. Just over
65 percent of the women who claimed they had no reli¬
gious affiliation were from the two manual social classes
and if religion and social class were held constant,
then the tendency for those people with no religious
affiliation to begin their families promptly was apparent
only amongst the skilled and semi— and unskilled manual
classes. It seemed that it was not the lack of reli¬
gious affiliation per se which influenced couples to
have their first child quickly, but the fact that most
of these couples were from the manual social classes.
With regard to the influence social class has on
the spacing between children, Cartwright found (1976:
110) that the only difference in her sample couples was
in the proportion for which the space was less than a
year. The reported differences were not large, however —
3 percent of .the working class mothers and less than
1 percent of the middle class mothers had their last
two children spaced within a year of one another. Ask-
ham found (1975: 30 ) that most of her spacing differen¬
tials were between couples with two and couples with
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four children, although, slightly more of the social
class III group waited over two years between the deli¬
very of the first and second child than of the social
class V group (83 percent compared to 67 percent, all
of whom had only two children). In Canada, Balakrishnan,
Kantner and Allingham (1975) observed almost no varia¬
tion in child spacing between children by husband's
occupation. This was also the case with our sample
couples, as is indicated in Table 5»5»
Table 5«5 Social Class by Space Between First
Child and When Couple Began Tidying for
Second
Occupational Categories
Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
1 « , Man. Won—Manual Manual Manual
Timing to Second
Under 9 months 19 °h 36 £ 26 # 15 £
10 - 14 months 33 29 3b 15
15 - 23 months 29 29 20 bo
Over 23 months 19 7 20 30
Total N 21 14 35 20
There appeared to be very little relationship bet¬
ween social class and spacing between children and, if
anything, it was in a way opposite to that suggested
by Cartwright and Askham, Although differences were
small, the working classes seemed more apt to delay
their second child than the middle classes — for in¬
stance, 23 percent of the manual classes delayed two
years or more between their children compared to 14 per¬
cent of the middle classes. Conversely, 22 percent of
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the manual classes and 26 percent of the middle classes
began trying for a second child within nine months of
the first child. As we have said, the differences are
small but they do indicate a trend opposite to that
suggested in the two British surveys.
In this introductory section on timing and spacing
we have looked at the relationship between age at mar¬
riage, religion and social class and the timing and
spacing of our couples' two childx*en. Little about
the spacing between children was uncovered, other than
the tendency for those with other religions to space
their children closely. This was accounted for by these
couples' large family size aspirations and their dislike
of birth control. Our examination of the timing to
the first birth was more fruitful. The common rela¬
tionship between premarital conceptions and social class
and age at marriage was uncovered, as well as a rela¬
tionship indicating that a young age at marriage and
inclusion in the working classes meant a greater ten¬
dency to begin a family shortly after marriage. In the
next two sections we shall consider income, price and
taste considerations, always bearing in mind the control
variables, to uncover more about how our couples have
built up their families.
5*2 Income and Price Variables
In the previous chapter we looked at the influence
of a number of income variables on the couples' desires
for more children. These income variables all dealt
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with the couple's current economic position and, unfor¬
tunately, this was all the information we obtained.
Because of the difficulties we anticipated in having
the women remember their income, or even general finan¬
cial position, at the time they began trying for their
two children — and the immeasurable amount of unreli¬
ability in their responses we decided to limit our
analysis to an examination of the impact of current
economic standing on past timing decisions, Freedman
and Coombs limited (1966: 6^+7—6^8) their study in this
way and found "the timing of births after marriage has
a strong and consistent relationship to economic posi¬
tion. ... Whether measured by current income or accumu¬
lation of several types of assets, a couple's economic
position is substantially better the longer the interval
to the first or last birth. Those wives already preg-
nant with their first child at the time of marriage are
particularly disadvantaged economically". Freedman and
Coombs' results were not a function of the longer marriage
duration of those without premarital pregnancies and
long birth intervals -— the relationship was apparent
even when length of marriage was controlled. They con¬
cluded that "those who have their children very quickly
after marriage find themselves under great economic
pressure, particularly if they married at an early age . . .
They are less able than others to accumulate the goods
and assets regarded as desirable by young couples in
our society. They are more likely than others to become
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discouraged at an early point and to lose interest more
quickly than others in the competition for economic
success".
Amongst our couples, the pretnaritally pregnant in
particular showed patterns similar to those discussed
by Freedman and Coombs. Couples who conceived their
first child preinaritally were in a poorer economic posi¬
tion now than those who began their families after* their
marriage. Amongst those who were not premaritally preg¬
nant, there was some relationship between timing and
income, but not to the extent witnessed by the premari-
tally pregnant. Table 5»6 presents the relationship
between husband's income and when the couple first began
trying for a chiid with the premaritally pregnant included
in a sepax*ate category.
Table 5«6 Husband's Income by Months Between Mar¬
riage and Time Couple First Began Trying for
a Child
Pre¬ Timing to First
marital ly Hithin 6 6-18 18-30 30 Month
Husband's Income
Pregnant Months Months Months or More
Under $12,000 35 1° 0 £ 9 £ 6 £ 0 •p
$12,000 - $15,000 39 bz 2b 17 25
$15,000 - $20,000 9 33 38 61 bb
Over $20,000 17 25 29 17 31
Total N * ' 26 12 21 18 16
* Information on their husband's income could not
be obtained from four women.
Although Freedman and Coombs' (1966) results were
not a function of the length of time a couple had been
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married, our results possibly could be, Jt might be
argued that a premarital pregnancy pushed couples into
a marriage and family sooner than they would otherwise
have chosen and that the lower incomes they were earning
now were just a function of being "one step behind" in
their careers, Ve looked more closely at the premaritally
pregnant and this argument did not seem applicable.
Only two of the eight couples who were premaritally preg¬
nant and earning under ^12,000 were in apprenticeships —
the rest were working at occupations where they would
always be earning below average wages, Koi"eover, the
two in apprenticeships, were in apprenticeship to low-
paying occupations (i.e. cook), Tt would be incorrect
to conclude that the x-elationship between income and
premarital pregnancy was due solely to an age-related
factor — as with Freedman and Coombs' data, we would
expect that these couples, at each stage of family forma¬
tion, will be earning the below average incomes,
Freedman and Coombs did find that the relationship
between timing of births after marriage and economic
position held for all couples, not only the premaritally
pregnant. This was only slightly the case with our
9
data . Couples who waited over thirty months to begin
trying for their first child were marginally better-off
now than those who began trying within six months (for
instance, 75 percent of the couples waiting thirty months
to try for their first child had incomes over $15|000
at present versus 58 percent of those who began trying
for their families within six months of their marriage),
203
but a largo part of this relationship was accounted for
by the relationship between social class and income.
Social class and husband's income were, not surprisingly,
related amongst our sample couples^, and when it was
controlled for, the relationship between income and
timing to the first child was largely attenuated, Tbose
few couples for whom income did not correspond with
husband's occupation (i.e. a high stattis job, but low
pay or a low status job with high pay) tended to follow
spacing patterns moxn characteristic of their social
class categorization than their income categorization^''".
Freedman and Coombs suggested (1966: 648) that
couples who have their children quickly may do so in
spite of the possible economic ramifications, because
they prefer children to the economic gains they may
forego. They then rejected this explanation with the
finding that "the proportion of wives dissatisfied with
the timing of their births increases rapidly as the
interval between marriage and successive births decreases".
Amongst our sample couples this explanation could not be
rejected and, in fact, is one of the key themes in the
qualitative analysis of Part III, The majority of women
in each of our spacing categories (other than the pre-
maritally pregnant classification) were pleased with the
spacing of their child. In fact, the majority who were
not pleased with when their first child was born tended
to have trouble conceiving or carrying a child to term.
By definition, our spacing categories were the time
periods between marriage and when a couple started trying
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for a child, and most couples began trying for a child
when they wanted one or, at the very least, were not
"bothered" if they had one. Differences were apparent
between the social classes (and income groups) in regards
to when a first child was wanted, and we would argue
that this was precisely because some social classes
"preferred children to economic gains" — or, possibly
more accurately, did not see in children economic gains
that would have to be "foregone". As we just mentioned,
this is a key theme in the qualitative analysis and the
reader is referred to Part XIX for a complete discussion,
12
Turning now to price considerations , we shall
consider only child-quality standards, We have serious
reservations whether or not "indirect costs", as the
economists use the term, are a factor influencing a
woman's fertility decisions (see discussion in previous
chapter) and hence wi.ll not consider their impact on
the timing and spacing dimension. Child-quality standards,
to repeat, were the level of material comfort with which
the couple felt it was necessary to provide each of
their children. Couples who held high child-quality
standards felt it was important to provide their children
with numerous commodities, those with low standards felt
these commodities were unimportant. In the previous
chapter, because we were unable to validate how relevant
our indicators were to all members of our sample, we
proceeded with the analysis only within occupational
categories. We felt that this would, to some degree,
control for selected taste-forming factors. This we
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also did here and Table 5.7 presents the relationship
between child-quality standards and timing- from marriage
to when the couple first began trying for a child for
the manual and non-manual social classes. Again we
collapsed our occupational categories because all the
non-manual workers showed similar patterns of relationship,
as did the manual workers.
Table 5»7 Child-Quality Standards by Months Bet¬
ween Marriage and Time Couple First Began





Direct Costs Direct Costs
Timing to First
Low High Low High
Up to 6 months 7 £ 0 <fi 35 27 £
6-18 months 29 28 36 36
18 - 30 months 43 33 12 23
Over 30 months 21 39 18 lk
Total N Ik 18 17 22
One would expect couples with high child-quality
standards to delay the birth of their first child so
that the various highly rated commodities could be
acquired. This tendency is apparent in the relationship
for both the manual and non-manual social classes but
the differences are slight. Couples who judge the direct
costs of children to be high or low certainly show no
distinctive trends — more or less equal percentages
wait the various time spans.
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Jn trying to account for this lack of relationship
we looked at the interviews and it became apparent that
the list of commodities we were using were not particu¬
larly i-elevant for the first born child. New clothes
and toys, separate bedrooms, a backyard and yearly holi¬
days may or may not have been important to "children",
but were usually seen as not important for a baby. Xt
was by the time the second child was being planned that
these commodities proved more useful in differentiating
those couples with high child—quality standards from
those with low. At this stage in the family formation
process, there was one child who could conceivably benefit
from the material goods. Table 5«8 presents the rela¬
tionship between child-quality standards and the interval
between the birth of the first child and when the couple
began trying for the second for the two social classes.
Table 5*8 Child-Quality Standards by Space Between
First Child and When Couple Began Tidying for










Under 9 months 43 £ ik f 30 $ Ik $
10 - 14 months 21 38 35 21
15 - 23 months 21 33 27 27
Over 23 months lk 1k 8 38
Total N lk 21 26 29
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It appears from Table 5»8 that couples with low
child-quality standards have their children closer together
than those with high child-quality standards. The top
two modal categories for spacing between children for
the wives of manual workers who held low child-quality
standards were under nine months (30 percent) and ten
to fourteen months (35 percent). The top two modal
categories for the wives of manual workers who held high
child-quality standards, on the other hand, were fifteen
to twenty-three months (27 percent) and twenty-four
months or more (38 percent). The relationship for the
non-manual workers was not as clear cut because equal
percentages spaced their children twenty—four months
or more apart. However, if this category is ignored,
the relationship was seen. Hhereas l4 percent of the
women whose husbands had non-manual occupations and who
had high child-quality standards began trying for their
second child within nine months of their first, this
was true of 43 percent of those who had low child-quality
standards. It seemed that those women who felt many
commodities were unimportant for their children tried
to have their second child more closely spaced to their
first than those who felt that it was important to give
their children such things as separate bedrooms and new
clothes and toys. The more apt a woman in either social
class was to hold high child-quality standards, the more
apt she was to wait before trying for a second child.
The importance couples placed on material goods for
their children seemed to have an impact on how they
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spaced those children. This vas mi important theme in
the reasons couples gave for spacing their children as
they did and the r-eader is referred to the qualitative
analysis in Pax*t III for a fuller exploration of the
topic.
In this section we have looked at the impact of
income and prices on the timing and spacing of our cotiples'
two children. Present income showed a relationship to
timing the first child, particularly amongst the pre-
V
maritally pregnant. Those women who had their two child¬
ren closely spaced after marriage were at the lower
end of the income scale and, judging by their occupa¬
tions, would appear destined to stay there. The rela¬
tionship with income for those planning their children
was less clear cut though and seemed to stem partly from
the association between income and social class. Direct
costs, that is the child-quality standards parents
held for their children, helped explain why couples in
both social classes spaced their second child as they
did. Couples who held high chiId—quality standards
tended to space their second child further from their
first than coviples with low child—quality standards.
In the next section, taste factors and their influence
on the timing of the couples' two children will be con¬
sidered,
5,3 Taste Variables
As we pointed out in the previous chapter, the var¬
iety and scope of possible taste factors influencing
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family formation behavior is extensive. Here, as there,
we will limit our discussion to three constellations
which have received some examination in the literature
and which we found to be useful in our qualitative under¬
standing of our couples' behavior. The three are the
conjugal relationship, sex role norms and behavior and
antipathy towards children.
Our measurement of the conjugal relationship —
which the reader may recall was divided into the four
components task performance, decision making, leisure
activities and communication and understanding — suffers
from the same problem that the income variables did in
accounting for the couples' timing and spacing behavior;
the measures are measures of the couples' conjugal rela—
tionship now, and although'^may provide a description
of the effects spacing has on a relationship, cannot
be used to comment on which sorts of people have their
families quickly and which sorts delay. That is, because
we could not determine the type of conjugal relationship
our couples had before each of their children, and we
cannot assume that a couple's relationship remains un¬
changed throughout their marriage (particularly with the
advent of children), we cannot conclude how, or even if,
a couple's conjugal relationship influences how they
space their children. We can, however, use the infor¬
mation to see if there are any regularities between spacing
of children and how couples perform tasks, make decisions,
spend their leisure and communicate with one another.
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Because we were interested in the patterns of rela¬
tionship between the spacing of the couple's two children
and their conjugal relationship, we decided to work with
actual spacing categories. These were the spacing cate¬
gories referred to in Chapter Three of the thesis; to
repeat, less than nine months, nine months to two years,
two years to three years, three years to four years and
over four years with regard to the time x^eriod f-rom mar¬
riage to the first child and less than eighteen months,
eighteen months to two years, two years to two and a
half years, two and a half years to three years and over
three years with regard to the time period from the
birth of the first child to the birth of the second.
Task performance and decision making were the first
conjugal relationship variables we looked at and they
showed little or no relationship to the timing of either
of the children. Similar breakdowns of percentages were
apparent within each of the spacing intervals, ¥e had
expected at the very least that women who had had their
two children closely spaced *jo~M have had more help from
their husbands with household tasks (simply because
caring for two small babies is in itself a time-consuming
task), but even this was not evident. Although the
tendency was apparent, it was not strong — household
tasks were shared by approximately 27 percent of couples
whose two children were born within eighteen months of
one another and by approximately 2h percent of the rest.
The conclusion from our data would have to be that spacing
of children is not a factor in determining who makes the
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decisions and vho does the chores.
In the previous chapter when we looked at how couples
spent their leisure time, we pointed out that the nature
of the couples' leisure activities influenced their
intentions regarding' a thix^d child. In those couples
where the husband had outside interests but the wife did
not, the wife was most likely to feel "tied down" and
less likely to want a third child. Wives who had their
own organized social life apart from their family res¬
ponsibilities were, on the other hand, least likely to
feel "tied down" and most likely to be considering further
children.
It is possible that an intervening variable here is
the timing and spacing of the two children. Women whose
children came quickly after marriage or closely spaced
together may feel more "tied down" or may be less able
to pursue interests on their own. We looked at the
relationship between the spacing of the children and the
nature of a couple's leisure activities to see if there
was any validity to this suggestion and there appeared
not to be. Women who began childbearing quickly after
marriage were no more apt than the others to display
unique leisure patterns. Even timing between the children
did not influence the nature of a couple's leisure acti¬
vities — more or less similar percentages of couples
socialized as a unit only, had separate interests, or
one or the other of them had separate interests in each
of the spacing categories. It seems that the nature of
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a couple's leisure activities cannot be accounted for
solely by spacing considerations. Women who want, or
have the interpersonal skills to enable them to have
outside interests do so regardless of how their children
are spaced.
The communication and understanding between a couple
likewise could not be accounted for by spacing considera¬
tions. How they spaced their children showed no char¬
acteristic relationship with the nature of a couple's
relationship. This was true even when we introduced
social class into the analysis. The manual occupational
classes generally were less happy with their1 conjugal
13
relationships , but there appeared to be little assoc-iix —
within either class between how well a couple got
on and when they had had their two children.
As we said in the previous chapter, most women
assessed their relationship with their husbands as being
"very good" and thus our results must be interpreted with
care. Also, it has been suggested that the well-known
inverse association between age at first marriage and
probability of divorce (Monahan, 1953; Jacobson, 1959;
Burchinal and Chancellor, 1963; Park and Glick, 1967;
Carter and Glick, 1970; Glick and Norton, 1971; Bumpass
and Sweet, 1972; Need, 197^+ and Schoen, 1975) is because
most young couples have their first child immediately
after their marriage and this puts a strain on their
relationship:
Vhen marriage begins with an extended period of
childlessness, the wife will continue in employment,
213
ajid the marriage is likely to be marked by relative
egalitarianism and sharing. But such an experience
is comparatively unlikely among the youngest couples
who rapidly enter parenthood, , , The birth of a
child makes egalitarianism much more difficult to
attain, , , They have a very short time to get to
know one another, , , (and) , , , they have very
little experience of life on which to build,
Ineichen, 1976: 64
Our data would not support this hypothesis; while
working class couples did show higher levels of marital
stress, this was regardless of when they had had their
first child. However, as we have said, our cell sizes
were small and hence the results must be considered
writh caution.
The second constellation of taste variables was
sex role norms and behavior. Included here was the
wife's work behavior and her attitudes towards tradi¬
tional and modern role behaviors. We began the analysis
by looking at the final control variable — the wife's
education.
The effect the wife's education has on the timing
and spacing of a couple's family has been almost com¬
pletely ignored in the literature — neither Askham
(1975)t nor Cartwright (1976) nor Balakrishnan, Kantner
and Allingham (1975) looked specifically at the influence
of the mother's education on child spacing, Cartwright
*
did suggest a strong monotonic relationship between social
class and mother's education and Askham commented (1975s
13*0 that women in social class III with two children
were more likely than average to have some further edu¬
cation, and hence, to this extent, we would predict women
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with higher levels of education to delay their first
child longer than the others, A high rate of prenuptial
conceptions was a3.so observed in these studies amongst
the unskilled and we would expect this to be reflected
in a high rate of premarital pregnancies amongst those
with less education.
All of these trends were found in our data. The
premaritally pregnant were concentrated amongst the women
with a grade twelve or less than a grade twelve education.
Approximately 40 percent of the prenuptially pregnant
had less than a grade twelve education, 30 percent had
a grade twelve education, 22 percent had a short training
course and 9 percent had a trade. No woman whose first
child had been premaritally conceived had attended uni¬
versity, There was also evidence that amongst those
planning their families, women with less education began
trying earlier for a child than the others. Table 5»9
presents the results.
Table 5*9 Wife's Education by Months Between Mar¬
riage and Time Couple First Began Trying
for a Child
Wife's Education
Less Than Grade Short Trade Univer¬
- 1 « , Grade 12
Timing to First
12 Course Course sity
6 months or less 71 'h 16 OH HH 10 io
6-18 months 14 32 35 33 kO
18 - 30 months lU 28 30 22 30
Over 30 months 0 2k 25 33 20
Total N 7 25 20 9 10
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Just over "JO percent of the women with less than a
grade twelve education began trying for their first child
within the first six months of their marriage. To em¬
phasis, none of these women were pregnant when they
married; they all had discontinued, or never began,
the use of contraception because they wanted to start
their families. Only about 10 percent in the other edu¬
cational categories began their families this quickly.
Conversely, while none of the women with less than a
grade twelve education delayed starting their families
thirty months or more, approximately one quarter in each
of the other educational groups did. It seems quite
clear that not completing secondary school has an impor¬
tant influence on the timing to the first child.
Why education should have such an influence on
timing to the first child appears, in this case, to stem
from the effect it has on widening a woman's horizons
beyond marriage and a family. When we examined the in¬
terviews it appeared that those women who had little or
no interest in further education were more positively
oriented towards marriage and child rearing than the
rest. Their goals in life were more apt to center around
having children and providing a home for them. Leaving
school before grade twelve also severely limited the
type of employment that was available to them to the
more monotonous, low-paying jobs. Since raising a family
was held in such high esteem, and any employment that
might have been found was likely to be unsatisfactory,
it is perhaps not surprising that these women started
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trying Tor a family more or less immediately after their
15
marriages .
Looking more directly at the influence the women's
work behavior had on how they spaced their children"**^,
we found that while most of the women worked before
their first child was boim, those women who began trying
for a child within six months of their marriage were less
likely to do so. Table 5» 10 presents the results.
Table 5*10 Work Behavior Before First Child by Months
Between Marriage and Time Couple First
Began Trying for a Child
Work Behavior Before First Child
Timing to First
Did Not.Work Worked Full-Time
Before First Before First
6 months or less 62 12 70
6—18 months 38 30
18 - 30 months 0 30
Over 30 months 0 27
Total N * 8 59
* Four women worked part-time only before their
first child and are not included in this table,
The women who did not work after they married were
more likely to begin trying for their families within
the early months of their marriage — 62 percent of
them began trying for their first child within six months
of their marriage versus 12 percent of the women working
full-time. The obvious explanation is that those women
who wanted children immediately did not have time to
work; they were quickly tied up with caring for children.
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This is, however, only a partially satisfactory explana¬
tion. Of the women woi-king full— time, most worked up
to the sixth or seventh month of their pregnancy and
hence, even if a woman did conceive a child immediately
after her marriage, thex^e would have been at least five
or si.x months when she could have worked. Proof of this
point is the fact that 83 percent of the premaritally
pregnant women worked before they had their first child.
Moreover, our women did not all conceive without delayj
trying for two or three months was more common and at
least two of the women were trying for closer to a year.
Our point is that most of these women would have had
time to work if they had chosen to — the fact is they
chose not to work once they married. A truer explana¬
tion for their behavior — and an explanation which is
expanded upon in Pai-t III -— is similar to the explana¬
tion we outlined above. The women with a grade twelve
or less than a grade twelve education tended to be the
women who did not work after marriage (75 percent of
those who did not work after marriage had a grade twelve
education or less). They all were very positively oriented
towards having children and none would have found it
easy to have found employment that was rewarding in either
an emotional or financial sense. The primary orientation
of these women was "setting up a home" and "having child¬
ren" — an orientation which included no great desire
for further education and a reluctance to work once
married.
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The one other work behavior variable we looked at
was future work intentions. This variable showed no
relationship to the timing of the first child, but it
was related to the timing of the second child in a way
similar to the child-quality variable. Table 5«H pre¬
sents the results. There were three categories used to
measure future work intentions: the woman never intends
to work in the future or only when her children have
left home, the woman intends to return to work when her
childi-en are in school and the woman intends to return
to work when her children are still pre-schoolers.
Table 5»il Future Work Intentions by Space Between
Fii~st Child and When Couple Began Trying
for Second
Woman Intends Returning to Work When:
Children Children in Children are
„ ,Leave Home School Pre-School Age
Timing to Second
Under 9 months 2-5 ^ 2h <p 18 <f>
10 - 1*4- months 0 32 33
15 - 23 months 33 27 26
Over 23 months h2 17 22
Total N * 12 hi 27
* The total N equals 80 because ten women were
unsure when they would be returning to work.
The relationship is not strong but does indicate
that women who space their children widely apart are
less apt to be contemplating an early return to the work
force. For instance, 75 percent of the women who were
planning to delay their return to work until their child-
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ren had left home waited at least fifteen months before
beginning to try to have their second child. This was
the case with only 48 percent of the women who were
planning to return to work with pre-schoolers. When we
reviewed the questionnaires, it appeared that the women
who were not intending to return to work when they had
school age or pre-school age children felt much more
strongly about the importance of being at home with
children and having children fairly far apart so that
each child could get its share of attention. Women
intending to work when they had pre-schoolers, on the
other hand, were less worried about giving each child a
great deal of attention —- to the point at times of
commenting that their working was beneficial to the
child because it stopped the child being "spoilt". This,
along with the child-qiiality variable, provide the
empirical basis to the qualitative analysis of child
spacing and the reader is referred to Part XXI for the
complete discussion. It appears that couples have varying
opinions on how much time, attention and money should be
spent on children and this influences their spacing
and possibly total family size.
Sex role norms, as the reader may recall from the
previous chapter, were measured through five scales
which we collapsed into one role index. When we were
looking at the relationship between when a woman began
trying for her first child and her educational level,
we suggested that the observed differences might stem
from the effect education has on widening a woman's
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horizons beyond marriage and a family. A similar argu¬
ment was also used to explain why women who began trying
for a child immediately after their marriage were less
likely than average to attempt to find employment. What
both of these explanations were basically suggesting
is that women A/ith "traditional" orientations (b© it
measured through a lack of desire to work once married
or created by lower levels of education) are more apt
to begin their families A/ithin six months of their' mar¬
riage than women with more "modern" orientations. Since
Aire did measure role oi'ientation more dimctly we looked
at the relationship betA/een it and timing to A/hen the
couple began trying for their first child. Table 5.12
presents the results.
Table 5.12 Role Orientation by Months Between





6 months or less 23 *£> 11 °jv
6-18 months 20 52
18 - 30 months 32 18
Over 30 months 25 18
Total N 27
There appeared to be only a slight relationship
betA/een role orientation and timing to when the couple
first began trying for a child, although our hypothesis
was supported in that a greater percent of those A/omen
A/ith a "traditional" orientation than those with a "modern"
221
orientation were trying fox" their fiz^st child within
six months of their marriage — 23 percent compared to
11 percent, The two sex role categories showed quite
different patterns of association — the majority (52
percent) of the women with a modern orientation began
trying for their first child when they had been married
from six to eighteen months. The women with a more
traditional orientation, on the other hand, were almost
evenly spread between the four spacing categories.
It is difficult to know how to interpret these re¬
sults. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, thei-e
did appear to be a tendency for women to select answers
indicating a greater degree of role modernity than we
would have expected. We have, however, no way of asses¬
sing this bias. Certainly from the qualitative analysis
and from other measures in the quantitative analysis
(i.e. educational level, work behavior), it appeared
that those women whose orientation was towards their
husband and children (i.e. they held a "traditional"
orientation) began trying for their families sooner after
marriage than those women whose orientation was more
towards their own individualistic interests (i.e. they
held a "modern" orientation).
The final taste variable we considered was anti¬
pathy towards children. This was a variable which indi¬
cated the extent to which children were seen as an encum¬
brance — the extent to which they got on the mother's
"nerves" or were a "burden". There was a relationship
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between it and whether more children were wanted for the
■women whose husbands held a non-manual occupation, but
the variable as measured was unable to pick up as much
of the variation in attitudes towards children as we would
have liked; most women expressed low levels of anti¬
pathy towards children. This was also a problem when
we looked at the timing and spacing of the couples' two
children. Thei'e appeared to be no relationship at all
between antipathy towards children and either acttial
spacing categories or the spacing categories limited
by when couples began trying for a child. Children were
seen as an encumbrance by equal percentages of couples
in each of the spacing categories. When we vere con¬
ducting the interviews, it appeared that women who had
had their children quickly after marriage and closely
spaced were under greater pressure than the rest. This
may simply be because we found it a greater strain to
conduct the interview when there were two "babies" pre¬
sent, or these women may have been under a greater strain
but without this affecting the extent to which children
were seen as an encumbrance. Our original expectations,
though, were not born out. Antipathy towards children,
at least how we have measured it, showed no relationship
to the timing and spacing of the couples' two children.
Again we would suggest that this variable has been rela¬
tively ignored in the literature and, from our interview
experience, would suggest that this be remedied.
In this last section on timing and spacing we have
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looked at the relationship between a number of taste
variables and the spacing of the couples' families.
None of the conjugal relationship variables appeared
to have been influenced by the timing and spacing of
the couples' two children (or, conversely, the timing
of the couples' two children did not appear to affect
their' conjugal relationship). Wife's education showed
an interesting relationship with the timing of the first
child — women who had not completed a grade twelve
education were significantly more likely to begin their
families immediately after their marriages than those
that had. This seemed to be a result of their greater
orientation towards having children and their poorer
prospects in the labour market. ¥e also found that these
women were less likely to work after their marriage. Xn
general, women who did not work once they were married
were moi'e apt to begin trying for a family immediately.
Future work intentions helped explain why couples spaced
their second child as they did. Women who were not plan¬
ning to return to work until their children had left
home appeared to place a greater premium on the impor¬
tance of spending time with children. This was reflected
both by when they planned to return to work and in the
spacing of their second child —- they were more likely
than average to wait at least two years before even
beginning to try for that child. This long spacing was
so that sufficient time could be devoted to each child.
Sex role orientation showed only a slight relationship
with timing and spacing considerations; however, because
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other behavioral indices had suggested a relationship
and because we felt there was an inherent bias leading
the women to select answers indicating a greater degree
of role modernity than wo would have imagined, we con¬
cluded that women wTith a "traditional" orientation were
more apt to begin their families quickly after their
marriage than women with more "modern" orientations,
A traditional orientation stressed the children's needs
before the mother's and seemed to be related to beginning
a family as quickly as possible. The last variable we
considered was antipathy towards children and this vari¬
able, at least how we measured it, showed no relationship
with the timing and spacing of the couples' two children,
5,k Summary
In this second quantitative chapter of the thesis
we have looked at the timing and spacing of our couples'
two children. In contrast to completed fertilit3r, this
topic has received relatively little attention in the
literature. However, with our commitment to a dynamic
model of fertility decision making \^ith its emphasis
on the situational nature of family formation, we felt
it essential to consider each birth interval individually.
In light of our (limited) available resources we chose
to consider couples with two children and thus had to be
content with an analysis of the factors that couples
said influenced their fertility behavior. Rather than
using the traditional spacing categories (categories
ended by actual births), we used categories limited by
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when couples began "trying" for a child. The traditional
spacing categories appealed to be uninfluenced by a wide
range of variables and, from the qualitative analysis,
we were suspicious about this lack of results.
kith regard to timing to the first child, we found
a basic social class difference which was reflected in
both income and taste variables. As a general xmle,
women from the working classes began their families
sooner after their marriages than women from the middle
classes. The reason why this was so appeared to stem
from the differing conceptions the two social groupings
had of marriage and child rearing. This is the primary
thrust of the first chapter of Section III and the reader
is referred there for a complete discussion.
Timing to the second child, in contrast#did not
appear explainable by reference to social class differ¬
ences. In fact, the two factors (one price, the other
taste) which did distinguish women who wanted their
children close together from women who wanted them further
apart both involved differing conceptions of how much
time, attention and material goods should be lavished
on children, and neither were related to social class.
Women who felt children should be invested with many
goods tended to have their children further apart than
women who felt that these things were unimportant. This
is another main theme in Section III and the reader is
referred there for the complete discussion. Before
beginning the qualitative analysis, however, we shall
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finish the quantitative analysis by considering the
couples' perceived fecundability and their use, and mis¬
use, of contraception. These were, the reader may recall,
the other two factors through which we conceptualized
fertility behavior as working.
227
CHAPTER SIX POTENTIAL OUTPUT OF CHILDREN
The theoretical framework used throughout this thesis
sees fex-tility behavior as a function of the demand for
children, the perceived potential output of children
and the costs of fertility control. In the last two
chapters we looked at the demand for children — wre con¬
sidered how income, price and taste factors influenced the
timing of the couple's present two children and the px-ob-
ability of their having a third child. In the following
chapter we will consider our couples' experiences with
bix-th control. In this chapter, though, we shall consider
the perceived output of children — how our couples'
behavior is influenced by the number of children they feel
they would have if fertility was not deliberately limited.
The determinants of fertility have been listed and
described by Davis and Blake (1956). There are factors
affecting exposure to intercourse, factors affecting
exposure to conception and factors affecting gestation
and successful parturition. The factors we felt were rele¬
vant to our couples' assessment of their natural fertility
levels included coital frequency, fecundity or sub-fecundity
as affected by voluntary and involuntary causes, and
foetal mortality from voluntary and involuntary causes.
V.Te will consider the influence of each in turn.
Coital frequency was not a topic this study was able
to handle very satisfactorily, The women were interviewed
six to eight weeks after the birth of a child and many
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had yet to resume marital relations. Those that had, had
just and found it difficult to answer questions asking
for an "average". We chose to interview the women so
close to the birth of their child because we felt interest
would be high in both demand and contraceptive factors.
This was certainly true, but unfortunately at the expense
of information on the long-term rate of marital sexual
relations. All the women but one were living with their
husbands, though, and in their discussions of the factors
leading up to the births of their first and second children,
none suggested coital frequency (including voluntary or
involuntary abstinence) as a possible explanatory variable.
Moreover, virtually all the women felt that unless steps
were taken there would be further pregnancies, and thus
we assumed that though rates of coital frequency undoubtedly
varied between the couples, all were sufficiently high
for the sake of conception"'".
Past foetal mortality from involuntary causes was
accurately assessed in that the information was on the
woman's medical record, to which we had access. There
were thirteen miscarriages of a pregnancy leading to the
first child and three miscarriages of a pregnancy leading
to a second child. All the miscarriages of a first born
were at approximately three months or less. One of the
miscarriages of a second child was at six months (the
baby was live—born, but died two hours later) and the
remainder were at three months or less. There seemed to
be no pattern to the women suffering miscarriages — all
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social classes were represented, as were all age groups.
More to the point, no woman suggested that her future
potential fertility might be hindered by foetal mortality
from involuntary causes.
Past foetal mortality from voluntary causes (i.e.
abortion) was more difficult to assess. Only one woman
admitted to an abortion (her second pregnancy which came
too quickly after her first), though there was one "mis¬
carriage" which might have been deliberately prompted.
We did not ask directly if the vonien had ever had an abor¬
tion, only if they had ever been pregnant without producing
a live-born child. In this one case, the woman had been
very young (seventeen) when she miscarried and seemed
2
fairly reticient about discussing details . The majority
of women (84 percent) were opposed to the abortion of
unwanted pregnancies for themselves (Would you ever con¬
sider an abortion? "Never, I'd look at our two kids and
I just couldn't, wouldn't ever do that."; "No, I would
never hate it that much.") and thus we would predict that
the rate of foetal mortality fx^om voluntary causes had
been, and would be in the future, quite low.
Measuring the extent of fecundity or sub-fecundity
as affected by involuntary factors has plagued many re¬
searchers in the area of family planning. Askham, for
instance, suggested (l975i 26) that for her sample "women's
own opinions and a reliance upon their memory of sexual
behavior and use or non-use of contraception meant that
the question of the extent of sub-fecundity ... was
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extremely difficult to determine". Cartwright (1976)
also relied on the woman's memox*y regarding fecundity
("Have you any reason to think that you and your husband
could not have more childx^en if you wanted to — that you
might have any difficulty becoming pregnant again — or
difficulty going on with a pregnancy until the baby was
born?) as did Beaujot (1975) with the Edmonton sample.
We too asked our sample women to assess their own level
of fecundity:
If you and your husband wanted more children, could
you, from a medical point of view, have them? Do
you think you could easily have another child or
would it be difficult or impossible? If difficult
or impossible, -what makes you think this?
In addition, as Askham (1975) and Cartwright (1976) did,
we looked at the length of time it took the women to
conceive when no form of birth control was being practieed.
As with the previous surveys, the majority of women took
three months or less to conceive and so all those who
took longer were considered as being possibly sub-fecund.
This is, of course, not a perfect method of determining
sub-fecundity due to involuntary factors but, under the
circumstances, was the best available to us. Table 6.1
shows the time taken to become pregnant for each pregnancy
for all mothers.
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Table 6.1 Time Taken to Conceive
Length of Time Having Unpx-otected
Intercourse Before:
First Second Third Fourth
Preg. Preg. Preg. Preg.
Not At All
(Taking Precautions) 15 i> 14 ^ lk <$> 0 £
Three Months or Less 5k 57 57 100 #
Four Months - One Year 22 22 21 0
Over One Year 9 7 7 0
Total N* 100 103 14 1
Information on how long it had taken to conceive could
not be obtained from five women in connection with the
first pregnancy, two women in connection with the
second pregnancy and three women in connection with
third pregnancy.
There is a tendency in the literature to assume that
fecundity or sub-fecundity is an attribute that women
have or do not have. Askham (l975)» for instance, decided
to classify seventeen of her women as sub-fecund after
"a careful study of the pregnancy and birth-control mea¬
sures". She does not mention, however, how women who had
troubles conceiving some of their children but not others
were classified, or how women whose sub-fecundity had been
medically remedied were treated.
In our sample only fifty-four couples had not experi¬
enced some degree of sub-fecundity. It had taken them
less than three months to conceive both of their children
and they all felt they could (ard would) have further
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children unless steps were taken . Conversely, there
were twelve couples who had experienced sub-fecundity
5
with both of their children . It had taken them longer
than three months to conceive each child and all realized
that this was "longer than average". At least two had
taken fertility drugs to prompt a pregnancy and most had
asked the doctor about their problems with sub-fertility.
None felt, though, that their sub—fecundity would totally
prevent them having a third child if they should so
choose — the fact they had conceived at least two children
meant to most of them that fux-ther conceptions were not
totally impossible.
The remaining thirty-nine women had difficulties
conceiving only one of their pregnancies. There were
twenty-three women who took longer than three months to
conceive their first child (but had no problems with the
second) and sixteen women who took longer than three months
to conceive their second child (and, conversely, had no
troubles with the first). Some of these "mysteries" were
easily explained — there were three women who had been
trying to get pregnant for three or four months before
consulting a doctor. The doctor found they needed some
relatively common operation such as a "D and C" after
which they rapidly became pregnant. There were also
four women who had had a miscarriage and the following
conception took slightly longer than average. All of these
women felt they could easily become pregnant again if
they wanted to.
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The rest of the women, though, who had had diffi¬
culties conceiving only one of their pregnancies had no
real explanation of why that conception had been so dif¬
ficult. The doctor had suggested "stress" or "trying too
hard" to a few, some (eighteen percent, 6/33) felt the
pill was involved ("Hie pill really mixed up my system.
It took me a year to get back to normal."; "The pill just
stayed in my system a long time."), but most were puzzled
by their sub-fecundity. Most were, however, quite sure
they could conceive a third child if they chose to. This
was particularly true for those couples who, having had
trouble conceiving their first child, failed to use contra¬
ceptives as long after its birth as they would have other¬
wise, thinking it would again take them a while to become
pregnant. This was not to be the case, though, and all
had their second child spaced closer than they would have
liked.
(Four years to conceive first child, one month to
conceive second.) I went off the pill early be¬
cause X didn't think she'd catch so fast. I was
sort of hoping it might take as long as the first
one, but it didn't.
(Fifteen months to conceive first child, one month
to conceive second,) It took me over a year to
get pregnant with the first. And I figured, if it
takes a year to get pregnant, then I'd better start
trying. And then bang, I was pregnant again.
The couples most apt to mention potential problems
with sub-fecundity from involuntary factors were those
whose second pregnancies had been delayed because of sub-
fecundity, There were six couples, in fact, whose marriage
had been prompted by the consequences of only a few
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instances of unprotected intercourse who then found them¬
selves unable to have the further children they both
wanted and were planning,
(One month to conceive first, eight months to con¬
ceive second.) With her (first child), it was that
one time. With him (second child), I couldn't believe
it, but I couldn't get pregnant. Me! It's maddening
when you can't have them when you want them,
(Three months to conceive first, one year for second.)
I sure had no trouble with the first one. But, and
I don't know what it was, I couldn't get pregnant
with him, I couldn't figure it out.
These couples were less sure about future pregnancies
but, as with the women who had had trouble with both of
their children, the fact they had conceived was proof
enough that unprotected intercourse would, sooner or later,
result in pregnancy.
The final factor we considered relevant to our couxD3.es'
assessments of their potential fertility was infecundity
due to voluntary factors (i.e. sterilization). This was
easier to determine. Thirteen women had had a tubal liga¬
tion after the birth of their second child and five men
had had a vasectomy by the time of the interview which
meant seventeen percent of the sample were voluntarily
infecund. Sixteen couples were also planning some form
of sterilization (vasectomy or tubal) within a year —
their doctors had advised them to wait six months to a
year after the birth of the second child before being
sterilized just in case something should happen to that
child and this was their intention. Including them in the
calculation brings to thirty-two the percent voluntarily
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infecund. This would secrn to be the route most couples
were considering in regards to their future fertility —
close to three-quarters of all couples thought it very
likely that either one or the other of them would be steri¬
lized by the time the woman was thirty-five. Ve will look
more closely at this phenomenon in the following chapter
on birth control, but we will conclude this chapter by
suggesting that infecundity due to voluntary factors (i.e.
sterilization) is the most important factor in regards
to the perceived potential output of children. There was
no indication that coital frequency was an important
influence on fertility; only seven percent of all preg¬
nancies were "wasted", most from involuntary causes; and
many more couples were worried about "too many" children
than about "too few". Infecundity due to voluntary factors
appeared to have the greatest influence on how our couples
assessed their fertility levels. This is, as we mentioned,
a contraceptive issue and is discussed in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN COSTS OF FERTILITY CONTROL
7•1 Knowledge and Use of C ontraception
In the preceding chaptei- we considered the perceived
output of children — that is, the number of children
couples think they would have if they did not deliberately
control their fertility. We found that for most couples,
the perceived output of children exceeded their demand.
Though we were unable accurately to assess rates of coital
frequency, there was no indication that this was working
as a sufficient check on natural fertility. This was also
the case with foetal mortality from voluntary and involuntary
causes and sub-fecundity due to involuntary factors. The
only potential permanent check on natural fertility that
most couples saw was voluntary infecundity (i.e. sterili¬
zation) . Seventeen percent of the sample had already been
sterilized and close to seventy-five percent were planning,
at some stage in their reproductive life, to undertake
such a step. Sterilization is, of course, the ultimate
birth control technique and in this chapter we shall con¬
sider it as well as its less dramatic counterparts.
All of our respondents understood the concept of
birth control' and all but one (99 percent) had used a
method at some time during their marriage. Such a high
rate of contraceptive use is increasingly common in fertility
surveys of developed countries. In Canada, the Edmonton-
based Growth of Alberta Families study (Krishnan and
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Krotki, 1976) asked questions on contraception but unfor¬
tunately did not provide information on the number' of
women who had ever used some technique. In Britain,
Askham found (l975i 68) that all but one of her ninety
Scottish couples had used, at one time or another, some
form of contraception and Cartwright's English sample showed
(1976: k%) a usage rate of 97 percent. In the United States,
the most recent published fertility report is the 3-970
National Fertility Study (YJestoff and Ryder, 1977). This
cross—sectional survey of ever-married women aged between
eighteen and forty—four found that 15 percent of the women
had never used contraception. The category "never1 used
contraception", though, included many diverse groups such
as the sub-fecund or recently married and ¥estoff and Ryder
concluded (1977s l6) from their knowledge of these groups
that "in 1970, the fraction who were at risk of unintentional
pregnancy but who had never used contraception because of
social or motivational reasons (was) clearly only a very
small one indeed".
Although the majority of couples do practice birth
control sooner or later, the exact stage of its introduction
does vary. Askham, for instance, found (1975? 69) that
skilled manual workers with two children were most likely
to begin using contraception early in the family-building
process (86 percent had practiced some form of contraception
after the first delivery) and that the semi- and unskilled
manual workers with four or more children were the most
likely to delay its use (only 35 percent had practised
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conti-aception before the first or the second delivery).
The 1970 National Fertility Study (NFS) considered only
the proportion of women who used contraception before the
first pregnancy and found (Westoff and Ryder, 1977: 55 -
56) that this proportion has been increasing significantly
for recent birth cohorts. For women born between 19^6
and 1950 and married when they were between twenty and
twenty—four, 6k percent had used contraception before their
first pregnancy. For similar women born between 1936 and
19^0, only 39 percent had used contraception before their
first pregnancy. We considered the time by which some
form of contraception had been practised in our sample and
Table 7.1 presents the results.
Table 7.1 Time by Which Some Form of Contraception
Has Been Practised by Social Class
Occupational Categories
AJ_1 Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
Man. Non-Manual Manual Manual
Before 1st Child 80 96 # 88 £ 71 cp 72
After 1st Child 97 96 100 9k 100
After 2nd Child 99 96 100 100 100
Not At All 1 k 0 0 0
Total N* 102 25 17 35 25
* Information on when some form of contraception had first
been practiced could not be obtained from three women.
All of these women were using contraception at the
moment, however.
A very high percent of our sample couples had practised
some form of contraception before the first delivery,
even when the specific occupational categories were con-
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sidered. AH of" the professional couples but one had
used contraception before their first child whilst '71 per¬
cent of the skilled manual workers and 72 percent of the
semi- and unskilled manual workers had used birth control
at this stage. These two manual social classes may have
been slightly slower to introduce the use of contraception
but by six weeks after the birth of the second child all
had begun its use. These usage figures are somewhat
higher than the results of other studies"'", and we can only
suggest that this might be related to the timing of our
survey (evidence suggests that the use of birth control is
increasing ) and to our exclusion of the sterile (cross-
sectional surveys include all worsen — fertile and infer¬
tile). Part of the explanation might also lie with the
medical profession in Edmonton. Our contraceptive data,
as will become evident, are quite different from that
reported in the older American studies and the more recent
British studies. As we did not have another Canadian
source to compare our results with (the Growth of Alberta
Families (GAF) study did not analyse their contraceptive
data in ways useful to us and, moreover, had a nonresponse
rate of over 30 percent, and the Toronto Study (Bala-
krishnan, Kantner and Allingham, 1975) was conducted in
early 1968), we approached the chairman of the Royal
Alexandra's Review Board and asked him if he thought our
figures were representative or not. From his experience,
he thought they were. He suggested that in Edmonton today
the topic of contraception would be introduced and discussed
by the doctor in most routine medical check-ups of young
2k0
people. Certainly after the birth of a child, the doctor
would inquire about the methods of contraception his
patient was planning to use. Most of our sample took the
vise of contraception (and the role of the medical profes¬
sion in providing it) for granted, but the comments of
this one woman show the extent to which medical intervention,
in Edmonton at least, could contribute to the high rate
of contraceptive use.
This respondent did not use contraception before the
birth of her first child. She used the pill between
her children, but says she will not go back on it.
She is unsure about future contraceptive use,
(Will you go back on the pills?) No. I didn't
want to take them in the first place, but a lot
of people pushed me, pushed me, pushed me. And
stupid me, not thinking, I said I'd go on it.
(You say "a lot of people?) Yea, the doctor,
then my husband, his mother.
In the course of the interview we asked the women
about the methods of contraception they had used before
the birth of their first child, between the births of
their two. children, the contraceptive techniques they
were using now and the methods they intended to use in
the future. Table 7,2 presents the contraceptive tech¬
niques used by the couples at some time since their
marriage. The percentages add to more than 100 as more
than one method of contraception was commonly used by
a couple as they passed through the stages of family
formation.
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Table 7*2 Methods of Contraception Used at Some
Time Since Marriage by Social Class
Occupational Categwies
All FrofOther Skilled Unskilled
Man. Non-Manual Manual Manual
Vithdrawa1 5 £ 0 6 5 # 8
Safe Period 8 8 6 11 4
Chemicals Alone 13 20 24 8 8
Diaphragm 8 12 18 3 0
Sheath 25 36 24 27 12
IUD 18 24 6 14 12
Pill 91 92 76 94 92
Sterilization 17 12 24 16 19
Total N 105 25 17 37 26
The most common method of contraception used is un¬
doubtedly the birth control pill. Just over 90 percent of
all the women we interviewed had used the pill at some time
or another. The next most popular method is the sheath,
though only 25 percent of the sample would claim to have
ever used it.
These results are quite different from those of previous
surveys. Askham, for instance, reported (1975: 7l) that
approximately 50 percent of her Scottish sample had ever
used the pill (and only 29 percent of those in social class
V with four or more children) and approximately 48 percent
had used condoms. Cartwright reported (1976: 52) that
approximately 65 percent of her English sample had ever
used the pill and 69 percent had ever used condoms. There
has traditionally, though, been a difference in British
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and American patterns of birth control techniques . In
contrast to American patterns, male methods (i.e. with¬
drawal and the condom) are very popular in Britain. Re had
no recent Canadian data to compare our results with (the
GAF data, to repeat, were not analysed in detail and the
Toronto Study was conducted in early 1968) and the 1970
NFS did not provide information on "ever-used" methods of
contraception. The NFS found (Westoff and Ryder, 1977: 21),
though, that in 1970 the oral contraceptive pill was clearly
the most popular method of contraception with married women
of reproductive age. These studies sampled a much wider
range of women than we did (i.e. women of all parities)
and it may be that our high usage rate of oral contracep¬
tives is linked to our limiting ourselves to women of
parity two. Cartwright suggests (19761 6l) that "people
who started using contraception after the pill was available
may well be prepared to accept it more readily than those
for whom it was an innovation introduced only after they
had started to use another method". Most of our sample
certainly began contraceptive use after the pill was avail-
k
able . In addition, otar feeling was that unless a woman
had strong objections otherwise, the birth control pill
was the first contraceptive technique the doctor would
suggest. Many women discontinued its use as side effects
(or the worry about side effects) developed but it was
the method most doctors initially prescribed. In a study
of contraceptive risk-takers in the United States, Luker
made (1975: 126) a similar observation. She suggested
that "because of their (referring to the contraceptive
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pill and IUD) improved statistical effectiveness, doctors
were reluctant to prescribe or approve of the methods
that subsequently began to be known as the "less effective"
methods". It seems that because the birth control pill
is so effective, many doctor's (at least amongst those with
patients in our sample and Luker's) are increasingly
"single-minded" about prescribing it.
Table 7»3 presents the "main" method of contraception
used by a couple during the four family formation stages
that we are concerned with here. The methods of contra¬
ception have been collapsed into five groups on the basis
of their popularity and their degree of reliability in
5
preventing conception . In the first category are the
"natural" methods, i.e. rhythm and withdrawal; in the
second are the appliances, i.e. diaphragm, condom and
chemicals; in the third the interuterine device (lUD);
in the fourth the birth control pill and in the fifth
sterilization. By "main" we mean the contraceptive tech¬
nique that was used for the longest period of time in each
of the four stages. For instance, many women would
temporarily use either a male or female appliance (say
whilst they were breast feeding their child or taking a
suggested "break" from the pill) but would rely primarily
on a more effective method. We considered these second
techniques as the "main" methods of birth control —
provided of course the woman used them longer than the more
temporary measures
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The method of birth control used at the moment was
problematic to code in that many women were temporarily
using male or female appliances because they were either
feeding their baby or waiting for a sterilization operation.
If they (or their husbands) had an appointment set up
for the sterilization operation or the insertion of the
IUD, or if they had their prescrijotion for the birth
control pills (which was the majority of the couples),
then we considered these second techniques as the "main"
techniques. Otherwise wre took the main method of contra¬
ception to be the method they were presently using. This
could provide bias in two ways -— some couples, even
though they had made arrangements for the use of another
technique, may never have begun its use and, conversely,
some couples could have switched to alternative techniques
within weeks even though arrangements had yet to be begun.
We could only hope that these two forces would in some
way balance out.
We measured contraceptive use in the future by asking
the women what method of contraception they thought they
would be using when they were thirty-five. For the fevT
women who were presently thirty-five or older, we asked
about when they were forty or forty-five.
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Table 7.3 Main Method of Contraception Used at
Four Family Formation Stages
Before First Between Now In Future
Child Children
Natural Methods 3 £ 2 £ 0 # 0 io
Appliances 13 18 13 0
IUD 0 7 22 6
Pill 61 62 k5 8
Sterilization 0 0 19 85
No Method 21 11 l 1
Total N* 102 103 102 92
* Information on the main method of contraception \ised
could not be obtained from three -women in connection
with the time period before the first child, two women
in connection with the time pex'iod between the children,
three women at the moment and thirteen women in con¬
nection with the future.
Birth Contro 1 Use Before the Fix'st Child
The most common method of birth control used before
the first child was born was the birth control pill.
Approximately 6l percent of our respondents used it as
their main method of contraception. Second were the
appliances (13 percent) and third were the natural methods
(15 percent). Twenty-one percent of the women had used
no method of contraception before their first child.
They tended to have less than a grade twelve education
(58 percent (ll) of those with less than a grade twelve
education had used no method of birth control before their
first child) and to have been married when they were under
twenty (4l percent (17) of the women who married when they
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were under twenty used 110 contraception before their
first). They also tended to have been premaritally
pregnant — 5^ percent (13) of the women who had their
first child within nine months of their marriage had
never used contraception.
The pill users tended to have at least a grade twelve
education (for instance, 69 percent (22) of the women
with a grade twelve education used the birth control pill
as their main method of contraception before their first
child and Gh percent (/) of the women with a university
degree did likewise) and to have been married when they
were twenty or over (86 percent (25) of the women marrying
when they were twenty or twenty—one used the birth control
pill as did 66 percent (2l) of those marrying when they
were over twenty-one). Catholic women were slightly less
likely to use the birth control pill than Protestant
women and women with no religious affiliation but, even
so» 53 percent (17) of them relied upon it (versus 65 per¬
cent (28) of the Protestants and 72 percent (13) of those
with no religious affiliation). The Catholic women were
more apt to use rhythm or withdrawal before their first
child than the other religious groups, but still, only
12 percent (4) claimed this as their primary method of
contraception. An equal percentage of Protestants and
Catholics relied on appliances before their first child
(l6 percent (5) of Catholic women and 14 percent (6) of
Protestant women). Appliances or the natural methods
were not popular with women with no religious affiliation.
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None of these women relied on rhythm or withdrawal before
their first child and only one woman was using an appliance.
These methods were also not popular with the six women
with other religious affiliations. Half of these women
had vised the birth control pill and half had used nothing.
Birth Control Use Between the Children
Between the children, the pill was again the most
popular method of contraception with approximately 62 per¬
cent of the sample reJ_ying upon it. The use of appliances
increased to 18 percent and 7 percent of the women switched
to the IUD. The use of the less reliable and natural
methods and no method declined. In fact, if we exclude
the relatively sub-fecund from the analysis, the number
of women using no method of contraception between their
children was only foivr. One of these four women was
Mormon (a religion which opposes the use of contraception)
and had never used birth control and never intended to.
She was different from the other three women in that she
had a university degree and her husband was a teacher.
The other three women who used no contraception between
their children had a grade twelve education or less and
their husbands had unskilled (two manual and one non-
manual) occupations. Catholicism did not seem to be the
prime factor in their not using contraception as only one
of the women was Catholic; the other two were Protestant.
Three of the four women not using contraception between
their children felt their second child was too closely
spaced to their first and none of these women had "planned"
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(that is, not used contraception because a child was
wanted — see discussion in the following section) the
child. The one woman who did "plan" her second child
felt it was spaced "just right".
Women using the pill as their main method of contra¬
ception between their two children were equally divided
amongst the four occupational categories. They tended to
have a grade twelve education or less or a short training
course. Women with a university degree or trade training
were less likely than average to use appliances. For
instance, 65 percent (22) of the women with a grade twelve
education relied upon the pill between their two children
and only 12 percent (4) used appliances. Amongst women
writh a trade training, on the other hand, 46 percent (6)
relied upon the pill and 38 percent (5) used appliances.
This was also the case with the university educated women —
45 percent (5) used the pill and 45 (5) percent used appliances.
Cartwright found (1976: 50 - 5l) a social class varia¬
tion in the contraceptive methods currently used by her
sample couples. The wives of professional men were less
likely than average to be using the birth control pill.
More of these women than of the other mothers had taken
the pill at some time, but more of them had given it up.
She reported a study in Finland that found similar results
and that argued:
The use of the pill is no exception to the general
rule that innovations are first adopted by the well-
to-do and better educated strata, and spread gradu¬
ally to other social groups. ... It could be
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hypothesized that the upper- strata . . . also have
been the first ones to discontinue its use because
of the widely publicised and discussed health hazards
of oral contraceptives.
Leppo et al., 1973-72*
The better educated women in our sample may have been
following this trend. lihen we looked at the methods of
contraception they had ever used, we found that only 12 per¬
cent (3/24) had never tried the pill. The others had tried
the contraceptive pill and, fox- one reason or another,
had given it up. The most common reason cited for giving
it up was the worry about side-effects.
I started to read how awful it (the contraceptive
pill) was for you and X just decided I'd been on it
too long. And I started disbelieving my doctor who
said it was all right. I realized it wasn't very
good for you.
I never really felt secure with (the pill). My
young sister died of a brain tumor after two years
of married life and we always kind of wondered if
the pill brought that on.
Religion did not appear to have a great influence on
the contraceptive technique used by our women between their
two children. Amongst Protestant women, 63 percent (27)
were using the pill and amongst Catholic women, 62 percent
(2l) were using the pill. There were only two women
relying on withdrawal and rhythm, though, both of whom were
Catholic. The highest percentage of women who used no
contraception between their children were amongst those
with other religious affiliations. Fifty percent of the
six women in this category used no contraception between
their children — two were Mormon (a religion, as we have
pointed out, which opposes the use of birth control) and
one woman had taken four and a half years to conceive her
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first child and hence felt no need for birth control.
Women with, no religious affiliation tended to use the con¬
traceptive pill — 65 percent (ll) of them relied upon it.
None of them used no method or the natural methods between
their children — the remaining six women were equally-
divided between the use of appliances and the use of an 1UD,
Birth Control Use at the Moment
At the moment, the birth control pill was still the
most popular method of contraception, though only ^5 percent
of our sample couples were using it. The percent using
appliances had dropped to 13 (l3)» but the use of the 1UD
had increased to 22 percent. Nobody was using rhythm or
withdrawal and just the one Mormon couple were using no
contraceptive technique. The number of couples sterilized
(or with appointments for this procedure set up) was twenty.
Thera were two Mormon couples within our sample and
one of them began using the contraceptive pill when her
second child was born. She had mixed feelings about contra¬
ception but had her two children within twenty-three months
of one another and did not want to "try her luck" with
regard to a third child. She felt her present two children
were spaced too closely and though she wanted more children,
she wanted at least three years between them. The other
Mormon couple never intended to use contraception. They
wanted "enough children to fill a (church) pew" and since
the woman was thirty when she married, she felt "the change
of life" would limit her family size to a manageable number.
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When we were looking at contraceptive use between the
children we found that the better educated women were less
likely to have used the birth control pill. They were as
likely as the others to have tried it, but more likely to
have dismissed it. Cartwright had found (1976: 50 - 5l)
a similar trend in her data and accounted for it by a
diffusion theory — the well-educated are the first to
accept innovations and the first to discontinue their use
as hazards are publicised. The trend for the higher social
classes and better educated women to move away from the use
of the pill in our data is even more sharply seen in the
women's present use of contraception. For instance, only
27 percent (3) of the women with a university degree were
using the contraceptive pill at the moment compared to 55 per¬
cent (ll) of the women with less than a grade twelve edu¬
cation and 48 percent (l6) of the women with a grade twelve
education. Moreover, only 32 percent (7) of the women
whose husbands had professional or managerial positions
used the pill versus 52 percent (l6) of the women whose
husbands had skilled manual jobs.
An alternative explanation to the diffusion theory is
that the better educated women have moved away from the
use of the contraceptive pill either because they are more
apt to feel their families are complete (and hence more
apt to turn to sterilization) or because they have more
reason to worry about side-effects than the women with less
education since they have been on the contraceptive pill
longer (the women with more education tended to be older
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than those with less education and hence could have been
using the contraceptive pill longer).
With regard to the first possible alternative expla¬
nation we did find a slight inverse relationship between
a woman's educational level and her proposed family size
(see pages 157-158 ) — the women with a university educa¬
tion were less likely than the women with less than a grade
twelve education to be planning more children. The exception
to this relationship, though, were the women with a trade.
They, more than any other educational group, were planning
additional children and they, as we have just seen, were as
apt to reject the use of the contraceptive pill as the
university educated women. If we look at the percentage
of women (or their husbands) who have been sterilized, this
first alternative explanation is given even less support.
An equal percentage in each of the social classes had been
sterilized — 21 percent (5) of the professional class,
23 percent (*+) of the other non-manual category, 17 percent
(6) of the skilled manuals and 20 percent (5) of the un¬
skilled manuals. Looking at wife's education, this first
alternative hypothesis is again given little support.
Whereas 27 percent (3) of the university educated women or
their spouses and 15 percent (3) of those with less than
a grade twelve education (or their spouses) had been steri¬
lized, no woman with trade training (or their spouses)
and 32 percent (8) of the women with a short course (or
their spouses) had undertaken this step.
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The second alternative hypothesis is more difficult
for us to accept or reject as we did not ask about contra¬
ceptive use before marriage. Women with higher levels of
education may have been slightly older than average at the
birth of their second child (see footnote 8), but this is
not to say they had necessarily been using contraceptives
(and the birth control pill specifically) longer than the
others. They tended to marry later (the relationship bet¬
ween wife's education and age at marriage is presented on
page xii) and when we examined the interview schedules,
thex'e was no evidence that the better educated women had
been using the birth control pill longer than the others.
Certainly none of them mentioned that their doctors had
refused them the contraceptive pill because of the length
of time they had been on it. The diffusion theory, in fact,
did seem to have some validity. Over ^0 percent (ll/25)
of the women with a university education or trade training
specifically mentioned giving up the birth control pill
either because of its side-effects or the worry about side-
effects. Just 25 percent (5/20) of the women with less
than a grade twelve education expressed giving up the pill
for these reasons. The quotes concerning the worry about
the effects of the contraceptive pill given above were
both from women with a university degree. Moreover, any
expressed enthusiasm for the pill was in most cases from
women with less than a grade twelve education.
The pill has never bothered me, or hurt me in any way,
and I've never gotten pregnant on the pill, so I'm
going to stick with it.
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I'm staying on the pill. It doesn't bother me; I
have no side-effects or anything. And my mom has
always used it.
Whereas the percentage of couples using the contra¬
ceptive pill declined over the life—cycle course, the use
of the IUD increased. Nobody was using an intrauterine
device before their first child, 7 percent were using it
between their children and 22 percent were using or planning
to use it now. That nobody used an IUD before their first
child was born is understandable in that it is a technique
that is normally prescribed only to women who have had a
Q
child . But why its use should increase fx-om approximately
7 to 22 percent is less clear. There were no apparent
social class or educational differences with regard to the
use of the IUD (for instance, 20 percent of the women
with less than a grade twelve education were using an IUD
compared to 27 percent (3) of the women with university
and 18 percent (4) of the women whose husbands were in pro¬
fessional or managerial positions were using an IUD as were
19 percent (6) of the women whose husbands had skilled
manual jobs) and our feeling was that its increase was in
large part due to the negative publicity surrounding the
birth control pill"*"^. It is also, we should point out,
a new technique for most of the women (17 of the 22) and
some will find it unsuitable. Of the eleven women in our
sample who had tried an IUD, five had given it up immediately
because of side-effects and three had stayed with it until
their second child was born although they neither "liked"
the method nor were "happy" on it. The side-effects them-
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solves seemed somewhat more severe than those associated
with, the birth contx-ol pill^ ^ and hence it may be premature
to conclude that such a high percentage of the couples
will actually be using an XUD for any length of time.
Future fertility intentions had the expected impact
on the contraceptive technique our couples were using at
the moment. Voraon who wanted more children were equally
divided between using appliances (27 pei'cent, 7)» an IUD
(35 percent, 9) and the birth control pill (35 percent, 9).
Women who definitely did not want additional children were
less likely to use appliances (9 percent, 5) ot an IUD
(13 percent, 7) and more likely to be using the very reliable
birth control pill (42 percent, 23) or be sterilized (36 per¬
cent, 20). Women who were undecided about their future
fertility tended to use the birth control pill (67 percent,
14). None were sterilized, 29 percent (6) had an IUD and
5 percent (l) relied on appliances.
Westoff and Ryder reported (1977: 18) that "one of the
most dramatic findings in the 1970 National Fertility
Study is the fact that voluntary sterilization — at that
time, typically, tubal ligation for women and vasectomy
for men has become the most popular method of contra¬
ception currently used by older couples (in which the wife
is aged 30 - 44)". In fact, Westoff and Ryder named (1977:
333) the published report of the 1970 NFS The Contraceptive
Revolution because of the "extraordinary changes that have
occurred in the control of fertility in (the United States)
. . . (namely) the spread of the birth control pill and
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sterilization for contraceptive reasons". Our sample
certainly were following these trends. Ve have outlined
the enormous popularity of the oral contraceptive pill and
will now consider the movement towards sterilization.
Looking first at the women and men who are currently
sterilized (and for this we have excluded the two couples
who only have the appointments for the procedure set up)
we found, to repeat, that thirteen women had a tubal liga-
12
tion after the birth of their second child and five men
had a vasectomy by the time of our interview.
There appeared to be a social class variation in the
type of sterilization procedure that our couples decided
upon. Of the tubal ligations, six were to women in the
skilled manual category, four were to women in the semi—
and unskilled category and there was one each in the other
two occupational categories. Of the vasectomies, on the
other hand, there were two each in the professional/mana¬
gerial category and the other non-manual category, none
amongst the skilled manuals and one in the semi- and
unskilled manual category. Moreover, two of the three
women in the top two occupational categories who had had
tubal ligations had also had caesarian sections, so that
the sterilization operation was particularly easy to perform.
None of the women in the manual social classes who had
had tubal ligations had had a caesarian delivery.
The 1970 NFS found a similar trend (Bumpass and Presser,
1972: 5^0); whereas the relationship with wife's education
was inverse for tubal ligations, it was direct for vasec-
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tomies. Moreover, the mode of sterilization varied with
income much as it did with education — tubal ligations
were more prevalent at the lower income levels and vasec¬
tomies were more prevalent at higher levels. Burnpass and
Presser suggested (1972: 5^0) that the differences might
arise thi^ough "education differences in the willingness
of the husband to become sterilized, in misinformation
about the physiological effects of vasectomy, and in medical
access to the two types of sterilization". We unfortunately
did not discuss in detail attitudes towards the two types
of sterilization, but our impression from the comments
that the women did make was that all three factors played
a role. Women in the lower social classes (who normally
had lower levels of education and income ~ ) -were more apt
to report that their husbands were not amenable to a vasectomy.
I tried to get my husband to go but he wasn't too
receptive to the idea. I wouldn't go back on the
pill for an indefinite number of years, so I thought
the only solution was the tubal.
It was always in my mind that once I'd had my second
one, there'd be no way to have a third. Every once
in a while I'd try to say to my husband -— it's a
lot easier to get a vasectomy — but there was no
way he would, so.
The women in the higher social classes, on the other
hand, were more apt to report that their husbands had
decided that a vasectomy was the best method of sterili¬
zation.
I wouldn't have brought it up, but he mentioned it.
It was more his decision. It was the only one 1
didn't discuss with him because you know what men
are like.
I was going to go in and then he said no, he would
go in instead because it's much easier for a man.
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He decided it was easier for him to have a vasectomy
than for me to have a tubal.
Medical access also appeared to have influenced the inci¬
dence of tubal ligations. Medical approval for female
s tex'ilization when there are only two children present is
granted in Canada only if the woman can corne up with some
pretty strong arguments. It seemed as if it were the women
in the two manual social classes who most easily impressed
us (and no doubt their doctox's) with their "need". Yeomen
in the other social classes did not, by and large, have
inadequate housing, low incomes, past contraceptive failures
and mental stress to refer to.
The 1970 National Fex*tility Study found a direct
relationship between the prevalence of sterilization and
age and we also expected, for a number of reasons, this
relationship to appear in our data. Older couples, we
felt, might be more interested in sterilization because
it
they might not want to risk another pregnancy and because
hospital and physician standards make it easier for the
older mothers to gain medical permission. This was not
as strongly borne out by our data as we had anticipated.
The average age of all the women in the sample was 25.6
and the average age of all the men was 27.8. The average
age of the sterilized women, in comparison, was 27.9 and
the average age of the sterilized men was 27.0. The steri¬
lized women were older than average (but only by two years
and a few months) whereas the sterilized men were slightly
younger than average. This would seem to stem partly from
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cmr limiting the study to couples with two childx*en. Our
older couples, in many cases, were undecided about whether
or not to have additional children and hence sterilization
was premature for them. Jn other studies, where there
is no limit on parity, the older respondents are more likely
to have finished their childbearing and hence more likely
to be candidates for a permanent form of birth control.
V.re investigated the correlates of the relationship and the
one variable that did clearly stand out as being related
to the incidence of sterilization was the husband's income.
Whereas 22 percent (6) of those couples earning between
/l2,000 and /l5,000, 14 percent (5) of those earning bet¬
ween /l5»000 and j/20,000 and 14 percent (3) of those
earning over /20,000 had been s ter*ilized , 50 percent (5)
of those earning under /12,000 had taken this step. More¬
over, within this low income category were two students,
neither of whom had been sterilized, who saw their low
income as a temporary phenomenon. If they are excluded
from analysis, then a striking 63 percent (5/8) of those
couples with poverty-line incomes have turned to sterili¬
zation to limit their family size. Reading their inter¬
views, it appears as if their low incomes (or, rather,
the problems associated with inadequate incomes) were
enough to havQ their doctors — even taking into account
their youth (three of the five women were twenty-one years
of age) — agree to some form of sterilization. This is,
incidentally, in line with our previous observation that
medical access has an influence on the incidence of steri¬
lization.
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The one other interesting finding had to do with
religion and was also reported in the 1970 National Ferti¬
lity Study (Westoff and Ryder, 1977s 15l) • Catholic women
were slightly less likely than average to "be sterilized
(or their husbands to have been sterilized) — 9 percent
(3) of them would definitely not have further children
with their present spouses versus 21 percent (9) of the
Protestants, 17 percent (l) of those with other religions
and 33 percent (6) of those with no religion.
Future Fertility Intentions
Looking finally at the couples' future fertility inten¬
tions, we found only the one Mormon couple who never intended
to use contraception. As we mentioned before, they felt
the "change of life" would provide sufficient fertility
control. All of the other couples were intending to use
either the reliable IUD or birth control pill or be steri¬
lized. Nobody intended to rely on the less reliable methods
in their later childbearing years. This finding seems
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universal in recent fertility studies . As desired family
size is reached, the more reliable methods are used; as
Askham (1975s 7l) explained it: "family-size limitation
tends to be seen as a more essential concern than family-
size spacing" .'
There were thirteen couples who were undecided at the
moment about what to do in the future to control their
fertility. Three of these couples had yet to think about
their future contraceptive needs. All were planning larger
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families and were more concerned about what to use now
than at some time "in the distant future". The rest of
these couples did not like the finality of sterilization,
but then did not want to take the birth control pill inde¬
finitely or risk a pregnancy with appliances or an IUD.
They vere very much "undecided".
My husband is totally against (sterilization) so X
don't think we'll ever do that ... I think I would
wait till I was over 30 or 35, then get it (tubal)
done. But then you never know what might happen.
You could lose your children or your husband. It's
the easy way out, but ... and yet, I don't want
to stay on the pill too long either, so ... Oh, I
don't know what I'll do.
I don't know (about a tubal ligation). You really
don't know in the long run what's going to happen.
I might have a tubal, but then X haven't tried that
loop before, so it just depends on that. (Vasec¬
tomy?) Forget it. He's chicken.
The majority of the other couples were sure that steri¬
lization was the method they would ultimately turn to -—
85 percent (78) of the decided were planning on some form
of sterilization. The remaining 14 percent were almost
equally divided between planning to use the birth control
pill (7) and planning to use an IUD (6). These couples
tended to have either religious objections to sterilization
■/o
or reallyt dislike its finality. They felt they would
be able to "get by" without having to resort to sterilization.
(¥ould you ever consider sterilization?) Never.
There's so many things that could go wrong. There's
a lot easier ways to stop having kids than having
an operation.
I don't think I'll ever have a tubal. Right now that's
my opinion. For the simple good reason, who knows
what's going to happen to your family life. You just
may want more kids. I think I can find other ways.
(What about a vasectomy?) Never.
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The majority of our sample, though, thought they or their
husbands would be sterilized by the time the woman was
thirty—five. The most popular foz'm of sterilization anti¬
cipated was for the female — 48 percent (29/60) of the
couples planning to be sterilized were planning a tubal
ligation, 15 percent (9) were planning a vasectomy and
37 percent (22) were undecided, at the moment, between the
two techniques.
The rise in the popularity of sterilization in Canada
has been nothing short of spectacular. As a contraceptive
technique, sterilization was virtually unheard of (and
frowned upon) less than a decade ago"^. Today, in contrast,
its support is near unanimous — approximately 75 percent
17of our sample , which from all other analyses has been
representative of young childbearing couples, are sure that
this is the method they will ultimately be using. A further
fourteen percent are undecided about its possible use,
leaving only eleven percent who are definitely opposed to
it for themselves.
With regard to sterilization, the 1970 National Ferti¬
lity Study (1977: 159) found that for whites in the United
States there was an inverse relationship between parity
and the serious consideration of male and female sterili¬
zation. Although there was no variation by parity within
our sample, our couples showed similar tendencies. Those
couples with large family aspirations tended to be more
undecided or opposed to sterilization than those couples
wanting only two children — 30 percent (8) of the couples
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wanting more children thought they would never be sterilized
as opposed to none of the undecided and 6 percent of those
definitely wanting only two children. Only one of these
women with large family aspirations wanted to be having
children until the end of her childbearing period, so simple
"lack of need" was not the explanatory variable. For a
small percentage of these women, religious beliefs were the
accounting factor — their religion both endorsed large
families and rejected sterilization. The views of the
rest, though, could not so easily be explained. Reading
the interviews it appeared as if the women writh large family
aspirations were the least likely to like the finality of
sterilization — the thought that if they did change their
minds or if something did happen to their present family,
they could not have additional children. Large families
were important to these women and sterilization was seen
as a potential threat to this. These women were also, of
course, in the midst of childbearing, whereas the others
were more or less at its end. They could veil change their
minds when they reached their desired family size and were
faced with years of potential excess fertility. As well,
medical intervention could push some of these women towards
a more permanent method of birth control. It was our
impression from reading the interviews that sterilization
was often suggested to women once they had reached their
stated ideal family size. This kind of medical endorsement
would for many of our women be a sufficient "push" towards
sterilization.
2 6k
(When did you first consider having a tubal ligation?)
Well the doctor questioned me — whether I was planning
on going back on the pill after having the baby.
This was when I was pregnant. He didn't think it
was a very good idea rne being on the pill for that
many years and to keep on going if X wasn't planning
on having more family. I would have waited but the
doctor felt it was best to have it done then. He
figured it was easier to have it done then, seeing
as I'd had the two. I'd have waited, but I decided
to take his advice.
The 1970 National Fertility Study found (1977: l6o)
American Protestants to be more interested in both male
and female sterilization than American Catholics, although
the Catholic l^eceptivity to contraceptive sterilization
was substantial. The Catholic/Protestant differentials
in our sample were in the same direction, but were quite
slight — 12 percent (4) of the Catholic women thought
they or their husbands would never be sterilized versus
5 percent (2) of the Protestant women and 6 percent (l)
of the women with no religious affiliation. It was the
two Mormon couples who were definitely opposed to contra¬
ceptive sterilization — neither thought they would ever
even "entertain the idea" of sterilization. The Catholic
women and the women with no religious affiliation who
were thinking of sterilization tended to be thinking of
female sterilization — 52 percent (12) and 73 percent (8)
respectively thought they would be having a tubal ligation.
Couples where the wife was Protestant, on the other hand,
tended to be more undecided (50 percent, 12) at the present
time between male or female sterilization. The percentage
of men planning to have vasectomies was highest amongst
the Protestant men (2k percent, 6/25) and lowest amongst
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the men with no religions affiliation (none had definitely-
decided on a vasectomy). Catholic men were intermediate —
13 percent (3/23) were planning to be sterilized.
Family income in the 1970 National Fertility Study
(Vestoff and Ryder, 1977? 160) was found to have no clear
relationship for whites with the serious consideration
of sterilization. Husband's income for our sample, like¬
wise, did not separate those couples planning to be steri¬
lized from those who were not. Social class, as well,
did not show a relationship with future sterilization plans.
More or less equal percentages in each occupational
category thought they might eventually take this step —
92 percent of the professional-raanagerials, 88 percent
of the other non-manuals, 89 percent of the skilled manuals
and 88 percent of the unskilled manual workers.
Female sterilization, as we have seen, is the most
popular form of sterilization and this was particularly
so for the semi- and unskilled social class and for those
couples where the wife had less than a grade twelve edu¬
cation. Of those couples intending to be sterilized,
82 percent (9/H) within the semi- and unskilled occupa¬
tional category were planning a tubal ligation. Less than
55 percent in the other occupational categories were this
sure that it 'would be the woman who would be sterilized.
No man with a semi- and unskilled job was definitely
planning a vasectomy, whereas 22 percent (4) and 18 percent
(4) of the professional and skilled manual occupational
categories respectively were. A similar pattern was seen
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with wife's education. Of the couples who were intending
to he sterilized at some time in the future, 78 percent
(7) of the women with less than a grade twelve education
thought they would be the one. The corresponding percent
for the women with a university education was only 28
percent (2) and all of the other educational groups ranged
in between, but closer to the 28 percent.
Ve saw a similar trend in our earlier discussion of
sterilization and we suggested, following Bumpass and
Presser's (1972) argument, that differences in the incidence
of male and female sterilizations might arise over medical
access to the operations, lack of information (or wrong
information) about the operations' side~effects and edu¬
cational differences in the willingness of partners to
undertake the procedures. These explanatory factors again
seem satisfactory.
Medical access to operations in the future is difficult
to determine and from discussions ve have had with the
medical profession ve have found no bias towards one form
of sterilization or the other. The comments of one woman
did suggest though that some doctors might be persuading
their patients.
My husband would have had a vasectomy. Ve talked
about it,. But I talked it over with my doctor and
he thought it better if I got my tubes tied. So
I took his word and I'm going in within a month.
There was no other evidence of this, and her doctor
may have been unique, but the influence of the medical
profession should not be totally dismissed.
2 67
The influence of the other two factors was strongly-
borne out by the comments the women made about vasectomies
and tubal ligations. Many of the women expressed doubts
about the effects of vasectomies —-
I don't know that much about it, but I don't parti¬
cularly like the idea of him having it done. You
don't know what it can do to them.
X don't know that many men that had it done. Whether
it would affect them any or not.
but the better educated women and the couples in the higher
social classes were more apt to mention the benefits of
vasectomies —
He'll have a vasectomy. Sterilization is too hard 011
women. It throws their hormone balance off and I
guess a vasectomy is much easier. From what I've
read.
We're both willing. Maybe he's more willing than me
because I think you have to go into a hospital to
have a tubal and that means a babysitter and for him,
he'd just have to go into the doctor's office and
stay home a day.
The most common reason the women gave for having
tubal ligations rather than their husbands having vasec¬
tomies was that if the household split up, either through
divorce or death, the men would be the most apt to want
further children.
I think the woman, if she is definite she doesn't
want any more children, she should have a tubal.
I think the man ... he should have the chance to
have another child by the next wife. That's impor¬
tant to men.
We thought if we ever, ever got divorced usually,
95 percent of the time, the women get the children.
And I thought if he ever gets married to a woman
who doesn't have any kids and they want children,
they're stuck right there. And why should he be
deprived. I've done my thing. I won't want any
more kids regardless.
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Thirteen women expressed this point of view and
eleven of them were from the two manual social classes.
The women from the higher social classes appeared to be
less concerned about the possibility of their husbands
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wanting further' children and more apt to malce comments
along the lines of "either of us would — it's the same
thing in the end". In addition, the husbands in the
higher social classes tended to be more favorable towards
vasectomies. As we commented on before, they tended to
decide themselves that a vasectomy was the easiest and
best method of sterilization. Many of them suggested that
it was their "turn" — their wives had had the children
and been responsible for contraception in the past and now
they could contribute something to fertility control.
A final factor which might perpetuate the social class
differences we observed in the method of sterilization
planned was the influence of friends. The majority of
women in all classes and with all levels of education were
hesitant about vasectomies but, as we have seen, there
were more women in the lover social classes and with less
education having tubals and more men in the upper social
classes having vasectomies. The influence this may have on
future sterilization trends is seen in the following quotes:
(From a couple in the professional/managerial occu¬
pational category) He's not too keen on a vasectomy,
but there seems to be more and more men — friends
of ours, friends of his — that this is the method
they are using. And it seems to be agreeing with
them. I would go ahead, but X think he might,
maybe, change his mind, and that would be fine for
me. Better, he could go instead.
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(The woman has had a tubal and has a grade twelve
education) X don't think we even considered a vasec¬
tomy, but then I don't know that many men that have
it done. ... The tubal seemed easier. I was in
the hospital and we knew we only wanted two and it
just seemed the thing to do.
The one other variable we looked at in regards to
future sterilization was the present use of birth control.
There was no clear pattern in the relationship between
the two variables. Women who were intending to be steri¬
lized were more likely to be presently using the birth
control piJ.l (46 percent, 13) and women who felt their
husbands would be having a vasectomy were more likely to
be presently using appliances (33 percent, 3)* Women who
were undecided between male or female sterilization tended
to be presently using the birth control pill (64 percent,
14) as did those undecided about sterilization itself
(71 percent, 10) and those opposed to it for themselves
(60 percent, 6). If there was any pattern, it was for
those women who felt that sooner or later they or their
spouses wTOu.ld be sterilized to be using appliances to a
greater extent than those women undecided or opposed to
sterilization. In many of these cases, though, this was
simply because a temporary measure was needed until arran¬
gements could be made for the sterilization operation.
Throughout the thesis we have used Askham's 1970
Scottish survey (published in 1975) and Cartwright's 1973
English survey (published in 1976) as comparison groups
for our data. In the section of this chapter where we
have reviewed the contraceptive methods our couples have
used throughout their marriage, we have failed to do this.
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There were two primary reasons for not providing the com¬
parison, the first of which is that contraception is an
area where change is rapid — new techniques and refinement
of older techniques make even five or six years seem a
long time. The 1970 National Fertility Study (the American
survey published in 1977) documented "extraordinary changes
in the control of fertility between 19^5 and 1970" (Festoff
and Ryder, ,1977s 333) and fx-oin comparisons of their data
with ours we can only conclude that these "extraordinary"
changes have been continuing. .The second reason for the
lack of comparison is that there appear to be cross-
cultural differences between Britain and Canada with regard
to contraception that were not so readily apparent in the
rest of the analysis. As we previously mentioned (see
footnote 3)* the British have traditionally relied upon
male methods of contraception to a far greater extent than
either Canadians or Americans. They seem also to be far
less favourable towards sterilization. Cartwright asked
(1976: 6b) her couples if they would ever consider being
sterilized and found that bj percent of the mothers and
43 percent of the fathers said definitely no. This, to
repeat, was a survey conducted in 1973 — in 1970* i11 the
United States, the National Fertility Study found (Westoff
and Ryder, 1977s 103 - 104) between 50 and 60 percent of
all their respondents favourable towards both male and
female sterilization. Our study of 1977 suggests that in
Canada this percentage has risen to 75 or SO. It is true
that the majority of women in Askham's study who had four
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or more children had been sterilized , but this seemed
almost to have been pushed upon them when it became
apparent they could not limit their fertility by other
methods; Askham herself referred (1975: 88) to sterili¬
zations as " "desparate" or "final" solutions to the
problems of controlling family size". This certainly was
not the case with our sample. The majority of women
efficiently and effectively used contraception as they
married and had their families and then turned to sterili¬
zation as the most reliable and safe technique in their
later childbearing years. For these two reasons, the
comparison -with the British literature was omitted from
this section of the thesis.
In conclusion, we have considered the birth control
techniques our couples have used, are using and are planning
to use at the various family formation stages in this
chapter. We have seen the wide-spread knowledge, and use,
of contraception amongst all social, religious and age
groupings and we have commented on the wide-spread use
of the oral contraceptive pill and the trend towards
sterilization. We have not as yet, though, looked at the
impact of contraception on the couples' family formation
patterns — the "effectiveness" with which the couples
were able to use the techniques. In the following section
we shall consider the timing and spacing of the couples*
two children in light of their contraceptive knowledge
and practice.
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7.2 Effectiveness of Contraceptive Use
In the preceding section we looked at the methods
of birth control our couples had used throughout their
marriage and the methods they were intending to use in
the future. Ve found that use of contraception usually
began before the first child and in those cases where
there was a delay, the delay was only until that first
child was born. By the time of the second child all but
one of our couples were using some method of birth control.
The methods of contraception chosen were, in most cases,
the statistically effective ones. Approximately 60 per¬
cent of the couples were using the birth control pill
before their first and second child and, while the percent
of contraceptive pill users had dropped to percent at
the moment, 19 percent of the sample had had a sterilizing
operation. Just under a quarter of the sample had used
no contraception before their first child was born and
this had dropped to 11 percent by the time of the second
child and 1 percent now.
Although the use of contraception was common and wide¬
spread, this reveals nothing about the "effectiveness"
of its use. All methods of birth control but sterilization
are open to abuse or failure and, in fact, amongst our
sample couples, only 65 percent of first births and 70 per¬
cent of second births were "planned". In this section
we will consider the effectiveness of contraceptive use
in terms of the number of children desired.
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To determine the effectiveness of birth control use
we presented our couples with a list of methods of contra¬
ception (which included all the methods listed in the
preceding section) and a list of "circumstances of becoming
pregnant":
1. Before you and your husband ever started using a
method.
2. While you were actually using some method and didn't
want a pregnancy just then.
3. When you took a chance and didn't use a method.
h. After you deliberately stopped using a method in
order to have a child.
5. Some other circumstance (please specify).
The women were asked which methods of contraception (if
any) they had used before each pregnancy and the circum¬
stances under which they became pregnant. In the actual
interview situation, these two questions normally generated
a great deal of discussion about all the methods of con¬
traception that had been tried, and all the problems that
had been encountered as well as why they had become preg¬
nant when they had. The last set of questions in the
interview asked explicitly why the couples had decided
to have their children when they did (for those people
who had decided) but it was at the previous point when
most of the information we wanted was offered. The last
set of questions was normally used for summary and clari¬
fication purposes.
In looking at the effectiveness of contraceptive use
we found, as Askham (1975: 65) had before us, that it was
not a dichotomous variable — people were not either
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effective or non-effective birth control users. Some
women had effectively planned one child but not the other
and others could not be even placed on the scale; they
either had no idea how many children they wanted (i.e.
It's God's choice how many and when) or they had had their
ideal family not through the effective use of birth control
but through "luck" (and, most likely, sub-fecundity).
We thus divided our couples into three contraceptive
effectiveness categories and considered each pregnancy
interval separately.
In the first contraceptive effectiveness category
were those couples who had "planned" their child — they
had either stopped using a birth control technique speci¬
fically to have a child or they had never begun the use
of contraception because a child was wanted. Some couples
who did not use contraception before their conceptions
suggested that it was not because they wanted a child but
because "they didn't care if one came along". These couples
were not included in the first category — by our defini¬
tion, "planning" meant actively trying for a child. By
this definition, 65 percent (66) of the first children
were planned and 70 percent (73) of the second children
were planned.
Leaving for a moment the second category, in the third
category were included those couples who had definitely
not planned their child. Either they had been using
a birth control method which failed on them or they were
taking a chance and not using contraception although a
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baby was not wanted at that particular time. The key-
point of this category was that at the time they became
pregnant they did not want a baby. Using this definition,
2k percent (25) of the first births and l4 percent (15)
of the second births were not planned.
The second, intermediate category was for those people
who did not properly fit into the planning/not planning
dichotomy. It included those people who had ceased
using, or never used, contraception for reasons other than
wanting a child (i.e. religious objections to contraception,
difficulties in finding a suitable technique) and whose
attitude to a pregnancy was "well, if it happens, it
happens". This was quite a distinct category and included
12 percent (12) of first children and 16 percent (17) of
second children. The couples in this category did not
seem to want to take the responsibility of actually "plan¬
ning" a child, but would take steps whereby a pregnancy
was more or less inevitable with the attitude that if a
baby was conceived "it didn't really matter", "if it
happens, it happens". This category has only rarely been
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suggested in the literature but, particularly in the
early interviews when we tended to "press" people to choose
either planned or unplanned, it was clear that it was
distinct.
(This couple was interviewed together. They had been
using condoms before their first child but admitted to
risk-talcing behavior. When initially asked if their
first child was planned the husband answered "no —
that was an accident". After discussing the timing
of the child, the husband added:)
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About Susan. Ve, how should we say this, we cer¬
tainly wanted to have our child in that year, but
a few months later would have helped us. (Was
Susan planned or more an accident?) More an acci¬
dent. I guess that's true, although in a way,
maybe ... maybe not. Because we were getting a
little concerned that the time was going on and we
really had to start making some decision about
raising a family or else not have one at all. That
really was one of our concerns. So, I suppose it
was impromptu, but, on the other hand, it may not
have been. One can look at it either way.
(This woman had been using the birth control pill but
did not renew her prescription because she felt she
had been on it long enough. The couple then used
nothing although they did not want a child, ideally,
for a year or two.)
(Was your first child planned?) I guess she was
kind of an accident. She wasn't planned. There
again, it didn't make any difference one way or
another if I got pregnant. If we'd wanted a planned
baby we would have taken precautions. This way we
didn't mind. (So she was an accident?) Well, I
don't know. Maybe a planned accident.
Looking at the planning status of the two children,
we found — not unexpectedly — that the range of demo¬
graphic variables normally associated with "unplanned"
first pregnancies were also present for our sample. The
majority of women who had had an unplanned first child
had had that child within nine months of their marriage
(76 percent, 19), had married when they were under twenty
(68 percent, 17)» did not have either a trade or university
training (80 percent, 20), had husbands employed in
manual occupations (60 percent, 15) and had annual incomes
of less than $12,000 (70 percent, 16). Conversely, women
whose first child was not conceived premaritally, who had
married when they were twenty or over, who had a trade
or university education, whose husbands were in the top
occupational classes and whose annual income was over
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$15,000 were most likely to have planned their first
child (over 65 percent of the women in all of these cate¬
gories had planned their first child).
Surprisingly, none of these variables had an influ¬
ence on the planning status of the second child. Women
whose second child was not planned were of no particular
age at marriage, their husbands did not earn any specific
annual income, they did not necessarily have either a
high or low level of education and their spouses were not
largely employed in either manual or non-manual occupations.
The only characteristic that showed any relationship with
the planning status of the second child was the timing
of that child — only 20 percent of the children born
within eighteen months of the first child were planned,
whilst 75 percent or more were planned in each of the
other spacing categories. These findings suggest that
though the younger, lesser educated -women may fall victim
to an unplanned first pregnancy, they generally, in Edmon¬
ton at least, do not continue in similar behavior patterns.
Looking at those women who had not planned their
children, we found that the majority of them — 52 percent
in connection with first births and 80 percent in con¬
nection with second births — had been using some form
of contraception when they became pregnant. This seems
quite a high percentage, but it is in line with our
previous finding of a high level of contraceptive know¬
ledge and use. A greater percentage of women were involved
in chance-taking behavior before their first child than
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before their second and, in every one of these cases,
the women were not married when they conceived their
child. There is an extremely interesting literature
about why unmarried women engaging in sexual intercourse
and not wanting a child do not use contraception (see,
for instance, Luker, 1975) and we will only mention here
that the reasons our women offered for not using contra¬
ception were in line with those the other researchers
have suggested:
I think I thought, oh, it won't happen to me. I just
knew X wasn't going to get pregnant when I didn't
want to.
It was just sort of spur of the moment.
I never took any precautions because I was dumb and
he didn't take any because he didn't want to. I guess
I was using hope and that's not a very good method.
I was still going to school and I couldn't get any
contraception.
Only 20 percent (3) of our women were engaged in
risk-taking behavior when they conceived their second
child and in all three cases the women had been using
contraception around the time they conceived. Two of the
women became pregnant while they were waiting for an IUD
to be inserted and the other woman had taken close to a
year to conceive her first child and hence felt one or
two "slip-ups" after its birth would not lead to another
pregnancy.
The most common birth control methods to fail on
our women were the appliances — 26 percent (6) of un¬
planned first births and 33 percent (5) of unplanned
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second births involved a failure with condoms, a diaphragm,
foam or some combination thereof. A failure with rhythm
or withdrawal caused one first child (k percent) and
three second children (20 percent). An IUD had unknow¬
ingly been rejected by one woman which led to her second
child (7 percent) and, most surprisingly, the failure of
the birth control pill had led to five first children
(22 percent) and three second children (20 percent).
The birth control pill has been heralded as the most
reliable (other than contraceptive sterilization) method
of birth control and yet eight of our women had conceived
a child whilst they were using it. If used correctly,
the pill is no doubt highly effective. However, all
eight of the women experiencing a pregnancy while on the
pill had been missing the odd day (in most cases not
fully realizing the possible impact of this) and all
suggested that this behavior was quite common amongst
their friends and relatives. If this is true, that is,
if the pill is not being taken faithfully by its users,
then doctors and other medical personnel might be wise
to distinguish between the pill's statistical effectiveness
21
and its actual effectiveness . If women cannot remember
or have a psychological resistance to taking a pill each
day (both reasons were suggested: "I can just never
remember every, single day.", "I don't like taking pills
of any sort and I always took just as many as I thought
I had to."), then its effectiveness may well have to be
re-evaluated.
280
The women involved in "planned accidents" appeared
not too different from the others on the standard demo¬
graphic variables. Five women contrived to have both
their children "accidents", three of whom accounted for
their behavior with religious reasons. There were no
differences between Protestants and Catholics with regard
to "planned accidents", nor did the variables of social
class, annual income, wife's education or age at marriage
differentiate between these people and the planners/non-
planners, Most of the women who had "planned accidents"
were more or less planning to have a child within a year
of the time they conceived and hence were "less worried"
about a possible pregnancy. Chance-taking with their
method of contraception became more acceptable or, if the
method they had been using had to be given up, then it
was often easier to rely on "hope". If getting or not
getting pregnant is not seen as that important, then the
desire to use contraception is correspondingly lowered.
The one variable that did distinguish these women, and
would be in line with the above explanation, was the
timing of their resultant children. The modal spacing
category for planned first children was between two and
three years after marriage, for unplanned first children
it was within nine months of marriage and for the "planned
accidents" it was nine months to two years. The modal
category for unplanned second children was less than
eighteen months after the first child was born — 53 per¬
cent of unplanned second births were in this category.
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Only h percent of planned second births were this closely
spaced, but 2k percent of the planned accidents were.
It appears as if the "planned accidents" are slightly
earlier than the perfectly planned births, but not early
enough to be considered complete accidents.
In this section we have examined the "effectiveness"
with which our couples used contraception throughout their
marriage. We found that the majority of the couples
efficiently planned both of their children — 65 percent
of first births and 70 percent of second births were said
to be completely planned. Moreover, the majority of women
having unplanned children had them through contraceptive
failure — 52 percent of unplanned first children and
80 percent of unplanned second children were due to a
failure with a birth control technique. Only three women
were "taking chances" when they conceived their second
child and one of these women felt she was sub-fecund and
the other two were waiting for an IUD to be inserted.
Contrary to the previous literature which tends to find
the same cluster of variables associated with a series
of unwanted pregnancies (see, for instance, Rainwater,
i960, 1965; Askham, 1975? Cartwright, 1976), our women
who had unplanned second children were not distinctive
on any of our classification variables. Younger, lesser-
educated working class women were more apt to have an
unplanned first pregnancy, but there was no evidence
that they were continuing in similar behavior patterns.
They were as likely as any other group to have effectively
planned their second child.
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7 • 3 Conclusions
In the first section of the thesis, in which we out¬
lined our theoretical model, we suggested that couples
would be motivated to regulate their fertility if their
perceived potential output of children was greater than
their demand for them. We saw in the last chapter that
all but one of our couples felt some need for contra¬
ception — they felt that sooner or later they would have
more children than they wanted unless they used some
method of fertility control. We then went on in the first
section of the thesis to say that though motivation was
a necessary condition for a couple to use birth control,
it was not a sufficient condition; birth control itself
imposes subjective costs (the displeasure associated with
using a technique), and objective costs (the time and
money necessary to acquire the knowledge and skill to use
specific techniques) on a couple. We concluded the dis¬
cussion on contraception by suggesting that whether or
not a couple would actually use a contraceptive technique —
and the degree of success they would have with its use —
would depend on their perception of the costs of fertility
regulation as opposed to their motivation to limit their
fertility.
In this chapter of the thesis we have examined our
couples' experiences with birth control. We have found
remarkably high percentages of our couples effectively
and efficiently using birth control. All of our couples
but one were using contraception at the moment and the
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one couple that was not wanted further children. No
couple was using the unreliable, natural contraceptive
techniques and only 13 percent were presently using
appliances — the techniques with statistically lower
levels of reliability and which had previously failed
most frequently with our couples. The majority (5^ per¬
cent) of these women, though, wanted a third child and
thus any potential contraceptive failure would result in
only spacing problems. The rest of the women who did not
want further children and were presently using appliances
were normally waiting for a sterilization operation. Cer¬
tainly no woman expected to be relying upon appliances or
natural contraceptive techniques for long into the future.
With the great medical shift toward surgical sterilization,
the majority of our couples felt this would be their ulti¬
mate birth control technique. The few couples who were
less sure about sterilization for themselves were in all
cases planning on using the statisticall}' reliable birth
control pill or IUD. No woman (other than the Mormon
woman who wanted as many children as she could have)
felt there was any chance that she could not (and would
liimt
not) be able to (efficiently her future, potential
fertility.
Our model suggests that such success with contra¬
ception could stem from two possible sources — our Edmon¬
ton couples may be strongly motivated to limit their
fertility or they may be finding the costs of fertility
regulation very low. With regard to the first contention,
2bk
we have no reason to suspect that Edmonton couples are
any more or less motivated than other couples to limit
their fertility; throughout the analysis they have been
shown to be remarkably similar to other study couples
on most dimensions. Our pre-test included thirty-two
Scottish couples and certainly we could perceive no major
differences between the two groups in regards to their
motivation to limit their fertility. The difference bet¬
ween our sample and the others, we would suggest, has
to do with the costs of fertility regulation. Ve hypo¬
thesize that, in Edmonton today, contraception is provided
in such a manner that most couples find the subjective
and objective costs attached to its use to be very low.
In most cases, contraception is mentioned t_o women
by their doctors before their marriage. Blood tests are
mandatory before a marriage license can be issued and it
appeared that doctors often used this opportunity at
"CO
leas t '(inquire about the couple's birth control intentions.
I went on the pills before I was married. I had to
go to the doctor for that blood test and he just
asked me what I was planning to do about children.
I guess I'd have mentioned it, but I was glad he
did. And then he gave me a year's supply of the
pills. That was really good because 1 didn't even
have to go to the drugstore.
The chief of obstetrics and gynecology at the Royal
Alexandra Hospital — the doctor who supervised our initial
contacting of the sample — said that he introduces the
topic of contraception to young women (whether or not
they are approaching marriage) in their annual medical
check-ups. He did not know the extent to which his
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practice was unique but he said he certainly did not
feel "exceptional".
For those women who conceived their first child
before they had had any contact with the medical profession,
contraception would almost definitely be mentioned,
again, to them either during the pregnancy or during
their hospital confinement.
(When did you first consider having a tubal liga¬
tion?) Veil the doctor questioned me — whether
I was planning on going back on the pill after
having the baby. This was when I was pregnant.
When I was about six or seven months pregnant the
doctor asked if I wanted to try an IUD. After
having the one mistake, X thought it would be
worth trying.
The idea of women not being "fitted" with one method
of birth control or another before they left the hospital
appeared to be almost totally unheard of; the provision
of contraception seemed to be a taken-for-granted service
that doctors provided. Fitting of an IUD, prescriptions
for the birth control pill and sterilization were usually
done in the hospital after the birth of the baby. If,
by happenstance, a doctor did not mention contraception
to a woman, then the woman's roommates almost certainly
would. Vomen were constantly being wheeled in and out
to have IUD•s fitted or to be sterilized and the advan¬
tages and disadvantages of the various techniques were a
prime discussion topic in the various maternity wards we
visited. Cartwright reported (1976: "lk - 75) that in
1973 in Britain 65 percent of her women had discussed
methods of birth control with their general practitioner,
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29 percent had discussed the topic with the family planning
clinic doctor and 25 percent had discussed it with the
doctor at the hospital. The chief of obstetrics at the
Royal Alexandra Hospital found these figures surpi-'jiin^
(and difficult to believe). He himself claims -to have
never not discussed birth control with a woman and, though
he would not say his practice is universal in Edmonton,
he did say he thought it was typical.
This is not to imply that all Edmonton women used
contraception and used it in an effective manner. There
were women who although they were offered reliable con¬
traceptive techniques did not appear to want (or "be
able") to use them. These couples were, though, a very
small percent^ of "the sample and, in all of the cases,
wanted additional children sooner or later. Moreover,
because surgical sterilization was so readily available
for a couple once they had reached their "ideal" family
size, these women would not be having large numbers of
increasingly unwanted children. Two women, in parti¬
cular, typified this pattern of behavior. Both had less
than a grade twelve education, both had had a premarital
pregnancy, both were living in sub-standard housing and
both were having difficulties using birth control — in
other words, both were the type of woman who in Askham's
(1975) study or Cartwright's (1976) study would have
likely been having large numbers of children. These
women, though, were confident that they would be able to
control their future fertility.
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Mrs. A (aged twenty) wanted "two or three or four"
children; her husband wanted "two" ("For this day
and age, two is good for a family."). They had had
two boys, though, and her husband did "like the
idea" of having a girl. Mrs. A was meant to be on
the birth control pill at the moment but had decided
it was too "dangerous". (This woman was quoted on
page 2hl to show the extent to which the medical
profession can "pressurize" women to control their
fertility). She wanted to have an IUD fitted, but
found it difficult to get an appointment. In Edmon¬
ton, a doctor will only fit an IUD during the men¬
strual period, but doctors' offices require a woman
to book an appointment a month in advance. Mrs. A
found it impossible to plan what she was going to
be doing "a whole month in advance", and had been
unsuccessful during her last menstrual period to
secure an appointment by somebody else's cancel¬
lation. She was going to try for an appointment
again next month but, in the meantime, her husband
was meant to be "taking care". She realized, though,
he was "very bad" about being careful. Moreover,
her own attitude to the condom was: "You can get
pregnant from them just as easy. You just need one
little hole and you're pregnant". Mrs. A was twenty
when we interviewed her and about her future birth
control plans she said: "I believe the wife should
do it (i.e. be sterilized) because if anything hap¬
pens, say like divorce, it's usually the women who
do get the kids and I feel if Rob ever remarries,
I'd feel he should have children with the woman he
married. . . . I'd probably wait till I was twenty-
five (before being sterilized). I'm twenty-one in
June so that would give me three years to decide
(whether or not to have a third child)". She took
it for granted that she would be sterilized and we
predict she would have one or two additional (likely
unplanned) children and then be sterilized.
Mrs. B (aged nineteen) had just turned seventeen
when she had her first child. She herself wanted
"five kids" when she married but because she and
her husband were having severe financial difficulties
at the moment, she was unsure how many children she
now wanted. Her husband wanted "two — a boy and a
girl" but they had had two girls. A number of times
during the interview Mrs. B talked about having
four children — the two they had now and another
two they would have "when they were really finan¬
cially set up". ¥hen I asked if they would go on
if they didn't feel financially set-up, she replied
"No, it'll have to be if we were financially able.
Unless, of course, if it was an accident". Mrs. B
conceived her first child while she was taking the
birth control pill, and now dismisses it as a com¬
pletely unreliable method: "I just know I was on
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the pill when I got pregnant with her. And my girl¬
friend was the same thing." Between her children
she and her husband were using condoms but they took
a lot of chances: "We just took a chance. Well,
it's so bloody annoying to use". At the moment
they were using condoms (and taking chances) but
Mrs. B's husband wanted her to have an IUD. "I
don't want to, but he wants me to. He wants me to
use the coil, but I can't be bothered going to get
it. Because I don't trust anything any more.
There's chances on all of them, so I'll take my
chances this way." There was more to her refusal
to use a coil, however: "I want to go for the coil,
but I just can't be bothered doing stuff like that.
If I have to wait, it makes me mad. My mom has an
IUD in and she's had nothing but problems with it.
And I can't — there was one month she bled for
three weeks in a row from this stupid thing. I
can't be bothered. I don't have time to worry if
I'm going to bleed to death or if something is going
wrong or if all of a sudden I'm pregnant and I have
this coil in me". About her future contraceptive
intentions Mrs. B said: "I want to (be sterilized)
but Brad wouldn't let me. The way he figures, if
something happens or he dies or we divorce or some¬
thing, if we remarry, if my new husband wants a
family he should be able to have one. It's not
fair. I'd like to though". When I asked who she
thought would win out, Mrs. B said with a laugh
"Me, because I'm a stubborn little cuss". We would
predict that Mrs. B, like Mrs. A, would have one or
two additional (and likely unplanned) children and
then have a tubal ligation. After outlining all
the problems she'd had with contraception, she added:
"I would rather just have ... that's what I'd
really like ... If we were financially okay right
now, we want four kids, have four kids, tubes tied,
then I don't have to worry and he doesn't have to
worry. But he won't let me do that either".
Our conclusion, thus, is that the high rate of effec¬
tive contraceptive use that we observed amongst our
sample was a product of the fact that, in Edmonton today,
any couple with any desire to limit their fertility are
finding the costs of using contraception to be quite low.
There are exceptions of course, but there are not that
many and, with the availability of sterilization, these
exceptions will increasingly also be perceiving the costs
of fertility control to be within their reach.
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FART 111 PATTERNS OF FAMILY FORMATION
CHAPTER EIGHT THE FIRST AND SECOND CHILD
Ve began this thesis with the aim of exploring the
various patterns of family formation — the ways families
have been built up and the future fertility changes that
are anticipated. After introducing the problem and out¬
lining our research techniques, we subjected the data
to a quantitative analysis; each of the major topics
the interview covered was coded and examined for its
influence on the timing and spacing of the couples' two
children and their future fertility intentions. Alongside
this analysis of the data, we proceeded with a qualitative,
"interpretive" analysis; by this we mean that we sought
patterns in the data from reading the interviews as units.
Ve would argue that both types of analyses were impor¬
tant to meet our aims. Most previous fertility studies
have been of a quantitative nature but we felt that if
we had limited our study in a similar manner, we would
have accomplished less than we had wanted to. Ve were
tempted initially to proceed with a purely qualitative
analysis and, yet, we feel that we personally would have
been unable to move beyond generalities if we had done
so; the quantitative analysis provided the means by
which we could take "explanations (which) consist of
chains of reasoning in the actors themselves" (Hawthorn,
1968: 73) beyond mere description.
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The only difficulty we encountered in trying to
combine a quantitative with a qualitative analysis had
to do with sample size. Whereas a quantitative analysis
demands a large number of cases, a qualitative analysis
becomes truly "un-do-able" if there are too many cases
involved (or, at least, "un-do-able" by one researcher).
We chose one hundred and five as our sample size because
we felt, given our time constraints, it was a reasonable
number. In fact, while one hundred and five cases was
small for the quantitative analysis, it was enormous for
the qualitative analysis. When one is involved in going
through fourteen or fifteen pages of transcription,
searching for and writing out stretches of conversation
on a particular theme, one hundred and five cases can
seem immense. One topic would often involve fifty or
sixty hours of work and it still had to be organized into
some sort of framework. Faced with these difficulties,
we decided to continue with the qualitative analysis by
concentrating on one or two themes concerning each family
formation stage. This was not our original aim, but we
felt it was the only feasible alternative open to us.
In this third part of the thesis we shall examine
the results of our qualitative analysis — the patterns
of family formation will be considered in light of the
results of the quantitative analysis and in light of the
explanations the women themselves gave for their behavior.
In this chapter, we shall examine the time period from
marriage to the second birth and in the following chapter,
2P1
we shall consider the couples' attitudes and intentions
regarding a third child. In the final chapter of this
section, we shall integrate these results into our theore¬
tical framework.
We should perhaps begin our analysis by pointing out
that "having a family" was really no decision at all for
the majority of our couples. All but one began marriage
with the understanding that sooner or later they would
have children. Many commented that the issue was never
explicitly discussed with their spouses — it was just
"taken for granted" or "assumed" that one day there would
be children. It seemed as if in their discussions with
us there was an implicit linkage between marriage and
childbearing. Not every woman was as explicit as the
woman who said "That's really what marriage is all about,
don't you think. Having kids", but there was a feeling
in the majority of the interviews that children were
inevitable — they were part and parcel of a successful
marriage.
Ve unfortunately did not question our women closely
about "why" they wanted children — we accepted the taken-
for-granted and moved quickly into how many and when —
but it may be useful to examine some literature which
has attempted to. Judith Blake (1968, 197*0 was one
the earlier researchers to point out the "necessity" of
children. In a critique of the economic theory of repro¬
ductive motivation, Blake suggested that couples will
never curtail their family size to be in line with their
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income because of those societal and familial institutions
which "motivate almost everyone to have some children".
By exercising control over every step in the repro¬
ductive process, but principally by a ruthless
exclusion of structured alternatives to and substi¬
tutes for family statuses, family satisfactions and
kinship affiliation — alternatives that extend
from prostitution and homosexuality, on the one
hand, to celibacy and careers for women on the other —
societies channel motivation in the direction of
goals that imply the advent and existence of children.
One can become a "parent", "have a family", be a
"mother" or "father", only by acquiring children.
That one should desire these statuses is the final
result of complex institutional control, but given
this desire, children and only children can satisfy
it. It is the societal support for the family that
provides the strong desire for children. ...
Blake, 1968: 22-23
(Emphasis in original)
More recently, Busfield and Paddon (1977) attempted
to analyse some of the salient ideas underlying the belief
that children are essential to a marriage that they
noticed amongst their sample couples. Working primarily
with a pilot sample of fifty cases from Ipswich in Britain,
Busfield and Paddon outlined a number of related ideas
which appeared to underpin the "automatic assumption"
that married couples will want and will have children.
Upon rereading our interviews, these ideas or themes also
seemed to be present^.
Their first point was similar to Blake's: just the
idea of becoming parents was important enough for some
couples to have children. Particularly for the women,
becoming a mother was very important — possibly, Busfield
and Paddon suggested (1977s 13^)» because the female
identity is so closely tied up with the familial roles of
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spouse and parent. Our women would say again and again:
That's all I ever really wanted to do — get married
and be a mother.
I think, for a woman, it satisfies an inner kind of
thing that you can't really pinpoint.
I'd feel so empty (without children). It's a real
responsibility; it makes you feel like you've
built something.
The second salient idea had to do with the self-
reinforcing connection between marriage and childbearing.
Because having children is often seen as a major reason
to
for marrying, not(have children becomes illogical.
"It (the connection between marriage and having children)
makes those who want to have children marry, and it makes
those who marry feel they should have children ...
having children is seen as the essential purpose of mar¬
riage, and ... this idea makes it difficult to think
of not having any children if you marry . . ." (Busfield
and Paddon, 1977: 13^). Related to this idea was the
feeling that children were essential to a successful
marriage. Some couples felt that without children there
would be no bonds holding a husband and wife together ——
there would be little reason for a marriage to survive
or succeed. The quotes that Busfield and Paddon included
were almost, word for word, the sentiments our women
expressed:
It wouldn't work for us; a marriage isn't really
complete until you have kids.
Without children, I don't think myself we would have
had a marriage. Because I feel you should have
children.
29k
What's the point of getting married if you don't
have kids? You might as well live common-law or
stay single.
The third salient idea outlined by Busfield and
Paddon was the feeling that children "make a family".
A family was only a family if there were children — they
were the sine qua non of family life. Since most people
want a family life — it is a life felt to be more exciting
and interesting having children becomes essential.
"When asked about having children most people draw upon
a set of ideas that links getting married, having children
and having a family to one another, making all seem
mutually interdependent. Underlying this set of ideas
is the belief that a married couple with children consti¬
tute a natural, normal and complete family. Without
children a married couple are not a proper family" (Bus-
field and Paddon, 1977: 135 - 136). Again, our women
would comment:
I don't think it's a family unless there's at least
one child} I don't think it's right.
To me, they really just make our home.
People would miss lots without children — a feeling
of nature, sort of, part of — not even a tradition,
just "that's the way it is".
The final idea that Busfield and Paddon were able to
derive from their interviews to account for the implicit
assumption that married couples would have children was
the feeling that children are so emotionally satisfying
that they "are an experience not to be missed". "Many
people believe that having children and bringing them up
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will give and does give them a great deal of pleasure;
they think that having children is emotionally and even
intellectually satisfying; they think life with children
is richer, more interesting and more enjoyable than life
without" (Busfield and Paddon, 1977: 137)• This is not
to imply that nobody saw any disadvantages attached to
children, just that the rewards and satisfactions were
clearly superior. Our women as well would comment:
I find it a little hard to understand (why some
people do not have children) because X think having
children to look after opens up a whole new world
to you which you just don't know about if you haven't
experienced it. It increases your understanding of
human beings and what the world is all about.
I feel sorry for them because there are a lot of
great things about kids.
1 couldn't think of not having my children — they
really are delightful.
In sum, Busfield and Paddon (1977) found great nor¬
mative pressure amongst their British couples to have a
family, in a way Judith Blake (1968) hinted was operating
amongst American couples, and which we felt was apparent
amongst our Canadian couples. A cautionary note, of
course, is that Busfield and Paddon, and ourselves, were
dealing with a sample that through their behavior had
chosen parenthood and thus the comments and underlying
sentiments cannot be generalized to the population at
2
large . However, for our women, and apparently for Bus-
field and Paddon's, the thought of remaining voluntarily
childless was never seriously entertained.
If children are assumed to be inevitable, then the
question really becomes when the family should be begun.
29C
Amongst our ouples two primary themes were mentioned
by most women when they were asked "In your opinion,
if a couple had complete control over their fertility,
how many months or years should there be between getting
married and having a first baby and why?" — one theme
which would encourage delaying a child and the other
which would encourage having it. The feeling was that
a couple needed time to adjust to being married before
having children, but that a couple must be careful not
to "get set in their ways". One needed time to get
to know one's spouse and to adjust to living together
before adding the complications of a pregnancy and a
child —
I'd say to get pregnant at least a year after
marriage — at least a year. It gives the
couple time — even if you live together before
marriage it's not the same as being married —
it gives the couple a chance, not really to
get to know each other, that too of course, but
settled with one another. You have to get
used to one another and, of course, get used
to being married.
I'd say about five years but that's from my own
personal experience. We waited five years and
we had a chance to grow this really strong
bond between us before we had a child. I cer¬
tainly don't agree that having a child will
keep you together or make you closer together.
It makes you further apart, if anything. So
if you wait before you have your family, you
have time to build a strong bond with one
another and a really solid basis to your mar¬
riage.
But, against that, one could get so used to being
just a couple if a child was not had fairly quickly
after marriage that its intrusion would be resented.
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If a couple waited too long before beginning a family,
they would get too used to being able to come and go
as they pleased and too used to all the advantages
that two salaries provide.
I don* t think you should wait too long because
you tend to, maybe you come to not like children.
Mainly it's because you get used to your freedom
and you resent it when it's gone — you get
thoroughly turned off. Also, you get too used
to the wife's money if she is working, which
she probably is. And she won't want to get
tied down, if she's had a lot of freedom, she
probably won't want to get tied down with
having a family.
If you wait any longer than a year or so, you're
getting just a little bit too used to things the
way you want them — coming and going as you
please, buying what you want, just everything.
Then when you start thinking of a family, it's
kind of hard to all of a sudden start saying,
okay, this is it, you can't do this, you can't
have that. It's a real shock cause a baby
really does change everything.
Most couples when discussing how they decided when
to have their first child mentioned these two push and
pull factors — they felt some pressure to delay so that
they could adjust to one another, and also some pressure
to begin before they got too used to one another. What
varied widely amongst the couples, though -- and was re¬
flected in the different birth timings — was how long
they thought it took "to get to know one another", on
one hand, and how long they thought it took "to get set
3
in their ways", on the other . These ideas seemed to
stem from other values and views the couples held re¬
garding marriage and the place children held in it and,
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in many cases, varied along social class lines. There
are. three main constellations of ideas which we wish to
discuss and which we feel account for much of the variation
we found in our sample in regards to the timing of the
first child.
The first view that we came across amongst our sample
couples was the view that "marriage was children" — the
only reason, or the primary reason, to marry was to have
children. As we commented before, all our women but one
began marriage with the idea that they would have children,
but these women stood out by the primary importance they
placed on children in a marriage. Perhaps not surprisingly,
this view was expressed most frequently by the women who
began trying for a child more or less immediately after
their marriage. They felt that children were such an
important part of life itself that, once married, there
was little or no reason to delay having them. Possibly
a short period of time could be envisaged to get to know
your spouse but even this, some suggested, could be accom¬
plished during the nine months it took to have a child.
The essence of this view is captured in the following
»
woman's discussion of why she had her first child within
the first year of her marriage and why she would suggest
this line of behavior to others.
Ve had her in the first year of our marriage and
it was really good. I don't think anybody should
wait longer than a year, at the very most. I think
children — they're, that's what makes a family —
that's marriage complete. I don't see any point
in waiting, you might as well have them and enjoy
them. I find it funny when people just get married
and then they wait to have children. It sounds odd
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to me. Why wait? (They might wait so they can
get to know one another and do things together
before they have children.) I don't understand
that at all. Why are they getting married if they
don't know one another — anyway, it takes nine
months to have a kid.
In the quantitative analysis we found that working-
class women (particularly those whose husbands had unskilled
manual jobs) were most likely to begin (and, most impor¬
tantly, want to begin) their families quickly after
marriage. From our qualitative analysis, it would seem
that this was a direct result of their holding this view
of marriage. Again and again, when we went through their
accounts of "why" they had had their first child when
they had (or wanted to have, in those cases where sub-
fecundity caused a delay), they would comment on the
primary role children played in their marriages.
(Why did you want to have your first child then?)
I wanted to start a family; I can't see a marriage
without kids.
You get married to have kids, in a way. I sure did.
To me, to us, the greatest thing in life was to have
a baby and we wanted one as soon as possible. We
were very anxious to have a baby right away.
I wouldn't want to be married with no kids. I
wouldn't get married.
The second view that we encountered amongst our sample
couples was the view that, though children were inevit¬
able, they must "take their place" behind the accumulation
of certain material goods and assets. The women expressing
this view all saw children as playing an important part
in their marriages, but felt no need to start their fami¬
lies immediately. It was more important, in the early
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years of their marriage to get to know their spouses and
to acquire a home, clear debts, or just generally "esta¬
blish" themselves. With most couples, "establishing"
themselves took two or three years and then the interest
turned towards a child.
(Why did you want to have your first child then?)
We owned our own apartment and it had two bedrooms
and we had a car. We were pretty well off actually
and it just seemed a good idea.
We had achieved ... we were married two or three
years and we were used to one another. I had just
finished a course and we had just moved into our
house and it was furnished comfortably. Everything
seemed to fit in and we just decided it was time we
had our family. As they say, once you get a little
security around you, you start thinking of a family.
We just wanted children. We wanted them earlier but
at the time we just couldn't really financially see
ourselves having children because we didn't own our
own home yet. We just couldn't have them just then.
From the quantitative analysis we knew that middle
class women tended to wait two or three years before
trying for their first child and, when we examined their
interviews, it seemed, in many cases, to be precisely
because they wanted to accumulate certain assets before
having a family. This attitude was not limited to the
middle class, though — some members of the working class
(normally the skilled manual members) also were timing
their first child to the accumulation of certain material
goods.
(The husband was employed as a technician and the
couple had just bought their first home (a condominium
in a "dormitory" town fifteen miles from the city)
two months before their second child was born. The
woman had her first child after two years and one
month of marriage. She conceived this child the first
month she began trying and when asked why they had
wanted their first child then, she responded:)
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We kind of got things together — some furniture
and stuff — and we decided it was probably a good
time to start because we had all the basics. We
didn't care if we had super-nice stuff as long as
we had the basics. Before that it was kind of impos¬
sible because we were getting our feet on the ground.
Most couples holding this view were trying for their
first child after two or three years of marriage but, in
some cases, it took them longer than average to acquire
the "necessary" assets and, hence, the first child was
delayed.
We said we'd have a child a year after we got our
first home. It took us five years to get, but when
we did, that was it — we had the baby.
The final constellation of ideas that we felt was
evident amongst our sample couples (at least the final
constellation that we wish to discuss) was the view that
children must "fit in" around other plans and activities
of the husband and wife. This constellation of ideas
was held by the fewest number of couples, but did seem
discrete. In contrast to the previous two themes, the
women holding these views tended to stress how important
it was for a couple to "really" get to know one another,
and to accomplish individual goals, before having their
first child. It was perhaps most indicative that they
were least likely to feel that couples would be "missing
something wonderful" if they chose not to have children
and most apt to feel "whatever a couple wants out of life
is fine by me". One example of a woman who we felt
expressed this view of marriage and children is as follows:
(Began trying for first child after five years of
marriage.)
We had things to do and we wanted to get to know
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each other and so we thought we'd better wait awhile
(before having the first child). ... We had a
chance to grow this really strong bond between us
before we had a child; we had those years to build
a strong bond and a good basis to our marriage.
And we did a lot of things that we couldn't — that
we can't do now. Like travelling and seeing things.
Whereas the two previous constellations of ideas
generally fell along class lines (i.e. the first constel¬
lation was more common amongst the working class and the
second constellation was more common amongst the middle
class), this could not so easily be seen for this constel¬
lation. Xt may have been slightly more common amongst
the middle class, but its most striking characteristic
was that the women who*<iwe felt held this view of marriage
and children had all done things "out of the ordinary"
before their first child. They had either travelled,
been employed overseas or they or their husbands had had
an extensive education. Most interestingly, in most
cases, it was their age which finally "pushed" them to
start their families.
One reason we didn't have him any later was because
we wanted to have more than one child and we didn't
want to wait too late — like into our thirties
before we finished having our family. So when I
was twenty-six, we thought we'd better start soon.
And we were completing our work in Puerto Rico and
coming back to a place we thought was our home,
at least for awhile, so we thought it was a good
time to start.
(Ve started our family) because we'd been married
five years and if you wait any longer you'11 be
thirty, which is getting a little old by the time
they're ... the generation gap. (Why not earlier?)
Ve were enjoying ourselves too much — doing what
we wanted to do by ourselves. Ve just weren't
ready to have children then.
I was twenty-nine at the time and X did not want
to have children any later. Ve were planning to
have two, so. , . and that was the time we just
felt ready.
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In sum, we found in our qualitative analysis of the
interviews two main themes regarding when a couple should
start their family — one which encouraged delaying the
first child (so that the couple could "adjust" to one
another) and the other which encouraged having the first
child (so that the couple would not resent its "intrusion").
How long each of these stages took, however, varied
widely amongst our couples and seemed to stem from the
couple's view of marriage and the place of children
within it. Three major constellations of ideas seemed
to be apparent:
a. children were the primary reason for marriage and,
hence, once married, it was best to begin the family as
quickly as possible.
Women who held these views tended to be from the
manual social class (more specifically, their husbands
tended to hold unskilled or semi-skilled jobs) and they
were quick to condemn those women who delayed having their
first child for any great length of time ("I think it's
selfish just getting married and not having kids."; (Did
housing or economic considerations influence you?) "Hea¬
vens noi Family comes first before anything like that.
It makes me sick when I hear people talking about a baby
like they would a new car or something.").
b. children were essential to a "good" marriage but
the first task of a husband and wife was setting up a
home and getting financially established.
Women who held these views normally were from the
non-manual social classes and timed their first child,
in most cases, to acquiring some sort of home for them-
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selves. In direct contrast to the first set of women,
they tended to condemn couples, or feel it was "irres¬
ponsible" of couples, to have children "before they can
even afford them". They were as likely to condemn,
though, those women who delayed their first child for
"selfish" reasons — "I think it's important to work
towards being in a position to afford your first child
once you get married. If you want to travel and all that,
maybe you're not really ready for marriage. It's a bit
selfish, I think, not to make some arrangements for the
baby. "
c. children added to a marriage but they must "fit in"
to other plans and arrangements the couple might have.
The one characteristic that seemed to single out the
women holding these views was that none had simply gotten
married and had a baby or "worked towards" having a baby.
They had either travelled, worked overseas or, in a few
cases, held a fairly demanding job for which a child
"just had to wait". In most cases, the first child was
timed to the woman's age — as she was approaching thirty
she felt she had to "get busy". These women were the
least likely to criticize other birth timings; they
tended to feel others should do "as they please", but at
times would suggest that they "felt sorry" for young girls
with babies or "turned off" by people whose primary goal
in life seemed to be "owning the largest house on the
street".
We have presented these three constellations of
ideas without any reference to the previous literature.
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Certainly the tendency for working class couples to have
their children relatively quickly after marriage and
middle class couples to delay has been noted before
(Woodward, Heath and Chisholm, 1978; Cartwright, 1976;
Peel and Carr, 1975» Woolf, 197i)» However, we could
find no reference to this being due to differing attitudes
about marriage and the place of children within marriage.
Askham (1975) suggested that different social groups
possess different types of orientation towards areas of
social action and that this influences their family-
building behavior. There is, for instance, a "lower
working-class orientation" (i.e. a present rather than
a past time orientation, an inability to control the
major events of their lives and a negative evaliiation
of material wealth and esteem) which is why working class
girls marry young and have greater difficulties managing
their fertility. This may or may not be true; as we
suggested earlier ( see pages 70-71 ), we felt there
was a tendency for our working class couples to be present
oriented, but we had no direct measure of it. This has,
moreover, little direct relevance for our classification
scheme. Regardless of "why" couples held the attitudes
they did, they did appear to hold them and, more impor¬
tantly, these sets of attitudes did appear to "make sense"
of their behavior. This is also the case with researchers
such as Ineichen's (1976) suggestion that there are very
positive social reasons why young working class girls
should want to have babies. There are very good reasons,
not the least of which is that these women held a con¬
stellation of ideas that suggest that children are one
306
of the most important parts of marriage.
Whereas variation in the timing to the first birth
vas tied to social class, this was not so with the timing
to the second birth. Once the family had been started,
subsequent births appeared to be influenced mainly by
the desire for a specific interval of time between child¬
ly
ren . When we asked the women "In your opinion, how many
months or years should there be between the first two
children and why?" most answered with reference to the
first child. There appeared to be two competing consid¬
erations — it was important to have children relatively
close so that they could be playmates, but it was impor¬
tant to have some space between them, so that the parents
could "cope" and each child could get the attention it
deserved.
Most couples — regardless of their social class —
were attempting some balance between these two competing
demands. They felt approximately two years was the
best space between their children because it was close
enough for the children to be "friends", but far enough
apart for them to be able to "manage" and give each child
its "share" of attention.
I would say two to three years between children.
They're close together in age so they'd make good
playmates but anything less than two years is too
hard on the mother.
About two years because it gets the first one up
and out of diapers — sort of on its own — and
yet they can still play together.
A couple of years because the kids are close to¬
gether and when they're older their interests are
the same. But, still, you'll have been able to
spend some time with each one and teach them things.
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The comments of the minority of couples who felt
relatively shorter, or relatively longer, intervals were
best for children further revealed this "balancing" of
preferences. Some women felt that couples should have
their children as closely spaced as possible and in all
of these cases the reason was so the children could be
friends.
(How far apart should you have your children?)
Between nine months and a year. Right away get
pregnant because if you wait three, even two
years ... like X said, I've been around a lot
of families and I've watched their kids and even
two years makes that difference; "I don't want
to take my little sister with me" and that little
sister feels bad because she's small and she can't
go with the rest of them. To me kids should be
close together. This way, if Mom is busy, they
could help one another. When they're close like
that, it just seems like a friendship there,
(but wouldn't that be hard on the parents?) Maybe,
but it depends what you want out of your family.
Like I wanted mine to be friends, to play together.
I think children should be close together, to be
truthful with you. If a person can stand it, I'd
say have them right away. I have a friend who has
children ten months apart and, they're older now,
they're so close. They are playmates for each
other all the time — the same as if they were
twins. I wanted mine that close but it took me
about a year to get pregnant and, when they're
that far apart, ... my little guy is bored all
the time. (Wouldn't it be hard on the mother to
have them close?) Sure it's hard on your system,
but some people have them all together. That's
what I wanted to do. It's best for the kids.
Conversely, some women felt that couples should
have their children relatively far apart and, in all these
cases, the reason was so that the mother could give
each child adequate attention and be able to cope with
the family's demands.
(How far apart should you have your children?)
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Three years. I feel you need time with your baby
to be able to see what its wants and needs are.
And be able to — you'd get so upset, well, I would
get so upset if I felt I was pregnant right after. . .
I'd go to pieces. Because I feel, take your time
and enjoy your child and then if you want another
one, okay. But be sure to let your first one have
time too. You shouldn't rush through it and then,
"there you are" all done.
I'd say three years and maybe four years apart.
The first one would have a better understanding of
things and it would give the parents a little more
time for individual attention and, as I've been
telling you, I think that's very important.
I thought at first six years would be too far apart
but now I'm beginning to think it is a nice age
because he really enjoys the baby. I had him alone
for those years and I think I've given him enough
attention in the last years to really help him —
he's really very advanced for his age. (But will
your children be friends? Some women want their
children to be friends.) Yes, but he really enjoys
the baby. He can play with him — not looking
after him — but entertaining him and he seems to
think it's all right.
In the quantitative analysis we found two factors
which distinguished women who wanted their children close
from women who wanted them far apart — the first was a
measure of how important couples felt certain material
goods were for children and the second was when the woman
intended to return to work. Ve felt that these two factors
were tapping differing conceptions couples had of how-
much time, attention and material goods should be lavished
on children —— those couples who wanted children close
were less concerned about "investing" their children with
individual time and attention than those who wanted their
children relatively far apart.
The qualitative analysis reinforced this basic idea.
It appeared, to repeat, that there were two primary con¬
stellations of ideas about how children should be spaced
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which stemmed from differing ideas couples had about
family life and what was best for children. There were
women who felt the most important thing in a family with
regard to children was the interplay between siblings.
It was most important for children to play together, to
to
learn from one another, and just generally(be friends
both as they grew up and into the future. This was best
accomplished by having children as close as possible and
this was these women's aim.
Conversely, there were women who felt the most
important thing in a family with regard to children was
to provide each child with the necessary requirements
for a successful future. It was most important for child¬
ren to have individual time and attention from their
parents so that they would be successful as they grew7
up. This was best accomplished by having children spaced
widely (more time could be spent with each child) and
this was these women's intention.
Most couples fell somewhere between these two "ideal
types" because they were attempting to balance the two
sets of ideas, but the exact spacing of their two children
did appear, in many cases, to reflect the relative impor¬
tance they placed on each of these two perspectives.
In this first chapter of the qualitative analysis
we have examined our couple's family-building behavior
from marriage to the birth of their second child. We
initially noted that all but one of our couples began
marriage with the understanding that sooner or later
they would have children. This was, moreover, not an
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"issue" with these ccmples -- it was a taken-for-granted
assumption that children were inevitable in their marriages.
Timing to the first child seemed to stem from the
couple's view of marriage and the place of children within
it. There were three constellations of views that we
noted. First of all, there were those couples (largely
working class) who felt children were the primary reason
for marriage and hence, once married, it was best to
begin the family as quickly as possible. Secondly, there
were those couples (largely middle class) who, though
they felt children were essential to a marriage, felt it
was more important for newly-married couples to establish
themselves financially. These couples were most likely
to wait two or three years before beginning their families.
The last view of marriage and the place of children within
it that we were able to isolate in our data held that
children added to a marriage but they must "fit in" to
the other plans and arrangements the husband and wife had.
The couples who felt this way were not characteristically
middle or working class and, in most cases, it was the
woman's age which prompted them to have their first child.
Timing to the second child seemed to be influenced
mainly by the desire for a specific interval of time
between children. There appeared to be two competing
considerations — on the one hand, it was important to
have children close so that they could be playmates and,
on the other hand, it was important to have some space
between them so that each child could get its share of
attention. Most couples were trying to balance these two
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considerations; however, some couples clearly thought
it was friendship between siblings which was most important
in a family and they tended to have their children closely
spaced. Conversely, some couples thought preparing each
child individually for the future was most important and
these people tended to space their children far apart.
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CHAPr R NINE FUTURE FERT3 LITY INTENTIONS
In this second chapter of the results of the quali¬
tative analysis we shall examine our couples' future
fertility intentions. As we mentioned previously, all
of the couples but one began marriage with the intention
of having children. All but one also began with the
intention of having more than one child.
The dislike of the one-child unit has been widely
noted. The Indianapolis study of the early 1950's
(Solomon, Clare and Westoff, 1956), for instance, reported
that a major reason couples gave for having a second
child was the desire to avoid the "only child" child
rearing situation. This was also reported in the more
recent studies of, for example, Cartwright (1976) and
Peel and Carr (l975)» Our women, as well, felt that an
only child would be socially handicapped; the child
would either be too "lonely" or too "spoilt" or both.
I don't think one is enough. An only child gets
spoilt too bad.
I don't think it's totally fair to the child, not
to have a brother or sister. If he had stayed an
only child, I think he'd have been terribly self-
centered because we devoted our total attention
on him.
I object to an only child because I think they're
missing out on a lot — having a playmate and being
in a family. I think it makes more of a family if
you have more than one. And not only that, but
once we're gone, they won't be so terribly alone.
However, if the one-child family was to be avoided,
so too, it appeared, was the "large" family. Increasingly,
fertility studies are concluding that in developed coun-
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tries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and
Canada"^, most couples plan on having between two and four
children. Certainly none of our women, with the excep¬
tion of a few who were strongly committed to religions
which actively promoted procreation, were planning on
any more than four children. Even these very religious
couples were thinking in terms of no more than a family
of five or six. In this day and age, the traditionally
2
large families are, by and large, not being considered.
Moreover, with the availability of the effective modern
birth control techniques, we can expect, at least in
Edmonton, people's wants and desires to be successfully
carried out.
Within this narrow range, though, there is some
variation — some couples with two children definitely
do not want more, some definitely do and many are unde¬
cided. In the quantitative analysis we looked at some
of the correlates of our couples' intentions regarding
a third child and we will now consider the results from
the qualitative analysis. We proceeded with this stage
by examining the interviews of the couples who were
definitely (or probably) going on, then the interviews
of those who were undecided and finally the interviews
of those who were definitely (or probably) stopping with
two children. We shall present our results in a similar
manner.
There were twenty-seven couples in our sample who
we felt were definitely planning on having a third, and
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possibly a fourth, child. Three of these couples had
had either two boys or two girls and were only going on
to have a child of the opposite sex. If their first
two children had been a boy and a girl, they would not
now be planning a third child. It was this desire for
a boy and a girl which was the motivating factor for the
larger family.
Two is ideal — a boy and a girl. That's what we
wanted, but I've got two boys. I'd still like my
girl, so we'll try once more. If I don't get my
girl, I think I'd stop. If I get my girl, I'll
definitely stop. (if you'd had a boy and a girl?)
I would have stopped with two. That would have
been it.
The recurring theme throughout the other women's
explanations of why they wanted more than two children
was the view that a family of two was not really "a
family" — two children were just "not enough". There
appeared to be four interrelated ideas about why this
was so — that is, the advantages of more than two child¬
ren — and we will outline each.
a. The first idea was that children are so enjoyable
that it really is a case of "the more the merrier". The
women expressing this idea seemed truly to enjoy child¬
ren and, hence, wanted more than just two.
Three is a nice number. I like children and it
doesn't really bother me to try and raise them.
(Why three and maybe four children?) I think it's
the enjoyment you get from them and what you can
give them emotionally which would make us (have
a third child). I really like babies.
I'm not satisfied with just two kids. I love kids
and two is not enough.
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b. The next idea was that children are happier growing
up in a larger family. It was nice for children to
"have a brother and a sister, instead of just a brother
or a sister".
I just think more kids, if there are more kids,
they're happier together. I think more children,
they're happier kids.
I think four is nice. They have playmates and,
I don't know, it's nice to have brothers and sisters.
More children are company for each other. Two
isn't company; they spend most of their time
fighting. And a big family, it's just fun for
the kids.
c. The third idea was that children can be "raised
better" if there is more than one other sibling. They
have a greater chance of learning about sharing and
co-operation.
To me, I don't think you can raise your kids pro¬
perly with only two. A lot of people do but it's
not good for the kids — you gain a lot of know¬
ledge from having brothers and sisters.
I think a large family is better for children grow¬
ing up. I don't know, it's just a personal feeling,
but I tend to feel in a smaller family, the child¬
ren get — not necessarily more attention — you
tend to dwell on their problems too much. If you
had more, they might tend to work them out them¬
selves .
I think four because they learn a bit more than a
smaller family does about sharing and co-operation.
d. The final idea we were able to isolate from the
women's explanations of why they wanted more than two
children was the feeling that, with a larger family,
there was a greater likelihood of children and grand¬
children visiting in future years. For most of the
women, this appeared to be highly valued.
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When you get older, it's nice to have kids around
you.
Vhen you get older and you have more kids, you
have kids coming over and stuff like that. I
think I'd like that.
I want three or four. Cause I always think then
you'll always have somebody coming home.
Most of the women wanting a larger family mentioned
two or three of these ideas. They felt two children
were not a "proper" family and, because they saw posi¬
tive advantages of more children, they were planning to
continue with childbearing.
The women who were most favourable towards larger
families were those whose first two children were a
boy and a girl. Most couples wanted a child of each
sex and those whose first two children were either two
boys or two girls usually also gave this as a reason
for having more children (twelve out of the fifteen who
had had two boys or two girls). Some, in fact, suggested
that they might have stopped with the two if they had
had a boy and a girl.
We always wanted four; now I think it's four or
a boy, which ever comes first. So if we have an¬
other girl, we'll give it another go for a boy.
I think three is a nice number. It's not exces¬
sively large, but it's not small. ... You know,
if I'd had a boy this time round, we may have
even stopped at that. It's hard to say.
We'll probably try once more for a boy. I wouldn't
mind stopping at two girls, but I would like to try
and see if I could have a boy. And I like a larger
family. Three is a nice number. (if you'd had a
boy and a girl, do you think you would have stopped
with two?) I really don't know. We'd have had to
think about it.
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This vas not the case with the couples who had had
a boy and a girl. They wanted larger families primarily
because they liked larger families.
During the qualitative analysis one interesting
thing that we noticed about the couples who were defi¬
nitely planning a larger family was that many of them
had begun their marriages with even larger family size
aspirations. The three or four children they were now
planning, while large compared to the majority of other
couples, was smaller than they had originally intended.
There appeared to be three reasons why their original
intentions had changed; one involved economic consi¬
derations, another coping considerations and the third
"normative" pressures to stop with two children. We
shall consider each in turn.
a. A number of women suggested that although they
had started their marriages wanting four, five or six
children, they now realized that three or four was all
"they could afford".
In the quantitative analysis we found that it was
the middle income couples who were most likely to be
3
planning additional children ; none were either very
rich or very poor. While they tended to take the atti¬
tude "We've decided to have children rather than to have
wealth; it's an emotional sort of wealth rather than
materialistic", none suggested that their family-size
intentions would put them under great economic pressure.
All wanted more than two children, but not more than
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what they could comfortably afford and, "in this day
and age", that seemed to be three or four.
We wanted five children when we got married but,
as the years went on, we decided on three. We
realized you just can't have large families with
the cost of living.
We wanted four, but four is just a bit too much
nowadays because of expenses, giving them what
they want. If I had five kids my husband would
have to work night and day to give them enough.
It would be kind of rough.
You've got to draw the line somewheres. We wanted
lots but they're expensive to raise. You still
want to have a little bit of time and money left
for yourself,
b. Some women suggested that they had cut-down on
the number of children they wanted once they realized
what was involved in looking after them, "In this day
and age", with so many interests other than raising
k
children, a family of three or four was enough ,
In the quantitative analysis, we mentioned that the
women who seemed to be coping well with two children
were most likely to be considering a larger family.
They wanted more than two children but not more than
what they could "cope" with and that seemed to be either
three or four children.
Well, we wanted five and my husband actually still
feels that way. But I say maybe three, at the most
four, I just don't think I could cope with five.
People do have five kids, but you've got to have
the right constitution. My mother did it, but
she's a different type of person. It takes an
awful lot — she's got an awful lot of patience
and she devoted everything to us, I just don't
think I can be like that, I'll have three, maybe
four, but I just don't think I could cope with five.
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We wanted more, but there's so many interests now
outsjde the home X think to cope with it all it's
fair to have only three or four children. Both
for the children and yourself — to have some time
for yourself.
c. The third reason why couples appeared to have
decided on smaller families than they originally had
wanted seemed to stem from "pressure" the women felt
from acquaintances to have two children. A number of
women planning more than two children mentioned that
their friends and relatives "couldn't understand" why
they wanted "extra children". The women we are considering
at the moment had all decided, more or less, to have an
additional one or two children, but we felt this "pres¬
sure" was one reason why it was not an additional three
or four children.
Nobody seems to be having large families any more.
After I had the boy and girl, "oh great, now you
can quit" is the comment I got from everybody.
Two seems such an idealistic number; nobody can
understand why I want more.
We wanted about five or six children, but not now.
As soon as she was bora, all the letters that we
received — "isn't that nice, you have a nice per¬
fect family now". They're all assuming that that's
it. All of them are saying "oh, you have the per¬
fect family now. You'll be so happy".
In sum, it appeared that most of the couples pre¬
sently planning more than two children had always had
large family size aspirations. However, "for this day
and age" (a phrase echoed over and over again), "large"
meant three or four.
The final observation that we made during the quali¬
tative analysis of couples who wanted more than two
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children was the important part the family of orientation
seemed to play in determining anticipated family size.
Most couples mentioned that their own families influenced
how many children they themselves wanted to have. This
was actually the case with all of the couples —■. those
planning to stop with two children, those undecided and
those planning larger families. The confusing aspect
to this observation, though, was that coming from a
large (or small) family was as likely to make couples
want a large as a small family. That is, some women
said they wanted more than two children because they
themselves had missed having brothers and sisters.
We want four children. My husband's an only child
and I have a brother eleven years older than me so
neither of us really had brothers or sisters around
us. And we mustn't have liked it much because we
decided we want our kids to have lots of brothers
and sisters.
X think I want more than two because there was two
in my family and it never seemed enough.
Others said they wanted more than two children because
they had enjoyed having brothers and sisters.
I grew up in a large family and I think it's good.
I want that for my children as well.
My husband comes from a family of fourteen and I
guess that's why we want more than just two.
I think more children, they're happier kids. It's
just because I came from a family of five.
Thus, family of orientation seemed to influence
the couple's decisions regarding family size, but not
as a function of number of siblings. What seemed of
importance was the woman's experiences of, and reactions
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to, the family she grew up in.
The second set of women we examined were those who
were undecided about their future fertility intentions.
There were twenty-three couples who were undecided and
of the twenty-three, fifteen had either two boys or two
girls. The sole reason most of these couples (eleven
of the fifteen) were considering a third child was the
desire for a child of the opposite sex.
I always wanted two, but novr I'd like a boy.
I wanted a boy and a girl, then stop there. Now
we have two boys so we need a girl.
What more is there after a boy and a girl. You
can't get anything different, so if I'd had a
girl, I would have stopped right there.
The reason why they were undecided whether or not
to have a third child seemed to stem from a number of
reasons: many definitely did not want three children
of the same sex ("We want a girl, but that could go on
forever and I really don't want three boys."); some
to
were worried about being able financially,!support
three children ("We'd try for a girl if money was no
object, but unfortunately it's a very big problem.");
some did not know whether they wanted to go through
another pregnancy and delivery ("The delivery is another
reason why we aren't sure whether we'll give it one
more go — whether I want to go through with it again.");
some were unsure if they could cope with another child
("It just sort of depends on how much there is to
looking after these two. If these two get on my nerves,
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forget it."); and, some were unsure if they were willing
to be "tied down" with another baby ("I'd like to go to
work and, if I have another one, it's a few more years
at home."). Most women mentioned at least two or three
of these reasons; it appeared that though they wanted
both a boy and a girl, they were undecided if they
wanted a third child.
The eight couples who had a boy and a girl were in
a different situation — they were similar to the women
definitely planning an additional one or two children
in that they saw advantages to larger families, but they
appeared to be under greater pressure to stop with two
children.
Most of the women with a boy and a girl who were
undecided about a third child mentioned some of the
advantages of a larger family that we were able to derive
from the interviews with the women definitely planning
more children. They liked children ("I look at him and
he's so cute and I say maybe another one."); they felt
their children would be happier growing up in a larger
family ("When he had a sister I thought, gee, he'll
never know what a brother is and she'll never know what
a sister is and I think that's a shame."); they felt
they could raise their children better with more than
one other sibling ("I've talked to a few people who've
come from a family of just two and they say it's terrible
because all the two do is fight. It's easier, I think,
from what I'm hearing, to raise more than two."); and,
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they felt more children meant a greater chance of com¬
pany in their old age ("With two, one'11 likely be in
Australia and the other somewhere else. With four,
I'm thinking, you'll always have somebody coming home.").
They were undecided, though, because they felt
imder greater pressure not to have a third child. When
we looked at the women who were definitely planning
more children we pointed out that most had curtailed
their original family size desires because of economic
pressures, coping difficulties or normative pressures
to have a family of two. These reasons had made the
women with large family size aspirations limit themselves
to three or four children, but these reasons appeared
to be making a third child problematic for the undecided.
Many of the women mentioned economic problems. Two
children they could manage, but three might be problematic.
The nicest number in a family is three; not too
many and not too few. I'd probably definitely
have three kids if I had lots of money but, I
like my kids well-dressed and when I go out and
buy her a little outfit it costs $ 23. So, I
don't know.
I'd like to have one more but it depends on our
income — whether I have to work full-time or part-
time or what. Because my mom said two is okay to
babysit, but not three.
Coping also appeared to be more of a concern. The
women who were undecided were more apt to mention that
they might be unable, or unwilling,^ to manage three
children.
It depends on how much there is to looking after
these two. I'm finding my hands full now, so I'll
just have to see how I get on.
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I had these tvo really close and I'd just like a
little break right now to get back to normal. So,
if" I had another one, it would be in two or three
years time and maybe then he'll be older and it
will be nice just to leave them just as they are
now. I might be doing something and not want to
get tied down with another baby.
Finally, the normative pressure to stop with two
children that the women who were planning larger families
mentioned they had run into, seemed to have been taken
more seriously by the undecided women,
Ve wanted a larger family when we married — four
or five — and I think I will have another one at
least, but , , , A lot of people have said "Oh,
you have the ideal family now, why have any more
and ruin it" sort of thing. So that's partially
why we're undecided, because so many people have
commented on it.
We wanted about four but now, especially since we
have a boy and a girl, we haven't made up our minds.
Everybody says it's such a nice family we might
just be tempted to let well enough alone.
In sum, it appeared that most of the undecided were
undecided because their first two children were either
two boys or two girls. They wanted a child of each sex,
but were unsure, for a variety of reasons, whether or
not they wanted a third child. The rest of the women
who were undecided about a third child saw advantages
to a larger family, but felt for economic or coping
reasons, or because of normative pressure not to have
further children, that they might be just as well off
with two children.
The last group of women we considered was the women
who felt it was fairly unlikely that they would be having
more than their present two children. Host of the sample
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(fifty-five couples) fell into this category — as we
have commented on before, "in this day and age", most
couples are planning on a family of two.
What we initially noticed about the women who felt
that they would only be having two children was "that
most of them (over eighty percent) had never expected
to have any more than two children. Whereas many of
the women who were planning to have one or two additional
children had begun their marriages wanting even larger
family sizes, this was not the case with the women pre¬
sently planning a family of two. Two was all they had
ever thought they would have.
The reasons that were offered "why" two children
often worked from the belief that one was not acceptable
and so you had two.
If you only have one, then it usually turns out
spoilt, so you have two. And two you have, I
think.
Mostly, I suppose, one is just fine and you have
the experience and you've repopulated one of you
anyway. But, then, I always feel badly about a
single child. One child, I think, would be so
lonely and that's why we had two.
Well, I don't think a marriage is complete without
children and the one was all I really wanted cause,
as I said, I want a life of my own too. But I
think one child is sort of lonely, particularly
if the mother is away working. So two, just to
keep the other company.
Not often did we get the impression that the couple
"really" wanted a larger family but felt constrained by
income or coping considerations — a feeling which, as
we have outlined, we did detect amongst those undecided
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or definitely planning larger families.
In the quantitative analysis we found that the
majority of the unskilled manual workers were planning
to have only two children. From the qualitative analy¬
sis we undertook at that stage, we found that these
couples were often limiting their families because of
economic factors. In fact, it was usually these couples
who had begun their marriages wanting more than two or
three children. They had found, though, that all they
could afford now was two.
(The husband of this woman fitted plate glass win¬
dows.) When vre got married I thought six, but my
husband thought four would be plenty. You can
tell, the people that come from big families, want
big families. But we both cut down pretty quick.
If you want to give them everything that you want
to give them, you just can't have more than two.
(The husband of this woman was a sanitation worker.
He had been unemployed off and on since their mar¬
riage.) We'd like four, but there's no way econo¬
mically we could see it. If we could afford it,
we'd have four.
Most of the non-manual workers had ever only wanted —
and ever only considered — a family of two.
During the interviews, we tried to have the women
explain "why" they wanted two children with more than
"well, it's a nice number" or "one would get spoilt,
so two". We were offered a wide variety of reasons
"why" to our probing but perhaps these reasons should
be considered with caution. If two is the normal family
size then couples may be deciding to have two without
any clearly defined reasons. The women planning or un¬
decided about larger families usually could explain the
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push and pull factors in their own family size decision
making activities, but the women wanting two children
would often refer to general societal norms to explain
why they wanted two children.
I just want two. Big families aren't that common
now.
It's a good size family. And everybody's having
two.
I don't know why I want two. It was just the num¬
ber I chose as being nice. Most people have two.
I think three is practically the most that I know of.
Two is good. Most people I talk to — and most
people when I was in the hospital — are only going
to have two.
However, we did probe beyond these general state¬
ments and a number of reasons were offered why the couple
had decided on two children. Many women mentioned that
they felt two children was all they could afford ("It's
what we can afford the way prices are."; "The standard
of living nowadays, you can't really afford more than
two."). A few (by and large those who had attended uni¬
versity) mentioned over—population ("Two is ideal because
I believe in population control."; "My husband is very
population conscious and all he would consider is two.").
Some mentioned the dislike of pregnancy and delivery
("I hate being pregnant. I just wouldn't want to go
through it more than twice,"; "I had a really rough
time having him and I don't want to go through that
again."). Many women mentioned they only wanted two
children because they did not think they could handle
more than two ("I just know I couldn't handle any more.";
"It's what I can handle without feeling terribly over-
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run by children. Mentally I don't think I could take
more."). Some felt their love might not stretch beyond
two children ("With two you can give them more love.";
"You can share your love more with two."). Some women
did not want to be "tied down" with another baby ("Babies
take all your time and I want a life of my own too.";
"X want to get back to work and another baby I do not
need."). Others did not want to be "tied down" raising
another child ("We'd like to travel and we're in a fin¬
ancial position to maybe live six months in Hawaii and
six months here. So I don't think we want to be raising
a whole raft of kids for fifteen years."; "I still want
to be young enough to do things when they've left home.
If we have any more we'll be getting up in our mid-forties
before they leave home and I don't particularly like
that idea."). Some felt they were getting too old to
have another child ("The thing is there's three years
to me being forty years of age and I don't think you
have the patience for it."; "We're both older and we
decided two was about all we could handle at this age.").
And some felt that with a boy and a girl there was nothing
to be gained by having a third ("You have a boy and a
girl and what else can you have."; "He has his son
and I have my daughter, so why bother with more.").
As we have said, most of these reasons were offered
in response to our probing and possibly should be con¬
sidered with care. However, all were voluntarily offered
by the women — we never asked "what about this" or
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"what about that". It seemed that though they may never
hwcthought "why" they wanted two children, they could
think of good reasons for two children.
The final observation we made during the qualita¬
tive analysis that we wish to discuss here was the impact
the family of orientation seemed to play in influencing
couples to have, or not to have, more than two children.
We commented on this phenomenon when we examined the
interviews of those couples wanting more than two child¬
ren. Here, as there, women would often refer to their
own families in their discussions of why they themselves
wanted a certain number of children. But, as before,
coming from a large and a small family was seen as evi¬
dence for having two and only two children. Some women
wanted two children because there had been two in their
family of orientation.
We're both from small families and we like small
families.
We both come from small families and I think it was
just assumed we would have about the same.
We're both from small families and that's all we
know.
Others wanted two children because of their experiences
in larger families.
I want two. I reached twenty-four this year. That's
forty-two by the time that that one's reached
eighteen. That's a time in my life I'd sooner have
to myself. Not be like my mother. She's forty-
eight and she still has kids at home.
We're both from large families so we want small
families. We're both the oldest and we've really
both had our fill of kids.
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Two is always what 1 had wanted. I came from a
family of four and I never had any privacy. I never
had my own room, by own bedroom. I always shared
with my sister and I always wanted to have a small
family so they could have a room of their own.
I look at my mom. She had twelve kids and I say
no thank you. Two does me fine.
Our conclusion is as it was before; family of orien¬
tation does appear to influence a couple's family size
decisions but not as a function of number of siblings.
It is the couples' experiences in the families they grew
up in that is the important factor.
In sum, in this last chapter of the qualitative
analysis we have examined our couples' future fertility
intentions. We have seen that the range of family sizes
that couples are considering is remarkably narrow —
most people wanted more than one child, but less than
five. It appears that nobody (with the possible excep¬
tion of one Catholic and one Mormon couple) was planning
to have more children than they believed they could
financially and emotionally cope with. "In this day
and age", our couples appeared unwilling to "burden"
themselves with large numbers of children. Moreover,
with the widespread use of contraception that we witnessed
amongst our couples, we can realistically expect our
couples' future fertility "plans" to be successfully
carried out.
Most couples in our sample were planning, for a
variety of reasons, on having only the two children.
Most had always wanted a small family and could see few
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reasons to continue with childbearing, Those couples
who were planning (or undecided about) additional child¬
ren tended to be positively oriented towards large fami¬
lies; however, even these couples had often scaled
down the number of children that they had intended in
the light of pressures they felt to limit their family
sizes. There appeared, throughout the study, to be a
shift towards a small — i.e. two child — family. As
one woman said:
If you only have one, then it usually turns out
spoilt, so you have two. And two you have, I
think.
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CHAPTER TEN SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary task of this thesis was to examine
patterns of family formation — to consider the ways
families in one developed country had been built up and
the future fertility changes that were anticipated. A
related goal was to remedy the bias we saw in the ferti¬
lity literature (particularly the literature of the 1960's
and early 1970's) towards "economic" interpretations.
We felt there was a need for a "sociological" dimension
in explanations of fertility behavior; that there were
important sociological factors which were being, at best,
standardised and, at worse, ignored in the bulk of the
available literature.
After considerable deliberation, we decided that
close interviewing of a small sample would be our best
research strategy. By actually discussing their families
with women, we felt we stood the best chance of uncovering
the factors that had gone into their family size and
spacing decisions. Although most previous fertility
studies had been large-scale surveys, we felt that inter¬
viewing a smaller sample was more likely to meet our
goals. Because of limited resources we confined the
sample to one hundred and five women who had just had a
second child at a large maternity hospital in Edmonton,
Alberta, Canada. These women, we felt, were "typical",
easily identifiable and most likely to be able, and
willing, to discuss with us their past, present and future
fertility-related activities.
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The data analysis proceeded along two paths — a
traditional, quantitative analysis and an "interpretive",
qualitative analysis. Most previous fertility studies
had been limited to quantitative analyses, but we felt
a qualitative analysis would add another dimension to
our understanding of the couples* behavior. We were
initially tempted to proceed with a purely qualitative
analysis; however, we felt that we, personally, would
have been unable to move beyond generalities if we had
done so. The quantitative analysis provided the means
by which we could take "explanations (which) consist of
chains of reasoning in the actors themselves" (Hawthorn,
1968: 73) beyond mere description.
The theoretical framework we used throughout the
thesis was integrative with a dynamic perspective. That
is, the influence of both economic and sociological in¬
fluences was considered on each parity progression. The
dependent variable was not, as it traditionally is, total
family size, but, rather, the probability of a couple
adding another child to their family at the second parity.
Also, because we were interested in how families were
formed, we had our couples look back and reconstruct
the decisions (or lack thereof) that went into having their
first and second child. Because we had limited the sample
to couples with two children, we were unable to consider
the probability of adding a or another child to the family
at zero-parity or parity one.
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Fertility behavior at each parity progression was
conceptualized as working through three factors;
a. the demand for children — that is, the number of
children the couples would have if they had perfect con¬
trol over their fertility;
b. the potential output of children — that is, the
number of children the couples felt they would have if
they had not deliberately controlled their fertility; and
c. the costs of fertility control — that is, the
subjective (or psychic) costs and objective costs that
were involved in learning about and using specific con¬
traceptive techniques.
¥e hypothesized that couples would be motivated to
regulate their fertility when their perceived potential
output of children was greater than their demand for them.
In the chapter on the potential output of children we
found that all but one of our couples felt some need for
contraception — that is, they felt that sooner or later
they would have more children than they wanted unless
they used some method of fertility control. We then
went on to hypothesize that though motivation was a
necessary condition for a couple to use birth control,
it was not a sufficient condition. Birth control itself
imposes subjective costs (the displeasure associated with
using a technique) and objective costs (the time and
money necessary to acquire the knowledge and skill to
use specific techniques) on a couple. Whether or not a
couple would actually use a contraceptive technique —
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and use it successfully — would depend on their per¬
ception of the costs of fertility regulation as opposed
to their motivation to limit their fertility. We found,
amongst our sample, remarkably high percentages effectively
and efficiently using birth control. This, we -suggested,
could have stemmed from two possible sources — our sample
couples might have been strongly motivated to limit their
fertility or they might have been finding the costs of
fertility regulation to be very low. With regard to the
first suggestion, we could find no evidence to support
the idea that our sample couples were any more or less
motivated than other couples to limit their fertility.
The difference, we felt, between our couples and previous
survey couples (who, almost uniformity, have been shown
to be using birth control less effectively) had to do
with the costs of fertility regulation. It appeared that
amongst our sample couples contraception was provided in
such a manner that most couples found the subjective and
objective costs attached to its use to be very low.
Because of the effective use of contraception, inter¬
est became centered on the demand for children. Demand,
we hypothesized, was a function of income, prices and
tastes. We posited that, at any given point in time,
couples had certain tastes which they attempted to maximize
subject to the constraints of income and prices. While
our conception of the couple's demand for children implied
that the couple rational — that is, their action
was intentional and goal-oriented — we were not using
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the rationality framework associated with the "classical
economic man". All our model implied was that, at any
given time, couples would have some preferences which
they would attempt to satisfy, as best they could, given
what they knew about their incomes and the prices of
children.
With regard to the timing of the first child, this
framework appeared to be relevant for only one sub-section
of our sample. We found in the qualitative analysis of
the interviews two main themes regarding when a couple
should start their family — one which encouraged delaying
the first child (so that the couple could "adjust" to one
another) and the other which encouraged having the first
child (so that the couple would not resent its "intrusion").
How long each of these stages took, however, varied
widely amongst our couples and seemed to stem from the
couple's view of marriage and the place of children within
it. Three main constellations of ideas seemed to be
apparent, only the second of which we felt conformed to
the demand framework we had outlined.
The first constellation of ideas held that children
were the primary reason for marriage and, thus, once
married, it was best to begin the family as quickly as
possible. The women who held these views tended to be
from the manual social class and, for them, their pre¬
ference for a child was so strong that their incomes
and the costs they saw attached to children were largely
irrelevant to the fertility decision making process.
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The second constellation of ideas held that children
were essential to a "good" marriage, but the first task
of a husband and wife was setting up a home and becoming
financially established. Women who held these views
normally were from the non-manual social class-and timed
their first child, in most cases, to acquiring a home
for themselves. Their behavior was most easily explained
by the framework we had outlined — they appeared to have
a set of preferences which included children that they
were attempting to satisfy, as best they could, given
what they knew about their incomes and the costs of having
and raising a family. The final view of marriage and
the place of children within it that we were able to
isolate in our data held that children added to a marriage
but they had to "fit in" with other plans and arrangements
the husband and wife had. The couples who felt this
way were not characteristically middle or working class
and, in most cases, it was the woman's age which prompted
them to have their first child when they did. This group
appeared to be satisfying their preferences for children
as best they could, not with their incomes and the prices
of children in mind though, but, rather, other preferences
they had which did not include children.
With regard to the timing of the second child,
this theoretical framework did not seem applicable to any
but a few of our sample couples. Timing to the second
child seemed to be influenced mainly be the desire for a
specific interval of time between children. When we
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asked the women "In your opinion, when should a couple
have their second child?" most answered with reference
to the first child. There appeared to be two competing
considerations — it was important to have children
relatively close so that they could be playmates, but
it was important to have some space between them, so
that the parents could "cope" and each child could get
the attention it deserved. Most women — regardless of
their social class or educational level — were attempting
some balance between these two competing demands and it
did not appear that the thought of income or the prices
of children entered into the deliberations of most of
them in any significant way.
Again, with future fertility intentions, the demand
framework we had outlined appeared to be relevant for
only a sub-section of our sample. Some couples with in¬
adequate incomes (largely working class, though not en¬
tirely) did appear to have certain tastes for children
which they were attempting to satisfy as best they could
within the constraints of their income and the prices
they saw attached to having and rearing children. For
many others, though, these were not concerns. Their
incomes and the costs they saw attached to having and
raising a family did not appear to be acting as "constraints"
on their future, intended fertility behavior. Most
couples had small enough family-size ideals (and large
enough incomes) that to speak about "maximizing tastes
subject to the constraints of income and prices" was,
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though technically correct, theoretically, not of much
use. Most couples did appear to be "maximizing their
tastes" for children, but, in most cases, the "constraints"
of income and prices were marginal. Because of the
marginality of the income-price constraints, it was
the influence of the taste variables which accounted for
most of the variation in intentions regarding the deci¬
sion to have or not to have a third child that we found
in our sample. A wide variety of taste variables appeared
to influence our couples' intentions regarding a third
child and we shall conclude the summary of the thesis
by presenting a selection of the more important of these
in point form.
1. It appeared that sex composition was an important
influence on our couples' intentions regarding a third
child. Most couples wanted at least one boy and one
girl, and, hence, those whose first two children were
the same sex were more likely than average to be con¬
sidering a third child. Couples whose ideal family size
was larger than two also showed a greater likelihood of
considering a third child.
2. The ability of a woman to "cope" appeared to
have an influence on her desires for a third child.
Women who were having difficulties coping with their
present two children were least likely to be considering
a larger family. Related to this taste factor was a
factor we termed "antipathy towards children". It seemed
that the more a woman did not like children, the less
likely she was to be considering a third child. To
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what extent these two concepts were related remains open
to investigation. Our analysis suggests that the two —
ability to cope and antipathy towards children — are
distinct and both important to fertility decision making.
3. A woman's sex role orientation appeared -to in¬
fluence her intentions regarding a third child. Vomen
with "modern" orientations (which, by our definition,
meant they were largely oriented towards the wife's
individualistic needs) were less likely to be wanting
more than two children than women with "traditional"
orientations (which, by our definition, meant they were
more oriented towards their children and their husbands).
4. Lastly, the couple's family of orientation seemed
to influence their decisions regarding family size;
however, not as a function of number of siblings. The
relevant variable seemed to be the couples' experiences
of, and reactions to, the families they grew up in.
Those with happy memories of their families of orientation
tended to want as many children as they had had siblings.
Conversely, those with unhappy memories of their own
families wanted differing numbers of children.
In sum, we hope that in this thesis we have accom¬
plished our related goals — that is, that we have exa¬
mined various patterns of family formation in such a way
that "sociological" factors have been accredited equal
status with "economic" factors. We would conclude,
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firstly, that researchers interested in the area of
fertility shift their research attention from questions
of total family size to considerations of the tempo of
fertility. There would appear to be, in developed coun¬
tries, a tendency toward more homogenous procreative
behaviors (more specifically, a shift toward a family
composition centered on two children) and this diminishes
the need (and interest) for continued studies concentrating
only on total or completed family size. Secondly, in
considering both total family size and the tempo of
fertility, we would conclude that more emphasis be placed
on "sociological" factors. From our research experience,
it appeared the traditional "economic" model (that is,
fertility behavior as a function of a couple weighting
their income and the costs they see attached to children
against their tastes) was useful in explaining the beha¬
vior of only a few of our couples. A model more solely
"sociological" (i.e. one which exphasized "sociological"
factors, many of which have been standardized or ignored
in previous fertility literature) would, we would suggest,
be more useful. Lastly, in future research work we would
emphasize the benefits of combining a quantitative with
a qualitative analysis. Again, from our experience, we
found that both contributed a valuable dimension to our





1. In a thought-provoking book published in 1977» Busfield
and Paddon (1977: 2-h) made criticisms similar to
those of Goldberg's. Demography, they suggested,
had "tended to concentrate on producing demographic
explanations of demographic phenomena" — explanations
which were "antithetical to the more holistic and
social approach" that they argued (and we would agree)
is essential for an understanding of any demographic
phenomenon. Furthermore, they suggested that when
one turned to sociology for help, one found "(little)
direct support, since, with the occasional significant
exception, sociologists ... have shown little inter¬
est in demographic phenomena". Busfield and Paddon
accounted for the lack of sociological interest in
childbearing through the development of demography
as a separate discipline tied to economics. They
concluded their discussion with a statement in the
true spirit of our research: "Patterns of marriage
and childbearing are just as much family and social
phenomena as demographic and economic ones".
2. Goldberg (1975) is» perhaps, overstating his case.
There were in the fifties and sixties some modest
depth studies conducted by sociologists which we
would argue did provide "theoretical excitment and
elegance in fertility theory". The two most obvious
examples of this are Banks (195*0 and Rainwater (1965).
Goldberg's basic point, though, remains — "good"
sociological explanations of various aspects of
fertility were, by and large, lacking.
3. This division of the "sociological" emphasis into three
components was originally suggested by Tien, 1968.
h. Malthus' theory of population has undoubtedly received
more attention than Gary Becker's i960 article. How¬
ever, on the topic of individual family formation
tactics, it is Becker's article which normally begins
the debate and hence our decision to begin our survey
of the fertility literature with it.
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5. Classifying Spengler as a critic demands some clari¬
fication in light of the fact that in his presidential
address before the American Economic Association,
Spengler spoke of Becker's work as a "notable contri¬
bution" to the economic analysis of fertility and
that in his 1966 paper, Spengler termed Becker's arti¬
cle "excellent". Our point in introducing him here
is that though he obviously saw Becker's model as
noteworthy, there were aspects of which he was criti¬
cal. Similar comments could also be made of Duesenberry.
6. Rlake's 1968 article most systematically outlines
her criticisms of Becker's model. We review this
article in light of Namboodiri's (1972a) review of it.
7. The "sociological" exphasis is, as we outlined, composed
of a number of different strands. Blake's criticisms
that we outline here are basically "normative" criti¬
cisms. We proceed with this strand because in this
instance we feel it shows most clearly the differences
between the "sociological" and the "economic" emphases.
The two other strands we mentioned — the "institu¬
tional" and the "interactional" — were never (as far
as we know) used directly to criticise the economic
emphasis.
8. P^or a discussion of the criticisms of Blake's objec¬
tions to Becker's economic model see, for example,
Namboodiri, 1972a.
9. Easterlin's "integration" of the normative and economic
approaches grew out of the research work of many others.
We are crediting him with the "integration" because
his was the first article to pull the findings to¬
gether into a model. See his 1970 paper for a complete
review of the various findings he drew upon.
10. Easterlin himself expanded his analysis of fertility
decision making (1975* 1978) to include a variable
he termed "production of children" — that is, "the
number of surviving children a household would have
if fertility were not deliberately limited" (1975s
55). His basic model, however, remained unchanged.
The demand for children was still conceptualized as
"depending on the household's balancing of its sub¬
jective tastes for goods and children against exter¬
nally determined constraints of price and income in
a way that'maximizes its satisfaction" (1975: 55).
We discuss his newer theory in greater detail below
when we outline our theoretical framework. We do
not include a fuller discussion of it in the text
at the moment because, although it was expanded,
it did not provide any major shift in theoretical
direction.
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Michael Hout (1978) provides a recent discussion of
the static versus the dynamic models of marital fer¬
tility. Included in this article is a more complete
list of research undertaken on the assumption that a
long-run equilibrium family size exists. Our dis¬
cussion of the two perspectives follow his.
Again, although we credit Namboodiri with first out¬
lining the dynamic model of marital fertility, we
should point out that his work grew out of the work
of others. See, for example, Goldberg, i960 and
Mishler and Vestoff, 1955«
Ve discuss our dependent variable in greater detail
in Chapter Four. The reader is referred there.
Our model is superficially similar to Easterlin's;
it was, certainly, derived from his. There are,
however, basic differences between his model and ours
both in the unit of analysis (i.e. the dependent
variable) and in the factors demand for children and
output of children.
The specific income, price and taste variables that
we consider in the thesis are outlined in Chapter
Four. Briefly, under income, we consider current
income, anticipated income flow through time and
relative income. Under costs, we consider child-
quality standards and indirect costs. Under tastes,
we consider size and composition of the ideal family,
the conjugal relationship, sex-role norms and behavior
and antipathy towards children. Throughout the analy¬
sis, social class (measured by husband's occupation),
religious affiliation, age at marriage and wife's
educational level are used as control variables. The
reader is referred to Chapter Four for the complete
discussion.
Conversely, although we did not consider the pre-
maritally pregnant in any great detail, a number of
them voluntarily suggested that they did not use
contraception before their first child because they
thought "it would never happen" to them — they saw
the chances of their becoming pregnant as very slim.
Luker (l975)» in her study of women seeking abortion,




1. The Indianapolis study (whelpton and Kiser, 19^+6 -
1958), the Princeton Fertility Study (Westoff, Potter,
Sagi and Mishler, 1961} Westoff, Potter and Sagi,
1963)» the Michigan Growth of American Families Studies
(Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell, 1959} Whelpton,
Campbell and Patterson, 1966) and the National Fer¬
tility Studies (Ryder and Westoff, 1971; Westoff and
Ryder, 1977) could all, in varying degrees, be accused
of limiting analysis to correlating independent vari¬
ables against a dependent variable. A similar criti¬
cism could be made about Balakrishnan, Kantner and
Allingham's (1975) Canadian fertility survey and
Woolf's (l97l) British survey of family intentions.
2. For example, all of the studies mentioned above use
either ideal, desired or expected family size as
their dependent variable. This is so even though
none of the surveys limited analysis completely to
couples past the reproductive age.
3. The reader is referred to Chapter Four for the com¬
plete discussion of static versus dynamic dependent
variables.
k. The latest addition to the ongoing National Fertility
Studies, Westoff and Ryder's (1977) The Contraceptive
Revolution, mentions (finally) this problem (1977 '•
3^^~3^lT; "We investigate too many areas and, in
consequence, fall short of sufficient depth in each".
5. See, for example, Denzin, 1970; Easthope, 197^; and
Bulmer, 1977.
6. Kathryn Backett (1977) mentioned this pattern of
behavior amongst her sample couples. As she points
out, it is very difficult for an individual to sus¬
tain a "front" for any length of time in an intense
interview situation.
7. The exact percentage of births which the Royal Alex¬
andra Hospital handles is unavailable as all hospitals
do not keep — or at least will not release — records
of the number of children they have delivered. In
1973 (the last year for which official statistics are
available), there were J626 births in Edmonton and
4235 of them were at the Royal Alexandra (55 percent).
This percentage could only increase because since 1973
the Royal Alexandra has increased the number of laying-
in beds, and set up a perinatal unit (special beds
dedicated to the investigation and treatment of high
risk obstetrical patients) and a special unit dealing
with prematures.
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8, As we were collecting1 the names of suitable couples
at the Royal Alexandra Hospital we met a woman who
was screening all maternity patients for suscepti¬
bility to multiple sclerosis. Since she visited all
maternity hospitals and dealt with patients of all
parities, we asked her if she felt there was any
difference in intake between the three city hospitals.
She felt there was no difference between the General
and the Royal Alexandra; she confirmed that the
University handled mainly first births, and she had
found that the Miscericordia dealt primarily with
women having their third, fourth or fifth child —
first and second births were relatively rare. She
said there was no real reason for this (i.e. it was
not an admissions policy) and our suspicion was that
by the time couples could afford to live in the catch¬
ment area of the Miscericordia, they were well past
the early family formation stages. This research
worker reassured us that our sample should be repre¬
sentative of all women having second children in the
city of Edmonton.
9. We were aiming for a sample size of one hundred because
we felt this would be large enough for the requirements
of a quantitative analysis and, yet, not so large as
to rule out a qualitative analysis. As we go on to
suggest, we wanted to combine both types of analysis
in our thesis. Our intention also was to spend approxi¬
mately one year collecting and coding the data and
we felt we could handle one hundred cases in this time
span. Our actual sample size was one hundred and five
because the refusal rate was lower than we had anti¬
cipated.
10. The pre-tests were conducted in Edinburgh, Scotland
during 1976. The general topic of "family formation"
was initially discussed with five women. From these
discussions, a questionnaire was developed which was
further tested (and revised) on thirty-two women.
The questionnaire formulated in Scotland was pre¬
tested twice in Canada before the interviewing for
the thesis was begun. All of the women in the pre¬
tests were similar to the sample women in that all
had just had a second child.
11. We perhaps should emphasise that all the respondents
knew the tape recorder was on — if for no other
reason than it had to be switched off and on a number
of times. The quality of the interview was adversely
affected in only two cases and, with hindsight, we
probably should have just left the tape recorder off.
However, both of these women appeared particularly
shy and withdrawn and might well have been reticient
regardless of the tape recorder. We should emphasise
that the more we were able to draw the respondent
into spontaneous conversation, the better the inter-
v
view was; trying to write down the respondent's
attitudes and ideas as well as engage in conversa¬
tional probing would have been very difficult, if
indeed even possible.
12. The results of our quantitative analysis are presented
in the form of tables. No tests of significance or
measures of association are included, although they
were calculated for each table. We felt that with a
sample size of one hundred and five, it was not jus¬
tified to rely solely on these statistical techniques
and we felt their inclusion in the thesis would give
a degree of "reliability" to the results which may
not have been warranted. We referred to the measures
of association and tests of significance in our analy¬
sis of the data, but always with the realization that
we were working with a small sample size.
13. See, for example, Leibow, 1967; Polsky, 1971» Gould-
ner, 1955; Cicourel, 1968; Whyte, 1955»
1^. Dean, Eichhorn and Dean (1967: 30l), for instance,
suggest analysis should proceed through "the editing
of field notes, developing categories for the classi¬
fication of data, deciding upon the units to be tallied,
counting and cross-tabulation, or in some other fashion
establishing relations among variables".
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Chapter Three
1. The statistical data reported in this section of the
thesis are from Statistics Canada, Vital Statistics,
Volume I (Births) and Volume II (Marriages and Di¬
vorces): 1974, 1975 and 1976.
2. These are, of course, not the only trends that demo¬
graphers refer to in their examinations of future fer¬
tility trends. Rates of abortion, illegitimacy, child¬
lessness and timing and spacing of births from marriage
are, for instance, normally examined. Unfortunately,
these statistics, for Canada, are not routinely pub¬
lished and hence we could not consider them here,
"Therapeutic Abortion" statistics are published an-
nuallyj however, these are notoriously inaccurate
because of the legal status of abortion in Canada,
Rates of illegitimacy were published until 1973» but
have not been included in more recent summaries.
The timing of births from marriage has never, in con¬
trast to the British Registrar General's Reports,
been provided by Statistics Canada,
3. Re present the demographic data of the family building
behavior of our sample without reference to Albertan
or Canadian trends because, as we mentioned previously,
Statistics Canada does not provide birth statistics
cross-tabulated by length of marriage of mother,
h. Not all first pregnancies resulted in live-born child¬
ren — some were aborted and others miscarried.
Chapter Six discusses this issue in greater detail,
5. This is including only those husbands who were legally
wed to their wives when those wives had their first
child,
6, One woman's "first child" was twins and hence her
second pregnancy yielded her third child. However,
to avoid confusion, we have referred to her twins
as a single unit.
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Chapter Four
1. Duinpass, Rindfuss and Janosik (1978: J6) inadvertently-
referred to the literature's emphasis on completed
family size when they began their article on child
spacing with "in contrast to completed fertility,
the social determinants of the tempo of fertility
have received relatively little attention". Virtually
all the fertility studies we have mentioned in pre¬
vious chapters and notes have concentrated their
analyses on determinants of completed fertility.
The 1970 National Fertility Study (Westoff and Ryder,
1977: 350) is the first major American study to
suggest this emphasis might be changing: "the vast
preponderance of attention has been devoted to final
parity, and that may be a misplaced emphasis".
2. See, for example, Beaujot, 1975? Krishnan and Krotki,
1976.
3. The reason why "excess children" may want to be ex¬
cluded from the dependent variable is to take into
account Becker's suggestion that differential contra¬
ceptive knowledge is the reason for the lack of empi¬
rical support for his theory, without using his sug¬
gested dependent variable, desired family size.
h. The relationship between social class and wife's age
at marriage is seen in the following:
Occupational Categories
Wife's Age Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
at Marriage Man. Hon—Manual Manual Manual
Under 20 15 £ 29 % 50 io 56 £
20, 21 27 23 31 32
Over 21 58 kj 19 12
Total N * 26 17 36 25
* The total N equals 10^1 because one couple had
not been legally wed at the time of our inter¬
view.
5. These suggestions will be tested more rigorously when
we consider our taste variables in a later section
of this chapter,
6. The People's Church and the Jehovah Witness did not
appear to prohibit the use of birth control (as the
Catholic Churches and Mormon religion do); however,
these two religions did appear to actively promote
large families.
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We should perhaps emphasise that it was active adher¬
ence to denominations which promote large families
which appeared to influence fertility intentions and
not simply higher levels of religiousity. The rela¬
tionship between church attendance and future fertility
intentions that was apparent for Catholic and Mormon
couples was not apparent for Protestant couples.
See, for example, Askham, 1975} Beaujot, 1975.
Westoff and Ryder (1977J 278), for example, in the
latest report of the 1970 National Fertility Study,
decided not to include any analysis of occupational
differences in fertility because "the classification
of occupation by social status is a complex and
dubiotis business, and there seems to be little effect
on fertility that is not captured by education and
income".
See Simon (1969) for a general discussion of the effect
of income on fertility. Johnson (1962) discusses
differential fertility by income in European countries.
The selection of a particular measure depends, of
course, on the dependent variable. We simply discuss
here the measures that have been used in the previous
literature. Most frequently, they have been used
when the dependent variable is expected or desired
completed family size.
We did, in fact, examine the relationship between
family income and probability of having a third child
and it showed exactly the same pattern of association
as the relationship between husband's income and the
probability of having a third child. This is perhaps
not surprising as many women were not working (see
discussion in the taste section of this chapter) and,
hence, the correlation between family income and
husband's income was very high.
Excluding unwanted births would not alter this table,
however. At this stage, only two women had more
children than they actually wanted. Chapter Seven
discusses wanted and unwanted births in more detail.
We should point out that Deborah Freedman compared
couples of similar age, occupation and education.
Since we compared only couples of similar occupation,
our results should be interpreted with care.
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15. Cell sizes are too small to justify including all
these tables. To provide an example of the type of
relationship we are referring to, we present the
relationship between future fertility intentions and
perceived adequacy of income for the skilled manual
occupational category.










No More Children 75 $> 25 $> 50 io




Total N 8 2k k
16, The relationship between perceived adequacy of income
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* The total N equals 95 because information could
not be obtained from ten women on these questions,
17. This growing realization appears to date from the
late 1960*s. Blake was one of the first to point
out that both direct and indirect costs need to be
considered in the analysis of fertility:
Let us now turn to the costs of children, which
Becker believes encourage a positive relation
of family-size desires and income. He reaches
this conclusion by ignoring indirect costs —
alternative utilities on which parents could
expend their resources, and by concentrating on
direct costs — the resources actually expended




This is, we should emphasise, a taste variable. Be¬
cause the sets of prices confronting households are
likely more or less uniform for all couples, those
who spend relatively more per child must do so because
of differences in tastes. We continue our discussion
of this variable here, rather than in the taste sec¬
tion, because (a) the literature has traditionally
been divided in this way and (b) these are tastes
concerned with price variables.
For instance, Easterlin (1978: 79) » who in a 1970
article criticised economists' measurements of oppor¬
tunity costs, makes the assumption in his latest
offering that "there is no uncertainty about the
independent variables over the planning horizon.
The quality of children and the work/leisure allo¬
cation of time are also taken as given . . .".
It could also be argued that our scale did not ade¬
quately measure child-quality standards because it
did not attempt some measure of the "quality" of items
considered relevant for children. For instance, two
women may both have felt a backyard was important
for their children, but one may have been thinking in
terms of a small garden and the other in terms of an
acre of land. Our scale measured child-qualit}'- stan¬
dards solely as a function of the "quantity" of goods
considered essential for children (the more commo¬
dities considered very important, the higher the
child-quality standards). However, we would suggest
that this consideration also be kept in mind by others
attempting to measure child-quality standards.
As twelve tables were involved in this further analysis,
we do not include the data here. However, as has
been our practice throughout the thesis (unless stated
otherwise), a percentage difference of at least fifteen
points must have been present for us to declare that
there was a relationship.
We should perhaps point out that only a minority of
our women felt they might have more children than
they wanted because of contraceptive failure. (And
with these women there was some confusion about how
many children they really did "want"). We would be
inclined to doubt that such a high percent of the
sample would actually be achieving, and not exceeding,
their anticipated family size, except for the fact
that many women were being sterilized when they reached
their "ideal". Our couples' experiences with birth
control are discussed more fully in Chapter Seven.
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23. As we {jo on to mention, one of the distinguishing
features of Rainwater's segregated and joint conjugal
role relationships was the ability of couples to
effectively use contraception. Couples in segregated
conjugal relationships were, by and large, less able
to effectively plan their families. We do not include
a discussion of this variable here becatise, in our
estimation, to do so would be to confuse the "demand
for children"factor with the "costs of fertility
control" factor. In our theoretical framework (see
Chapter One), these are two separate influences on
a couple's reproductive behavior. The "costs of fer¬
tility control" factor for our sample is discussed
in Chapter Seven.
24. The percent of women who assessed the relationship
between themselves and their husbands as being very
good was 6k percent for the communication variable,
49 percent for the understanding variable, J6 percent
for the -physical relations variable and 73 percent
for the companionship variable.
23. This path is, in fact, the "indirect opportunity
costs to the wife" which we discussed in the previous
cost section. However, our discussion here will
concentrate on the non—economic rewards of female
employment — our previous discussion was in light
of the economists' use of the term and emphasised
monetary rewards.
26. Grade twelve is the final year of secondary schooling
in Canada.
27. The relationship between the wife's age at marriage









































* The total N equals 104 because one couple had
not been legally wed at the time of our interview.
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It is possible that there are simply not that many
"working wives" in the population and that we just
did not happen to include any in our sample. It is
also possible that the "working wives" we did contact
did not want to take part in the study because they
were too busy with other pursuits. We did meet all
potential sample members once, however, and there
was no indication from the information we received
at this meeting that the refusers were more career
oriented than the rest.
This is a subjective measure derived during the
qualitative analysis. However, all of the university
educated women planned to return to work sooner or
later whereas approximately 10 percent in each of
the other educational categories said they had no
intention of ever working again. We have not yet
discussed sex role orientation, but, on these scales,
the university educated women were also the most
likely to show a "modern" orientation.
The relationship between the wife's educational level









This is not to imply that women in the manual social
class were more apt to have high antipathy scores.
There was, in fact, little difference between the
occupational categories in the percent scoring high
on the antipathy scale: 36 percent amongst the pro-
fessional-managerials, 35 percent amongst the other
non-manuals, 30 percent amongst the skilled manuals
and k2 percent amongst the unskilled manuals. The
suggestion is, rather, that working class women live
in an environment where children are more apt to be
seen as "troublesome" and hence their own attitudes
are not considered particularly relevant to the
decision regarding a third child.









Prof.-Managerial 5 f> 15 $> 23 £ 36
Other Non-Manual 5 18 27 7
Skilled Manual h5 38 27 50
Unskilled Manual b5 29 23 7
Total N 20 3h 26 14
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Chapter Five
1. All the fertility studies we have used for compari¬
son purposes (for instance, Cartwright, 1976; Ask-
ham, 1975; Peel and Carr, 1975; Balakrishnan,
Kantner and Allingham, 1975) have used the first
method of measuring spacing — that is, the time
period studied is the time period ended by the birth
of a child. Most of these studies, though, have not
concentrated on timing and spacing considerations.
2. Or, alternatively, the couple's attitude towards con¬
ception was of the nature "if it happens, it happens".
The salient factor was that contraception to avoid
pregnancy was not being used and a pregnancy was not
"not wanted".
3. See, for instance, Luker (1975) and, in particular,
her bibliography (pages 193-204).
4. These findings are supported by the Registrar General's
figures for Scotland and England and Wales. For in¬
stance, in 1969/70* one-third of teenage brides in
England and Wales were pregnant, compared with 16
percent of brides aged 20 - 24. Moreover, 43 percent
of all births conceived premaritally in England and
Wales in that year were to teenage mothers. See
Ineichen, 1976. For Canada, similar trends are out¬
lined in McVey, 1976.
5. Ending the discussion of the relationship between
age at marriage and timing to the first birth with
a mention of the rate of premarital pregnancies (as
Cartwright, 1976 and Peel and Carr, 1975* for instance,
do) leaves the reader with the impression that the
inefficient use of contraception is a prime explana¬
tory factor. Our argument is that, while it may be
important, the explanation needs to be expanded.
6. The percent of women with no religious affiliation
was 20 percent amongst those married when they were
teenagers, 20 percent amongst those married when
they were twenty or twenty-one and 10 percent amongst
those married when they were over twenty-one years
of age.
7. The relationship between social class and wife's
age at marriage for our couples is given in Note 4,
Chapter 4.
8. Cartwright claimed (1976: 109) that "both social
class and age at marriage are related independently
to mothers* views and experiences of the interval
between marriage and starting a family"; however,
the data she presented followed patterns similar to
ours. Social class had much more predictive power
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than age at marriage if one wanted to know when a
woman felt a couple should begin a family.
One could argue that if actual spacing categories
were used, then the relationship found by Freedman
and Coombs would be clearer. This, however, was not
the case. Because so few couples had trouble con¬
ceiving and delivering children (see Chapter Six) the
two tables — actual timing and timing to when a child
was wanted — were similar. This is seen in the fol¬
lowing table which uses actual spacing categories to
the first child.
8 Months 8 Months- 2 Yrs.- 3 Yrs.- Over
Husband's Income
or Less 2 Yrs. 3 Yrs. 4 Yrs. 4 Yrs
Under £12,000 35 £ 0 io 15 f, 0 $ 0 <$>
£l2,000 - £15,000 39 36 20 14 27
£15,000 - £20,000 9 27 55 71 4o
Over £20,000 17 36 10 14 33
Total N * 22 23 19 15 15
* Six women had to be excluded because they were
not married to their present spouses when they
had their first child and an additional five
women had to be excluded because they did not
know their husband's income.
The relationship between social class and husband's
income for our couples is seen in the following:
Occupational Categories
Prof.- Other Skilled Unskilled
Husband's Income Man,
Non-Manual Manual Manual
Under £12,000 9 * 6 £ 6 * 23 1o
£12,000 - £15,000 14 35 33 31
£15,000 - £20,000 50 35 30 38
Over £20,000 27 23 30 8
Total N * 22 17 33 26
* The total N equals 98 because information could
not be obtained from seven women about their
husband's income.
We should also point out that Freedman and Coombs
measured "general economic position" through current
income and accumulation of assets. Our measure was
based solely on current income and, thus, should be
seen as only a partial measure of Freedman and Coombs'
hypothesis.
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12. Timing between children and current economic standing
showed no relationship and hence the analysis was
not included.
13. The relationship between social class and the com¬























































* The total N equals 101 because four women did
not answer all of the communication questions.
14. There was a relationship in our data between social
class and wife's educational level (see Note 30,
Chapter Four) and to this extent we would predict a
relationship between wife's educational level and
timing to the first child.
15. Ineichen (1976: 62—63) used similar arguments to
account for "why young working-class girls should
want to have babies" in his sample of newly married
English couples: "It gets them out of dead-end jobs."
"It bestows adult status." "Working-class value
systems endorse the raising of a family and mark out
as deviant (possibly selfish and even unnatural)
those who do not marry and have children".
16. Spacing between children showed no relationship by
wife's education and thus is not discussed here.
Once women began childbearing, their level of edu¬
cation did not appear to influence how they spaced
their children. The most popular space was one and
a half to two and a half years and this did not vary
by how much education the mother had.
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Chapter Six
1. Cartwright's (1976s 87-90) was the only study we could
find that investigated the possibility that frequency
of intercourse influenced the time taken to conceive.
She found that the reported frequency of intercourse
was clearly related to mother's age and length of
marriage. However, when looking at the proportion
taking two years or more to conceive, frequency of
intercourse in the week before interview did not seem
to be related. The effect of age remained, but fre¬
quency of intercourse had no influence.
Proportion Taking Two or More Years to
Conceive
Mother's Age
20-24 25-29 30 or More
Number of 0 7 $ (75) 17 ^ (84) 31 £ (67)
Intercourse 1 2 * <88> "#(83) *> # 0»)
In Week 2 4 $ (98) 10 $ (105) 32 $ (4l)
Interview 3 9 # <79> 9 * <55> 26 (27)
4 or 5 $> (80) 15 £ (33)
More
(Figures in brackets are the number of mothers on
which the percentages are based (= 100 ^). Those
who became pregnant while taking precautions have
been excluded.)
2. This is in contrast to most of the other women who
were only too happy to discuss their complete medical
history. The chairman of the hospital review board
(who approved the study) had suggested that most women
would be "anxioiis" to discuss each pregnancy and
delivery to a willing audience and this, in most cases,
was true,
3. To repeat, 83.5 percent of the women totally rejected
the idea of aborting a pregnancy that they simply
"did not want". Some suggested they would consider
aborting if their health was in danger or the child
was deformed and even percents mentioned that though
they themselves would never consider an abortion
(or only under extenuating circumstances) they felt
that abortion should be a freely available option for
others.
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U. Eighteen of our couples had been sterilized by the
time of our interview and hence were infertile. All
of these sterilizations were primarily for contra¬
ceptive reasons and are discussed when we consider
sub-fecundity due to voluntary factors. To simplify
our discussion of the potential output of children
we discuss sub-fecundity due to involuntary factors
as if none of our couples had been sterilized.
5. Ve classified these women as sub-fecund from their
previous pregnancy history; however, there were
three women who, when we interviewed them at eight
weeks after the birth of their second child, felt
they might be pregnant again. Two of these women
were among the "sub-fecund".
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Chapter Seven
1. For Britain see Peel, 1972; Askham, 1975« For the
United States see Westoff, Potter, Sagi and Mishler,
1961; Campbell and Patterson, 1966.
2. For Britain see Cartwright, 1976; Peel, 1972. For
the United States see Westoff and Ryder, 1977» For
Canada see Krishnan and Krotki, 1976.
3. For a discussion of this difference in British and
American patterns of contraceptive use see Rowntree
and Pierce, 1961.
4. The pill became available in Canada in i960 (Krish¬
nan and Krotki, 1976; Webb, 1978) and all of our
couples were married well after that date. In fact,
only twelve couples were married before 1970, Age-
wise, as well, only five of our women would have been
of an age to have possibly needed contraceptives in
i960 (i.e. fifteen or older) and reading these women's
interviews gives no indication that they were engaging
in sexual behavior at that stage in their lives,
5. For similar groupings see Askham, 1975 and Peel and
Carr, 1975# A case could be made for combining the
birth control pill and the IUD into one category but,
as these are the two most modern contraceptive tech¬
niques, we decided to consider them separately. For
contraceptive failure rates see, for example, Peel
and Potts, 1969.
6. Information on the "main" method of contraception
was taken from two questions; the first asked ex¬
plicitly which methods had been used and for how long
and the second asked about the circumstances of get¬
ting pregnant (before a method was ever used, while
a chance was being taken, when a technique failed,
or when contraception was stopped to have a child).
This second question was used to confirm information
obtained from the fiyst question.
7. There remains medical controversy about the effects
of using the birth control pill for long periods of
time (see, for example, Webb, 1978); however, many
of our women felt there were definite risks involved.
The pill agrees with me but I wouldn't want to
stay 6n it for too many years.
I thought I'd better go off the pill before some¬
thing happened to me because I had been on it
some time.
xix
The average age of all the women in the sample was
25.6. By educational level, the average age was:





See, for example, Webb, 1978.
We have no direct evidence for this other than the
large number of women who had been successfully using
the birth control pill, but who were switching because
they felt frightened of its continued use.
There's so much controversy over the pill.
Whether it's good for you or not. I thought
I'd be safe and try that loop.
I just don't think it's safe to use the pill for
that many years. I used it for a year and a
half and I figured that was enough. It was time
to find something else. With an IUD you can
keep it in indefinitely.
With regard to the IUD, Webb (1978: 55» 58) writes
(and our women agreed):
When inserted in the uterus by a doctor ... it
usually causes pain ... it can perforate the
uterus and cause injury and infection; shift
and permit pregnancy; produce severe cramps,
spotting and heavier flow; (and) be rejected
by the body.
The birth control pill's side-effects, on the other
hand, were listed as:
Sore breasts and legs, water retention, nausea,
depression, anxiety and headaches.
There are a number of female sterilization operations
available, the most common of which is the tubal li¬
gation, Most of our women did not realize there was
this choice, though, and most assumed that they would
be having the "tubal". Throughout this chapter we
use the term "tubal ligation" or "tubal" to refer to
all varieties of female sterilization.
The relationship between social class and husband's
income for our couples is given in Note 10, Chapter
Five, The relationship between social class and
wife's educational level is given in Note 30, Chapter
Four.
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14. Medical evidence suggests (see, for example, Taylor,
1976) that the incidence of congenital malformations
is considerably higher in infants born to mothers
at the upper end of the reproductive age span. Many
of our women mentioned that they wanted their children
when they were "young" because they felt the risks
of child deformity were greater at the older ages
and because they felt pregnancy and delivery would
be more difficult then.
15. For Britain see, for example, Askham, 1975, Cart-
wright, 1976; Woolf, 197f« For the United States
see, for example, Westoff and Ryder, 1977; Ryder
and Westoff, 1971; Westoff, Potter, Sagi and Mishler,
I96I; Westoff, Potter and Sagi, 1963; Bumpass and
Westoff, 1970; Rainwater, 1965.
16. See Webb, 1978. In the 1968 Toronto study (Bala-
krishxian, Kantner and Allingham, 1975)» sterilization
as a birth control technique was so rare that it was
not included in the list of contraceptive techniques.
Furthermore, the researchers did not ask those couples
who had had an operation which made another pregnancy
impossible why they had had the operation.
17. According to Table 7.3, 83 percent of the sample
women are planning on some form of sterilization in
the future. However, this table excludes the thir¬
teen women who were undecided about their future con¬
traceptive plans. If they are included, then 75
percent of the sample are planning to be sterilized
in the future.
18. The women from the manual social class may have had
more reason to be concerned about eventual divorce.
They were less apt to report a very good relationship
with their husbands on three of the four husband-
wife communication indices (see Note 13, Chapter
Five). Furthermore, they were more apt to have been
married when they were under twenty (32 percent in
the semi- and unskilled occupational category and
50 percent in the skilled manual group versus 9 per¬
cent in the professional-managerial category and
36 percent in the other non-manual group) and Vital
Statistics for Canada show that wife's age at mar¬
riage has an important impact on eventual divorce.
Divorces Per 1000 Marriages
Age of Wife
at Marriage 197^ 1975 1976
Under 20 365.^3 434.08 501.23
20 - 24 19^.70 219.81 260.40
25 - 29 142.72 154.20 168.60
30 + 100.43 109.25 122.12
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19. Aberdeen is also a unique city; it has for many years
followed a liberal policy of sterilization, abortion
and the provision of birth control. See, for example,
Askham, 1975.
20. This "planning" category appeared to have been present
in Rainwater's data (1965:202), although he did not
make special mention of it:
... they may occasionally joke about the child
that was a "martini" baby, conceived when one
partner felt like taking a chance ... (but)
one gets the impression that the chance was
taken in most cases to solve by fiat ambivalence
over whether or not to have another child.
Rainwater, 1965: 202
Most recently, Woodward, Heath and Chisholm discuss
(1978: 43) the " 'grey area' between definitely
planned and definitely unplanned conceptions".
21. Luker suggests (1975) such a dichotomy might be use¬
ful to account for the high percent of her abortion
seeking women who had been using the birth control
pill around the time they conceived.
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Chapter Eight
1. Ve would argue that these themes or ideas are not
"equally distributed" throughout the childbearing
population — a working class girl, for instance,
may want children for entirely different reasons than
a thirty year old working woman. Busfield and Paddon
(1977) did not attempt to systematise their data in
this way (one of the criticisms we have of their
book) and -we did not feel that we had sufficient
data to attempt to do so. Ve present their ideas
and themes underlying the "automatic assumption"
regarding children because these were often echoed
in our data and seemed a logical "first step" in our
discussion of patterns of family formation.
2. Ve may not be able to generalise to all of the popu¬
lation; however, the percent of couples who remain
childless (voluntarily and involuntarily) in Canada
has been and remains very small (see McVey, 1976).
3. This is, incidentally, a very good reason why questions
such as Cartwright's (1976: 36-37) which ask whether
a woman favours starting a family "straight away" or
"leaving it for awhile" can be misleading. The majo¬
rity of our women (as Cartwright's did) would likely
say "leave it awhile" but "awhile" would have ranged
from one month to three years or more.
4. Again we ignore the previous literature, mainly be¬
cause we could find none which we felt contributed to
our discussion. The exception would be Busfield and
Paddon's (197 7: 137) comments concerning the Ipswich
couples:
Two ideas dominated the accounts of the preferences
about the spacing of births: one that encouraged a
relatively close spacing of births, the other a
more distant one. Neither show any concern with
economic considerations. On the one hand with what
they think is good for children in mind, people
argue that births should be relatively close so
that the children can grow up together; on the
other hand with their ability to look after and
care for their children in view, they argue that
the births should not be too close to make it
easier for the parents to cope with the work that
a baby involves. Many people mentioned both points
and were clearly attempting some balancing between
them* Busfield and Paddon, 1977: 157
(Emphasis added)
Our qualitative analysis was completed before we re¬
ceived the Btisfield and Paddon book, however, it
sounds as if the trends we observed are present in
more than our sample.
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Chapter Nine
1. See, for instance, Westoff and Ryder (1977* 306),
Busfield and Paddon (1977: 9-1*0 and Cartwright (1976:
22-25).
2. In Canada, for instance, the average family size
estimated circa 1800 was 5.7. By 1971 the average
family size had declined to 3.7 (including both
parents) and there is evidence that this has fallen
even further in recent years. See McVey, 1976.
3. It was also the case that the few couples who wanted
more than two children and who earned below average
incomes wanted to wait before having their third
child,
4. There do appear to be two interconnected ideas
here — whether one is willing to cope versus whether
one can cope. Some women felt they could not cope
with more than three or four children, while others
suggested they were not willing to cope with more
than three or four. As we have commented on before,
we did not decide to consider "coping" in any great
detail until the interviewing was half finished and,
hence, we did not feel we had enough data to differ¬
entiate clearly between these two concepts. In the
discussions we have, many women appeared to be re¬
ferring to both ideas: they could not, and would
not, consider more than three or four children.
5. Here, again, there appear to be two interrelated




All of these questions were covered, but their order
was flexible. That is, we interviewed from the basis of
the questionnaire, but allowed respondents to direct the
conversation along their own lines. Included in this
questionnaire are six sets of attitudinal statements.
Their ordering is approximate; we introduced them when¬
ever a natural pause seemed to develop,
A, Marriage
1, How old were you and your husband when you married?
2, How long had you known each other?
3, How had you met?
4, What type of wedding did you have?
B, Family Size Intentions
1, When you got married, did you feel you would like to
have children sometime? If yes; At that time, how
many children did you want in all? (if not pre-
maritally pregnant;) And when did you think you
wanted your first child?
2, At about the time of your marriage, did you discuss
with your husband whether you wanted children?
If yes; How many children did your husband want
then? (if not premaritally pregnant;) And when
did he want to have the first child?
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3. After you had just had your first child (say three
months after), did you feel you would like to have
more children sometime? If yesj At that time, how
many children did you want in all? And when did you
think you wanted your second child?
4. After you had just had your first child, did you
discuss with your husband whether you wanted more
children? If yes; How many children did he want
then, do you think? (if more than oneI) And when
did he want to have the next child?
5. If you and your husband wanted more children, could
you, from a medical point of view, have them? If
yes: Do you think you could easily have another
child or would it be difficult or impossible? If
difficult, what makes you think this?
6. Do you feel you would like to have more children
sometime now? If yes: How many children do you
want in all now?
7. Have you discussed with your husband since having
the second baby whether you want more children? If
yes: How many children do you think your husband
wants now?
C. Husband and Wife Role Scales
Now here are some statements about husbands and wives.
I would like you to check whether you strongly agree,
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the state¬
ments. If you are undecided, check between agree and
disagree.
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1. Wife Role Scales
i. A married woman's most important task in life
should be taking care of her husband and
children.
ii. She should realize that a woman's greatest
reward and satisfaction come through her
children.
iii. Having a job herself should be just as impor¬
tant as encouraging her husband in his job.
iv. If she works, she should not try to get ahead
in the same way that a man does,
v. She should be able to make long-range plans
for her occupation, in the same way that her
husband does for his.
vi. A wife should not have equal authority with
her husband in making decisions,
vii. If she has the same job as a man who has to
support his family, she should not expect the
same pay.
viii. If being a wife and mother isn't satisfying
enough, she should take a job.
ix. There should be more day-care centers and
nursery schools so that more young mothers
could work.
x. A wife should realize that, just as a woman
is not suited for heavy physical work, there
are also other kinds of jobs she is not suited
for, because of her mental and emotional nature.
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xi. A wife should give up her job whenever it
inconveniences her husband and children,
xii. If a mother of young children works, it should
be only while the family needs the money,
2. Husband Role Scales
i, A married man's chief responsibility should
be his job,
ii. If his wife works, he should share equally in
household chores such as cooking, cleaning,
and washing,
iii. If his wife works, he should share equally in
the responsibilities of childcare,
iv. If her job sometimes requires her to be away
from home overnight, this should not bother him,
v. If a child gets sick and his wife works, he
should be just as willing as she to stay home
from work and take care of the child,
vi. If his wife makes more money than he does,
this should not bother him,
vii. The husband should be the head of the family,
viii. On the job, men should be willing to work
for women supervisors,
ix, A married man should be willing to have a
t
smaller family, so that his wife can work
if she wants to,
"Ideal" Family
1, Thinking about couples more or less like yourself,
what do you think is the ideal number of children
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for them to have nowadays? Why?
2. How many children would couples like yourself have
to have before you would say there were too many
children?
3. What do you think is the ideal number of children
for a couple in this country nowadays, supposing
they had no particular worries about money or any¬
thing like that?
h. Some couples want a certain minimum number of boys
or girls. For example, they continue to have
children until they have a son or daughter. Would
you continue to have children until you had at least
one boy? At least one girl?
5. In your opinion, if a couple had complete control
over their fertility, how many months or years should
there be between getting married and having a first
baby? Why?
6. How many months and years should there be ideally
between the first and second child? Why?
Task Performance
I would now like to ask you some questions on how you
organize things at home. Here is a list of tasks and
I would like you to tell me whether the husband always
does this task; the husband usually does it, but some¬
times the wife will; both husband and wife will carry
out the task together; sometimes the wife, sometimes
the husband; the wife usually, but sometimes the




2. repairing minor things around the house
3. getting breakfast for the children
k, keeping track of the money and bills
5. vashing the evening dishes
6. taking out the garbage
7. putting the children to bed
8. paying the rent
9. tidying up the house
10. getting things from the attic or basement
11. disciplining the children
12. handling financial affairs at the bank
13. preparing the evening meal
14. the family's laundry
15. getting up with the children at night
16. dealing with the mortgage company (or landlord)
F. Decision Making
Now I would like to ask you some questions on how your
family makes decisions. Again the response categories
are across the top and the decisions down the side.
The response categories here are husband always; the
husband usually but sometimes the wife; the husband
and wife together; the wife usually but sometimes the
husband; or the wife always. I am sure you will have
discussed most things that I mention with your spouse,
but what I am interested in is, after you have dis¬
cussed the issue, who actually makes the decision.
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1. Which house or apartment to take?
2. Where to go on vacation?
3. How much money should be spent on the children?
4. What job the husband should have?
5. Whether or not to buy life insurance?
6. Which friends are seen the most often?
7. What the child should be allowed to do?
8. How much money the family can afford to spend per
week on food?
9. Whether the wife should work?
10. How often they should go out together for an evening?
11. At what time the children should be sent to bed?
12. How much money should be spent on major purchases?
13. What television (or radio) programnes to watch?
14. How the children will be disciplined?
G. Probability of Third Child
1. You now have had two children. Would you say you
will definitely have more children, you probably
will have more children, you're uncertain, you pro¬
bably will not have more children or you definitely
will not have any more?
i. Uncertain: Are you uncertain because you may
change your mind later on or because you may
*
have children you haven't planned on?
ii. Probably Will, Probably Will Not, Uncertain:
What would push you towards having another
child? What would push you away from having
another child?
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iii. Definitely Will Not: Can you think of anything
that would make you change your mind and have
more children?
iv. Probably Will, Definitely Wills How many more
children do you think you will have? Does the
number depend on whether you have children
of the sex you want? When do you think you will
have your next child? Why then?
v. Probably Will Not, Uncertain: If you do decide
to have more children, how many more do you
think you will have? Would that number depend
on whether you have children of the sex you
want? When do you think you would have that
child? Why then?
2. What do you think will be the largest number of
children you will have altogether (counting those
you have now).
3. And what do you think will be the smallest number of
children you will have altogether (counting those
you have now).
k. How certain are you that you will have this number
of children — very sure, fairly sure, or not too
sure? If fairly or not too sure: Are you not very
sure because you may change your mind later on, or
because you may have children you have not planned on?
Maternal Role Scale
The next set of statements are questions people have
raised about a mother's role, I would like you to
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check whether you definitely would say yes to the
question, probably say yes, probably say no to the
question or definitely say no to it.
1. Do you believe that the institution of marriage and
and family was established by God?
2. Do you feel that being a mother is a special calling
from God?
3. Do you think that a working mother can establish
just as warm and secure a relationship with her
children as a mother who does not work?
h» Do you feel that a parent gets more satisfaction
when a son gets ahead in his occupation than when a
daughter gets ahead in hers?
5. Do you feel a marriage is incomplete without children?
6. Do you think that young girls should be permitted
as much independence as boys?
7. Do you feel a pre-school child is likely to suffer
if the mother works?
Companionship
Also on that sheet are some questions on the companion¬
ship between you and your husband at the moment.
Would you also please answer those questions by checking
the appropriate response.
*
1. How do you feel about the ways you and your husband
can confide in each other, talk things over and
discuss anything that comes up? Do you feel it is
very good, okay or not so good?
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2. How do you feel about the way your husband under¬
stands your problems and feelings? Do you feel his
understanding is very good, okay or not so good?
3. How do you feel about the physical love and sex
relations you experience with your husband? Do you
feel it is very good, okay or not so good?
How do you feel about the companionship that you
and your husband have in doing things together?
Do you feel the companionship is very good, okay
or not so good?
J. Childlessness
1. What would be your reaction to a couple who decided
not to have any children in their marriage?
2. Do you have any friends who have decided not to
have any children?
K. Occupational Behavior
1. Did you work between getting married and having your
first child? If Yes: Doing what? What hours?
When did you finish that job? If No: Did you work
before you were married? Doing what?
2. Was your husband working at that time? If Yes:
Doing what? Did he change employment at all? Why?
If No: Was he looking for work? As what?
*
3. Did having your first child when you did mean a
substantial reduction in your standard of living,
a slight reduction or did that child not change
your standard of living at all,
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Between your first and second child, did you work
at all? If Yes: What did you do? Hours? What was
your main reason for working at that time? When
did you finish that job? If No: Did you consider
working? If so, what prevented you from working
at that time?
And was your husband working then? If Yes: Doing
what? Did he change jobs at all? If so, why?
If No: Was he looking for work?
Has having your second child meant a substantial
reduction in your standard of living, a slight re¬
duction in your standard of living or has this child
not changed your present standard of living in any
major way?
Are you working now? If Yes: Doing what? Hours?
What is your main reason for working at the moment?
Would you prefer not to be working at the moment?
If No: Are you looking for work? If so, what sort?
Hours? What is your main reason for wanting to
work? WTould you prefer not to be considering work
at the moment? If not, would you like to be working
at the moment? If so, what prevents you from
working?
i. Not Working: Do you think you will be working
five years from now? Twelve years from now?
Twenty years from now? If yes to any: What
sort of work do you think you will be doing?
What hours will you work? What will be your
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main reason for working?
ii. Working and Seeking Work: Do you think you will
be doing the same kind of work with the same
hours in five years time? Twelve years time?
Twenty years time? For each change: What do
you think you will be doing? If working, what
type of work and hours? What will your main
reason for working be then? If no changes,
what will be your main reason for working in
twenty years time?
8. Is your husband working now? If No: Is he looking
for work? As what? If Yes: Doing what? Hours?
Do you feel this job is quite secure? Does he have
any plans to change? If so, to what? Why?
Present Income
1. How would you rate your family income at the moment?
Would you say it was enough for your needs, more
than enough or less than what you really need?
2. Suppose your husband lost his job tomorrow and
neither you nor he could manage to find work for one
month. Do you feel you could pay all your usual
bills for that month out of your family savings?
Two months? Three months?
3. In about five years time, do you think your family's
standard of living will go up a great deal, go up
slightly, be about the same or be worse than it is
now?
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h. How would you compare yourself, financially, with
your friends? Would you say you are slightly better
off than they are, about the same, or worse off,
financially, than most of them are?
5. And how would you compare yourself, financially,
with families where the husband has the same kind
of job as your husband?
Childcare
1. For Women Working Full-Time or Part-Time:
i. Who looks after the children while you are at
work?
ii. Do you pay for this service?
iii. Are you happy with this service?
iv. Do you think you are easily earning enough to
offset the costs of employment (better clothes,
transport), you are just about breaking even,
or you are not earning as much as it is costing
you to work?
2, For Women Not Working:
i. Say you wanted to go back to work at the moment,
do you think you could easily find employment
suitable for your education and qualifications,
you likely could if you looked hard enough
of do you think you would find it very diffi¬
cult to find suitable employment?
ii. And how about suitable day-care or babysitters
for your children? Could you easily find a
reliable person, you could if you looked hard
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enough or it would be very difficult?
iii. Would you, do you think, have to pay for this
service?
iv. Say you were working, do you think you could
earn enough to offset the costs of employment,
you would just about break even or you would
not earn enough to cover your costs?
Timing of Pregnancies
1, For each pregnancy: Apart from what you feel now,
looking back to the time you found out you were
pregnant, at that time would you rather it had
happened a bit earlier, a bit later, were you happy
with that timing or were you sorry it happened at all?
If earlier or later, when would you have liked that
pregnancy? Why then?
2. From your experience now, how would you change the
timing of your two children? If any changes, why?
Abortion
1. Say you found out you were pregnant now. Would
having another baby right now present you and your
husband with any major problems? Would you consider
termination?
2. Say you became unintentionally pregnant in two or
three years time, would you consider termination then?




Different people have different ideas about how impor¬
tant a child's physical surroundings are. Will you
please look at this card and tell me, on the whole,
whether you think it is very important, important or
not essential for a child to have the things I will
mention. By very important, I mean so important that
you really wouldn't have a child unless you could provide
it with this commodity. By important, I mean you feel
it would be nice to provide your child with this com¬
modity and you will try to do so. By not essential,
I mean that you really feel that the commodity is just
not important for your child.
1. The majority of his or her clothes new for them,
rather than ones handed down.
2. A separate bedroom for each child when they were
teenagers.
3. A nice (that is, physically pleasing) home for
inviting friends around.
k. Toys like those of children he plays with.
5. A backgarden of their own where they can play.
6. A summer holiday away from home every year.
Antipathy to Children Scale
Also on that sheet of paper are some statements men
and women have made about families and children. I
would like you to check whether, on the whole, you
feel the same way or not.
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1. Given the choice, most women would not be without
children.
2. Women only have babies because they feel they ought
to have babies,
3. People will have to stop having large families
because we are over-populated.
h. Children are selfish; it's all give and no take
having children.
5. When children grow up, there will be so many people,
it will be difficult to get jobs.
6. Children get on your nerves most of the time.
7. Most women find motherhood satisfying.
8. These days, schools are over-crowded because too
many children are being born.
9. Children tie you down too much.
Leisure Activities
1. Thinking about your husband's friends, do you know
most of them quite well, some of them or do you not
know many of your husband's friends? How often does
your husband go out with his friends and without you?
What sorts of things does your husband do with his
leisure?
2. Thinking about your friends, does your husband
know most of them quite well, some of them or not
too many of your friends? How often do you go out
with your friends and without your husband? What
sorts of things do you do with your leisure?
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3. Now how about friends other than relatives. During
the past two weeks, how many times did you and your
husband get together with friends — I mean things
like going out together or visiting in one another's
houses? Has this been a typical two week period,
and if not, about how often would you and your
husband go out with friends?
4. Thinking of visits, phone calls and letters, which
(if any) of your and your husband's relatives were
you in touch with during the past two weeks? ¥hich
of these do you and your husband see or visit regu¬
larly — say at least every week?
S. Contraception
1. Now a few questions about contraception. Many married
couples do something to limit the size of their
families. At the time of your marriage, did you
discuss the question of contraception? If Yes: By
discuss, do you mean that one oi the other said
I'll take care or did you go through the pro's and
con's of the various methods and then choose one?
2. Here is a card* of various methods of birth control.
Did you or your husband use any of these methods
before your first pregnancy? If Yes: Which methods?
(For each change) Why did you change from x to y?
Did you and your husband use this method always or
were there times you took chances? If No: Was it
because you wanted a child straight away, you didn't
mind having a child straight away, or some other
reason?
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3. Also on that card* are various conditions under
which a pregnancy can occur. Could you please tell
me under which of those circumstances your first
pregnancy occurred. Also, how long would you esti¬
mate it took you to get pregnant?
b» Between your first and second pregnancies, did you
use any method of contraception? If Yes: Which
methods? (For each change) Why did you change
from x to y? Did you and your husband use this
method always or were there times you took chances?
If No: Was it because you wanted a child straight
away, or some other reason? (Continue to ask for
each pregnancy interval.)
5. Under what circumstances did your second pregnancy
occur? How long did it take to get pregnant? (And
ask for each pregnancy interval.)
6. Since your second child has been born, have you used
any method of birth control? If Yes: Which method?
At the moment, do you and your husband always use
a method or do you sometimes take a chance? Do you
think you will continue using this method? Specify
any changes and reasons for changes. Are you happy
with this method? Are there any disadvantages?
If No: 'Have you and your husband resumed sexual
relations again? If yes, what are the main reasons
why you are not taking precaution? Do you think you
will use some form of birth control in the future?
Which methods and when?
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7. Have you ever discussed sterilization with your
husband? Would you ever consider sterilization?
Would your husband? If so, when and for whom?
For those sterilized: When and why did you decide
to have this operation?
Reasons for Pregnancies
1. If first child planned: Why did you and your husband
decide to have your first pregnancy when you did?
Why not earlier? Why not later? Often a husband
or wife will decide the right time has come to start
their family — both will discuss it, but it was
initially one or the other's idea. In your case,
who decided to have the first child?
2. If second child planned: Why did you decide to have
your second child when you did? Why not earlier?
Why not later? And who decided to have this child?
Powerlessness Scale
I now have a number of statements about the future.
I would like you to check whether you strongly agree,
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statements
1. I worry about the future facing children these days.
2. Sometimes I have the feeling that other people are
using me.
3. Being responsible for the development of a little
child frightens me.
4. There is little or nothing I can do toward preventing
a world war.
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5. There are so many decisions that have to be made
today that sometimes I could just scream.
6. There is little chance to get ahead in life unless
a person gets a break.
7. The future looks very dreary.
Background Factors
1. What was the highest grade or year of elementary
or secondary school you (and your husband) attended?
2. How many years of schooling have you (and your hus¬
band) received since then?
3. When you were growing up, how many brothers and
sisters did you have living with you? And where
were you in the family? How about your husband?
4. WTiat was your father's (and your husband's father's)
occupation when you were growing up?
5. Which religious denomination, if any, do you (and
your husband) belong to?
6. Do you (does your husband) attend religious services?
If so, how often?
7. To which ethnic or cultural group did your (and your
husband's) father belong to on coming to this
continent?
8. What language do you speak in your home now?
9. In what other languages can you (and your husband)
converse?
10. Do you and your husband own or rent this house/
apartment/mobile home? How many bedrooms does it
have? Have you any intentions of moving in the
future? If so, why?
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11. Do you presently own a washing machine and tumble
dryer? A car for husband and wife? Colour tele¬
vision? A freezer?
12. On this card is a number of income groups. Could
you please circle the letter of the group into which
your husband's income from all sources before tax
would fall in 1976. And would you just tell me the
letter of the group which would apply to your income
before taxes in 1976.
a. Under $2,000 j. $12,000 - $14,999
b. $2,000 - $2,999 k. $15,000 - $17,499
c. $3,000 - $3,999 l. $17,500 - $19,999
d. $4,000 - $4,999 m. $20,000 - $22,499
e. $5,000 - $5,999 n. $22,500 - $24,999
f. $6,000 - $6,999 o. $25,000 - $29,999
g. $7,000 - $7,999 P. $30,000 - $34,999
h. $8,000 - $9,999 <!• $35,000 and over
i. $10,000 - $11,999
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^Methods of contraception:
1. Safe period - rhythm method
2. Husband withdraws
3. Douching - washing within one hour
4. Complete abstinence from marital relations
5. Husband uses sheath — rubber - condom
6. Loop - coil - intra-uterine device - IUD
7. Cap - Diaphragm with jelly or cream
8. Cap - Diaphragm by itself
9. Jelly or cream by itself
10. Suppositories - pessaries - foam tablets
11. Aerosol foam - Emko
12. Pill - contraceptive pill - birth control pill
13. Other (please specify)
*Circumstances of becoming pregnant:
1. Before you and your husband ever started using a method.
2. While you were actually using some method and didn't
want a pregnancy just then.
3. When you took a chance and didn't use a method.
4. After you deliberately stopped using a method in order
to have a child.
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